Federated Authentication for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) using OpenID Connect
draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid-12
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (regext WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Scott Hollenbeck | ||
| Last updated | 2022-03-23 | ||
| Replaces | draft-hollenbeck-regext-rdap-openid | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | plain text html xml htmlized pdfized bibtex | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Associated WG milestone |
|
||
| Document shepherd | Zaid AlBanna | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | Zaid AlBanna <zalbanna@verisign.com> |
draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid-12
REGEXT Working Group S. Hollenbeck
Internet-Draft Verisign Labs
Intended status: Standards Track 23 March 2022
Expires: 24 September 2022
Federated Authentication for the Registration Data Access Protocol
(RDAP) using OpenID Connect
draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid-12
Abstract
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
regional internet registries. RDAP allows a server to make access
control decisions based on client identity, and as such it includes
support for client identification features provided by the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Identification methods that require
clients to obtain and manage credentials from every RDAP server
operator present management challenges for both clients and servers,
whereas a federated authentication system would make it easier to
operate and use RDAP without the need to maintain server-specific
client credentials. This document describes a federated
authentication system for RDAP based on OpenID Connect.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 September 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Federated Authentication for RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. RDAP and OpenID Connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps . . . . . 6
3.1.3.1. Provider Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.3.2. Authentication Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.3.3. End-User Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.3.4. Authorization Response and Validation . . . . . . 8
3.1.3.5. Token Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.3.6. Delivery of User Information . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.4. Specialized Claims for RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.4.1. Stated Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.4.2. Do Not Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Protocol Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.1. Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.2. Device Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Client Login . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2.1. Clients with Limited User Interfaces . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.1.1. UI-constrained Client Login . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.1.2. UI-constrained Client Login Polling . . . . . . . 17
4.3. Session Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.4. Session Refresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.5. Client Logout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.6. Parameter Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6. RDAP Query Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. RDAP Conformance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1. RDAP Extensions Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.3. RDAP Query Purpose Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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9. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.1. Editor Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.2. Verisign Labs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.3. Viagenie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10.1. Authentication and Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Introduction
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
regional internet registries. RDAP allows a server to make access
control decisions based on client identity, and as such it includes
support for client identification features provided by the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [RFC7230].
RDAP is specified in multiple documents, including "HTTP Usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7480], "Security
Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7481],
"Registration Data Access Protocol Query Format" [RFC9082], and "JSON
Responses for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)"
[RFC9083]. RFC 7481 describes client identification and
authentication services that can be used with RDAP, but it does not
specify how any of these services can (or should) be used with RDAP.
1.1. Problem Statement
The traditional "user name and password" authentication method does
not scale well in the RDAP ecosystem. Assuming that all domain name
and address registries will eventually provide RDAP service, it is
impractical and inefficient for users to secure login credentials
from the hundreds of different server operators. Authentication
methods based on user names and passwords do not provide information
that describes the user in sufficient detail (while protecting the
personal privacy of the user) for server operators to make fine-
grained access control decisions based on the user's identity. The
authentication system used for RDAP needs to address all of these
needs.
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1.2. Proposal
A basic level of RDAP service can be provided to users who possess an
identifier issued by a recognized provider who is able to
authenticate and validate the user. The identifiers issued by social
media services, for example, can be used. Users who require higher
levels of service (and who are willing to share more information
about them self to gain access to that service) can secure
identifiers from specialized providers who are or will be able to
provide more detailed information about the user. Server operators
can then make access control decisions based on the identification
information provided by the user.
A federated authentication system in which an RDAP server outsources
identification and authentication services to a trusted OpenID
Provider would make it easier to operate and use RDAP by re-using
existing identifiers to provide a basic level of access. It can also
provide the ability to collect additional user identification
information, and that information can be shared with the consent of
the user. This type of system allows an RDAP server to make access
control decisions based on the nature of a query and the identity,
authentication, and authorization information that is received from
the OpenID Provider. This document describes a federated
authentication system for RDAP based on OpenID Connect [OIDC] that
meets all of these needs.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Federated Authentication for RDAP
RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP
relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to
provide needed security services including access control,
authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality,
data integrity, and identification. A description of each of these
security services can be found in "Internet Security Glossary,
Version 2" [RFC4949]. This document focuses on a federated
authentication system for RDAP that provides services for
authentication, authorization, and identification, allowing a server
operator to make access control decisions. Section 3 of RFC 7481
[RFC7481] describes general considerations for RDAP access control,
authentication, and authorization.
