TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification
draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest-05

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (rats WG)
Authors Guy Fedorkow  , Eric Voit  , Jessica Fitzgerald-McKay 
Last updated 2020-10-26
Replaces draft-fedorkow-rats-network-device-attestation
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RATS Working Group                                      G. Fedorkow, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                    Juniper Networks, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                                   E. Voit
Expires: April 29, 2021                              Cisco Systems, Inc.
                                                     J. Fitzgerald-McKay
                                                National Security Agency
                                                        October 26, 2020

         TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification
           draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest-05

Abstract

   This document describes a workflow for remote attestation of the
   integrity of firmware and software installed on network devices that
   contain Trusted Platform Modules [TPM1.2], [TPM2.0], as defined by
   the Trusted Computing Group (TCG).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 29, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Fedorkow, et al.         Expires April 29, 2021                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             Network Device RIV               October 2020

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Document Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.4.  Description of Remote Integrity Verification (RIV)  . . .   5
     1.5.  Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.6.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       1.6.1.  Out of Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   2.  Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.1.  RIV Software Configuration Attestation using TPM  . . . .   9
       2.1.1.  What Does RIV Attest? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.1.2.  Notes on PCR Allocations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.2.  RIV Keying  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     2.3.  RIV Information Flow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     2.4.  RIV Simplifying Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       2.4.1.  Reference Integrity Manifests (RIMs)  . . . . . . . .  18
       2.4.2.  Attestation Logs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   3.  Standards Components  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     3.1.  Prerequisites for RIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       3.1.1.  Unique Device Identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       3.1.2.  Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       3.1.3.  Appraisal Policy for Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     3.2.  Reference Model for Challenge-Response  . . . . . . . . .  21
       3.2.1.  Transport and Encoding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     3.3.  Centralized vs Peer-to-Peer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   4.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     5.1.  Keys Used in RIV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     5.2.  Prevention of Spoofing and Man-in-the-Middle Attacks  . .  28
     5.3.  Replay Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     5.4.  Owner-Signed Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     5.5.  Other Factors for Trustworthy Operation . . . . . . . . .  30
   6.  Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   8.  Appendix  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
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