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The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients
to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This
situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers
increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use
one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client
credential management complexity.
3.1. RDAP and OpenID Connect
OpenID Connect 1.0 [OIDCC] is a decentralized, single sign-on (SSO)
federated authentication system that allows users to access multiple
web resources with one identifier instead of having to create
multiple server-specific identifiers. Users acquire identifiers from
OpenID Providers, or OPs. Relying Parties, or RPs, are applications
(such as RDAP) that outsource their user authentication function to
an OP. OpenID Connect is built on top of the authorization framework
provided by the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] protocol.
The OAuth authorization framework describes a method for users to
access protected web resources without having to hand out their
credentials. Instead, clients are issued Access Tokens by
authorization servers with the permission of the resource owners.
Using OpenID Connect and OAuth, multiple RDAP servers can form a
federation and clients can access any server in the federation by
providing one credential registered with any OP in that federation.
The OAuth authorization framework is designed for use with HTTP and
thus can be used with RDAP.
3.1.1. Terminology
This document uses the terms "client" and "server" defined by RDAP
[RFC7480]. An RDAP client performs the role of an OpenID Connect
Core [OIDCC] Entity or End-User. An RDAP server performs the role of
an OpenID Connect Core Relying Party (RP). Additional terms from
Section 1.2 of the OpenID Connect Core specification are incorporated
by reference.
3.1.2. Overview
At a high level, RDAP authentication of a browser-like client using
OpenID Connect requires completion of the following steps:
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1. An RDAP client sends an RDAP "help" query to an RDAP server to
determine the type of OpenID Authorization Server that's used by
the RDAP server. This information is returned in the
rdapConformance section of the response. A value of
"rdap_openidc_local_level_0" indicates that the server uses a
local Authorization Server. A value of
"rdap_openidc_remote_level_0" indicates that the server uses a
remote Authorization Server.
2. An RDAP client (acting as an OpenID End-User) sends an RDAP
"login" request to an RDAP server as described in Section 4.2.
3. The RDAP server (acting as an OpenID Relying Party (RP))
prepares an Authentication Request containing the desired
request parameters.
4. The RDAP server sends the RDAP client and Authentication Request
to an Authorization Server operated by an OpenID Provider (OP)
using an HTTP redirect.
5. The Authorization Server authenticates the End-User.
6. The Authorization Server obtains End-User consent/authorization.
7. The Authorization Server sends the RDAP Client back to the RDAP
server with an Authorization Code using an HTTP redirect.
8. The RDAP server requests a response using the Authorization Code
at the Token Endpoint.
9. The RDAP server receives a response that contains an ID Token
and Access Token in the response body.
10. The RDAP server validates the ID Token and retrieves the claims
associated with the End-User's identity.
The RDAP server can then make identification, authorization, and
access control decisions based on End-User identity information and
local policies. Note that OpenID Connect describes different process
flows for other types of clients, such as script-based or command
line clients.
3.1.3. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps
End-Users MUST possess an identifier (an OpenID) issued by an OP to
use OpenID Connect with RDAP. An OP SHOULD include support for the
claims described in Section 3.1.4 to provide additional information
needed for RDAP End-User authorization. OpenID Connect requires RPs
to register with OPs to use OpenID Connect services for an End-User.
The registration process is often completed using out-of-band
methods, but it is also possible to use the automated method
described by the "OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration"
protocol [OIDCR]. The parties involved can use any method that is
mutually acceptable.
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3.1.3.1. Provider Discovery
An RDAP server/RP needs to be able to map an End-User's identifier to
an OP. This can be accomplished using the OPTIONAL "OpenID Connect
Discovery" protocol [OIDCD], but that protocol is not widely
implemented. Out-of-band methods are also possible and can be more
dependable. For example, an RP can support a limited number of OPs
and maintain internal associations of those identifiers with the OPs
that issued them. An RP can also ask an End-User to identify the OP
that issued their identifier as part of an RDAP query workflow. In
this case, the RP will need to maintain state for the association
between the user's identifier and the OP in order to process later
queries that rely on passing the access token and user identifier as
authorization parameters. An RP MAY use any provider discovery
approach that is suitable for its operating environment.
3.1.3.2. Authentication Request
Once the OP is known, an RP MUST form an Authentication Request and
send it to the OP as described in Section 3 of the OpenID Connect
Core protocol [OIDCC]. The authentication path followed
(authorization, implicit, or hybrid) will depend on the
Authentication Request response_type set by the RP. The remainder of
the processing steps described here assume that the Authorization
Code Flow is being used by setting "response_type=code" in the
Authentication Request.
The benefits of using the Authorization Code Flow for authenticating
a human user are described in Section 3.1 of the OpenID Connect Core
protocol. The Implicit Flow is more commonly used by clients
implemented in a web browser using a scripting language; it is
described in Section 3.2 of the OpenID Connect Core protocol. The
Hybrid Flow (described in Section 3.3 of the OpenID Connect Core
protocol) combines elements of the Authorization and Implicit Flows
by returning some tokens from the Authorization Endpoint and others
from the Token Endpoint.
An Authentication Request can contain several parameters. REQUIRED
parameters are specified in Section 3.1.2.1 of the OpenID Connect
Core protocol [OIDCC]. Apart from these parameters, it is
RECOMMENDED that the RP include the optional "login_hint" parameter
in the request, with the value being that of the "id" query parameter
of the End-User's RDAP "login" request. Passing the "login_hint"
parameter allows a client to pre-fill login form information, so
logging in can be more convenient for users. Other parameters MAY be
included.
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The OP receives the Authentication Request and attempts to validate
it as described in Section 3.1.2.2 of the OpenID Connect Core
protocol [OIDCC]. If the request is valid, the OP attempts to
authenticate the End-User as described in Section 3.1.2.3 of the
OpenID Connect Core protocol [OIDCC]. The OP returns an error
response if the request is not valid or if any error is encountered.
3.1.3.3. End-User Authorization
After the End-User is authenticated, the OP MUST obtain authorization
information from the End-User before releasing information to the
RDAP Server/RP. This process is described in Section 3.1.2.4 of the
OpenID Connect Core protocol [OIDCC].
3.1.3.4. Authorization Response and Validation
After the End-User is authenticated, the OP will send a response to
the RP that describes the result of the authorization process in the
form of an Authorization Grant. The RP MUST validate the response.
This process is described in Sections 3.1.2.5 - 3.1.2.7 of the OpenID
Connect Core protocol [OIDCC].
3.1.3.5. Token Processing
The RP sends a Token Request using the Authorization Grant to a Token
Endpoint to obtain a Token Response containing an Access Token, ID
Token, and an OPTIONAL Refresh Token. The RP MUST validate the Token
Response. This process is described in Section 3.1.3 of the OpenID
Connect Core protocol [OIDCC].
3.1.3.6. Delivery of User Information
The set of claims can be retrieved by sending a request to a UserInfo
Endpoint using the Access Token. The claims MAY be returned in the
ID Token. The process of retrieving claims from a UserInfo Endpoint
is described in Section 5.3 of the OpenID Connect Core protocol
[OIDCC].
OpenID Connect specifies a set of standard claims in Section 5.1.
Additional claims for RDAP are described in Section 3.1.4.
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3.1.4. Specialized Claims for RDAP
OpenID Connect claims are pieces of information used to make
assertions about an entity. Section 5 of the OpenID Connect Core
protocol [OIDCC] describes a set of standard claims that can be used
to identify a person. Section 5.1.2 notes that additional claims MAY
be used, and it describes a method to create them. The set of claims
that are specific to RDAP are associated with an OAuth scope request
parameter value (see Section 3.3 of RFC 6749 ([RFC6749])) of "rdap".
3.1.4.1. Stated Purpose
There are communities of RDAP users and operators who wish to make
and validate claims about a user's "need to know" when it comes to
requesting access to a resource. For example, a law enforcement
agent or a trademark attorney may wish to be able to assert that they
have a legal right to access a protected resource, and a server
operator will need to be able to receive and validate that claim.
These needs can be met by defining and using an additional "purpose"
claim.
The "purpose" claim identifies the purpose for which access to a
protected resource is being requested. Use of the "purpose" claim is
OPTIONAL; processing of this claim is subject to server acceptance of
the purpose and successful authentication of the End-User.
Unrecognized purpose values MUST be ignored and the associated query
MUST be processed as if the unrecognized purpose value was not
present at all.
The "purpose" value is a case-sensitive string containing a
StringOrURI value as specified in Section 2 of the JSON Web Token
(JWT) specification ([RFC7519]). An example:
{"purpose" : "domainNameControl"}
Purpose values are themselves registered with IANA. Each entry in
the registry contains the following fields:
Value: the purpose string value being registered. Value strings can
contain upper case characters from "A" to "Z", lower case ASCII
characters from "a" to "z", and the underscore ("_") character.
Value strings contain at least one character and no more than 64
characters.
Description: a one- or two-sentence description of the meaning of the
purpose value, how it might be used, and/or how it should be
interpreted by clients and servers.
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This registry is operated under the "Specification Required" policy
defined in RFC 5226 ([RFC5226]). The set of initial values used to
populate the registry as described in Section 8.3 are taken from the
final report (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-
report-06jun14-en.pdf) produced by the Expert Working Group on gTLD
Directory Services chartered by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN).
3.1.4.2. Do Not Track
There are also communities of RDAP users and operators who wish to
make and validate claims about a user's wish to not have their
queries logged, tracked, or recorded. For example, a law enforcement
agent may wish to be able to assert that their queries are part of a
criminal investigation and should not be tracked due to a risk of
query exposure compromising the investigation, and a server operator
will need to be able to receive and validate that claim. These needs
can be met by defining and using an additional "do not track" claim.
The "do not track" ("dnt") claim can be used to identify an End-User
that is authorized to perform queries without the End-User's
association with those queries being logged, tracked, or recorded by
the server. Client use of the "dnt" claim is OPTIONAL. Server
operators MUST NOT log, track, or record any association of the query
and the End-User's identity if the End-User is successfully
identified and authorized, the "dnt" claim is present, the value of
the claim is "true", and accepting the claim complies with local
regulations regarding logging and tracking.
The "dnt" value is represented as a JSON boolean literal. An
example:
{"dnt" : true}
No special query tracking processing is required if this claim is not
present or if the value of the claim is "false". Use of this claim
MUST be limited to End-Users who are granted "do not track"
privileges in accordance with service policies and regulations.
Specification of these policies and regulations is beyond the scope
of this document.
4. Protocol Parameters
This specification adds the following protocol parameters to RDAP:
1. Data structures to return information that describes an
established session and the information needed to establish a
session for a UI-constrained device.
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2. A query parameter to request authentication for a specific End-
User identity.
3. Path segments to start, stop, refresh, and determine the status
of an authenticated session for a specific End-User identity.
4.1. Data Structures
This specification describes two new data structures that are used to
return information to a client: a "session" data structure that
contains information that describes an established session, and a
"deviceInfo" data structure that contains information that describes
an active attempt to establish a session on a UI-constrained device.
4.1.1. Session
The "session" data structure is an object that contains two sub-
objects:
1. A "userClaims" object that contains the set of claims associated
with the End-User's identity as used/requested by the RDAP server
to make access control decisions. The set of possible values is
determined by OP policy.
2. A "sessionInfo" object that contains two members:
a. "tokenExpiration": an integer value that represents the
number of seconds from the current time for which the Access
Token remains valid, and
b. "tokenRefresh": A boolean value that indicates if the OP
supports refresh tokens. As described in RFC 6749 [RFC6749],
support for refresh tokens is OPTIONAL.
An example of a "session" data structure:
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"session": {
"userClaims": {
"sub": "103892603076825016132",
"name": "User Person",
"given_name": "User",
"family_name": "Person",
"picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
"email": "user@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"locale": "en",
"purpose": "domainNameControl",
"dnt": false
},
"sessionInfo": {
"tokenExpiration": 3599,
"tokenRefresh": true
}
}
Figure 1
4.1.2. Device Info
The flow described in Section 3.1.3 requires an End-User to interact
with a server using a user interface that can process HTTP. This
will not work well in situations where the client is automated or an
End-User is using a command line user interface such as curl
(http://curl.haxx.se/) or wget (https://www.gnu.org/software/wget/).
This limitation can be addressed using a web browser on a second
device. The information that needs to be entered using the web
browser is contained in the "deviceInfo" data structure.
The "deviceInfo" data structure is an object that contains three
members:
1. "verification_url": the URL that the End-User needs to visit
using the web browser,
2. "user_code": the string value that the End-User needs to enter on
the form presented in the web browser, and
3. "expires_in": an integer value that represents the number of
seconds after which the opportunity to visit the URL and enter
the user_code will expire.
An example of a "deviceInfo" data structure:
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"deviceInfo": {
"verification_url": "https://www.example.com/device",
"user_code": "NJJQ-GJFC",
"expires_in": "1800"
}
Figure 2
4.2. Client Login
Client authentication is requested by sending a "session/login"
request to an RDAP server. If the RDAP server supports only remote
Authorization Servers, the "session/login" request MUST include an
End-User identifier that's delivered using one of two methods: by
adding a query component to an RDAP request URI using the syntax
described in Section 3.4 of RFC 3986 [RFC3986], or by including an
HTTP authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme as
described in RFC 7617 [RFC7617]. Clients can use either of these
methods to deliver the End-User identifier to a server that supports
remote Authorization Servers. Servers that support remote
Authorization Servers MUST accept both methods. If the RDAP server
supports a local Authorization Server, the End-User identifier MAY be
omitted.
The query used to request client authentication is represented as an
OPTIONAL "key=value" pair using a key value of "id" and a value
component that contains the client identifier issued by an OP. An
example for client identifier "user.idp.example":
https://example.com/rdap/session/login?id=user.idp.example
The authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme contains
a Base64-encoded representation of the client identifier issued by an
OP. No password is provided. An example for client identifier
"user.idp.example":
https://example.com/rdap/session/login
Authorization: Basic dXNlci5pZHAuZXhhbXBsZQ==
An example for use with a local Authorization Server:
https://example.com/rdap/session/login
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The response to this request MUST use the response structures
specified in RFC 9083 [RFC9083]. In addition, the response MUST
include an indication of the requested operation's success or failure
in the "notices" data structure (including the client identifier),
and, if successful, a "session" data structure.
An example of a successful "session/login" response:
{
"rdapConformance": [
"rdap_openidc_remote_level_0"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": {
"title": "Login Result",
"description": [
"Login succeeded",
"user.idp.example"
],
},
"session": {
"userClaims": {
"sub": "103892603076825016132",
"name": "User Person",
"given_name": "User",
"family_name": "Person",
"picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
"email": "user@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"locale": "en",
"purpose": "domainNameControl",
"dnt": false
},
"sessionInfo": {
"tokenExpiration": 3599,
"tokenRefresh": true
}
}
}
Figure 3
An example of a failed "session/login" response:
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{
"rdapConformance": [
"rdap_openidc_remote_level_0"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": {
"title": "Login Result",
"description": [
"Login failed",
"user.idp.example"
]
}
}
Figure 4
4.2.1. Clients with Limited User Interfaces
The "OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant" [RFC8628] provides an
OPTIONAL method to request user authorization from devices that have
an Internet connection, but lack a suitable browser for a more
traditional OAuth flow. This method requires an End-User to use a
second device (such as a smart telephone) that has access to a web
browser for entry of a code sequence that is presented on the UI-
constrained device.
4.2.1.1. UI-constrained Client Login
Client authentication is requested by sending a "session/device"
request to an RDAP server. If the RDAP server supports only remote
Authorization Servers, the "session/device" request MUST include an
End-User identifier that's delivered using one of two methods: by
adding a query component to an RDAP request URI using the syntax
described in Section 3.4 of RFC 3986 [RFC3986], or by including an
HTTP authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme as
described in RFC 7617 [RFC7617]. If the RDAP server supports a local
Authorization Server, the End-User identifier MAY be omitted.
Clients can use either of these methods. Servers MUST support both
methods.
The query used to request client authentication is represented as an
OPTIONAL "key=value" pair using a key value of "id" and a value
component that contains the client identifier issued by an OP.
An example using wget for client identifier "user.idp.example":
wget -qO- --keep-session-cookies --save-cookies\
https://example.com/rdap/session/device?id=user.idp.example
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Figure 5
The authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme contains
a Base64-encoded representation of the client identifier issued by an
OP. No password is provided.
An example using curl and an authorization header:
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer dXNlci5pZHAuZXhhbXBsZQ=="\
-c cookies.txt https://example.com/rdap/session/device
Figure 6
The response to this request MUST use the response structures
specified in RFC 9083 [RFC9083]. In addition, the response MUST
include an indication of the requested operation's success or failure
in the "notices" data structure (including the client identifier),
and, if successful, a "deviceInfo" data structure.
An example of a "session/device" response:
{
"rdapConformance": [
"rdap_openidc_remote_level_0"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": {
"title": "Device Login Result",
"description": [
"Login succeeded",
"user.idp.example"
]
},
"deviceInfo": {
"verification_url": "https://www.example.com/device",
"user_code": "NJJQ-GJFC",
"expires_in": 1800
}
}
Figure 7
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4.2.1.2. UI-constrained Client Login Polling
After successful processing of the "session/device" request, the
client MUST send a "session/devicepoll" request to the RDAP server to
continue the login process. This request performs the polling
function described in RFC 8628 [RFC8628], allowing the RDAP server to
wait for the End-User to enter the information returned from the
"session/device" request using the interface on their second device.
After the End-User has completed that process, or if the process
fails or times out, the OP will respond to the polling requests with
an indication of success or failure.
An example using wget:
wget -qO- --load-cookies cookies.txt\
https://example.com/rdap/session/devicepoll
Figure 8
An example using curl:
curl -b cookies.txt https://example.com/rdap/session/devicepoll
Figure 9
The response to this request MUST use the response structures
described in Section 4.2. RDAP query processing can continue
normally on the UI-constrained device once the "login" process has
been completed.
4.3. Session Status
Clients MAY send a query to an RDAP server to determine the status of
an existing login session using a "session/status" path segment. An
example "session/status" request:
https://example.com/rdap/session/status
The response to this query MUST use the response structures specified
in RFC 9083 [RFC9083]. In addition, the response MUST include an
indication of the requested operation's success or failure in the
"notices" data structure (including the client identifier), and, if
successful, a "session" data structure.
An example of a "session/status" response:
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{
"rdapConformance": [
"rdap_openidc_remote_level_0"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": {
"title": "Session Status Result",
"description": [
"Session status succeeded",
"user.idp.example"
]
},
"session": {
"userClaims": {
"sub": "103892603076825016132",
"name": "User Person",
"given_name": "User",
"family_name": "Person",
"picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
"email": "user@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"locale": "en",
"purpose": "domainNameControl",
"dnt": false
},
"sessionInfo": {
"tokenExpiration": 3490,
"tokenRefresh": true
}
}
}
Figure 10
4.4. Session Refresh
Clients MAY send a request to an RDAP server to refresh, or extend,
an existing login session using a "session/refresh" path segment.
The RDAP server MAY attempt to refresh the access token associated
with the current session as part of extending the session for a
period of time determined by the RDAP server. As described in RFC
6749 [RFC6749], OP support for refresh tokens is OPTIONAL. An RDAP
server MUST determine if the OP supports token refresh and process
the refresh request by either requesting refresh of the access token
or by returning a response that indicates that token refresh is not
supported by the OP in the "notices" data structure. An example
"session/refresh" request:
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https://example.com/rdap/session/refresh
The response to this request MUST use the response structures
specified in RFC 9083 [RFC9083]. In addition, the response MUST
include an indication of the requested operation's success or failure
in the "notices" data structure (including the client identifier),
and, if successful, a "session" data structure.
An example of a "session/refresh" response:
{
"rdapConformance": [
"rdap_openidc_remote_level_0"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": {
"title": "Session Refresh Result",
"description": [
"Session refresh succeeded",
"user.idp.example",
"Token refresh succeeded."
]
},
"session": {
"userClaims": {
"sub": "103892603076825016132",
"name": "User Person",
"given_name": "User",
"family_name": "Person",
"picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
"email": "user@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"locale": "en",
"purpose": "domainNameControl",
"dnt": false
},
"sessionInfo": {
"tokenExpiration": 3599,
"tokenRefresh": true
}
}
}
Figure 11
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4.5. Client Logout
Clients MAY send a request to an RDAP server to terminate an existing
login session. Termination of a session is requested using a
"session/logout" path segment. Access and refresh tokens can be
revoked during the "session/logout" process as described in RFC 7009
[RFC7009] if supported by the OP (token revocation endpoint support
is OPTIONAL per RFC 8414 [RFC8414]). If supported, this feature
SHOULD be used to ensure that the tokens are not mistakenly
associated with a future RDAP session. Alternatively, an RDAP server
MAY attempt to logout from the OP using the "OpenID Connect RP-
Initiated Logout" protocol ([OIDCL]) if that protocol is supported by
the OP.
An example "session/logout" request:
https://example.com/rdap/session/logout
The response to this request MUST use the response structures
specified in RFC 9083 [RFC9083]. In addition, the response MUST
include an indication of the requested operation's success or failure
in the "notices" data structure (including the client identifier).
The "notices" data structure MUST also include an indication of the
success or failure of any attempt to logout from the OP or to revoke
the tokens issued by the OP.
An example of a "session/logout" response:
{
"rdapConformance": [
"rdap_openidc_remote_level_0"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": {
"title": "Logout Result",
"description": [
"Logout succeeded",
"user.idp.example",
"Provider logout failed: Not supported by provider.",
"Token revocation successful."
]
}
}
Figure 12
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In the absence of a "logout" request, an RDAP session MUST be
terminated by the RDAP server after a server-defined period of time.
The server should also take appropriate steps to ensure that the
tokens associated with the terminated session cannot be reused. This
SHOULD include revoking the tokens or logging out from the OP if
either operation is supported by the OP.
4.6. Parameter Processing
Unrecognized query parameters MUST be ignored. An RDAP server that
processes an authenticated query MUST determine if the End-User
identification information is associated with an OP that is
recognized and supported by the server. Servers MUST reject queries
that include identification information that is not associated with a
supported OP by returning an HTTP 501 (Not Implemented) response. An
RDAP server that receives a query containing identification
information associated with a recognized OP MUST perform the steps
required to authenticate the user with the OP, process the query, and
return an RDAP response that is appropriate for the End-User's level
of authorization and access.
5. Token Exchange
ID tokens include an audience parameter that contains the OAuth 2.0
client_id of the RP as an audience value. In some operational
scenarios (such as a client that is providing a proxy service), an RP
can receive tokens with an audience value that does not include the
RP's client_id. These tokens might not be trusted by the RP, and the
RP might refuse to accept the tokens. This situation can be remedied
by having the RP exchange these tokens with the OP for a set of
trusted tokens that reset the audience parameter. This token
exchange protocol is described in RFC 8693 [RFC8693]. This issue is
not visible to the RDAP client and should be managed by the OpenID
implementation used by the RDAP server.
6. RDAP Query Processing
Once an RDAP session is active, an RDAP server MUST determine if the
End-User is authorized to perform any queries that are received
during the duration of the session. This MAY include rejecting
queries outright, and it MAY include omitting or otherwise redacting
information that the End-User is not authorized to receive. Specific
processing requirements are beyond the scope of this document. A
client can end a session explicitly by sending a "session/logout"
request to the RDAP server. A session can also be ended implicitly
by the server after a server-defined period of time. The status of a
session can be determined at any time by sending a "session/status"
query to the RDAP server.
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An RDAP server MUST maintain session state information for the
duration of an active session. This is commonly done using HTTP
cookies as described in RFC 6265 [RFC6265]. Doing so allows End-User
to submit queries without having to explicitly identify and
authenticate themselves for each and every query.
7. RDAP Conformance
RDAP responses that contain values described in this document MUST
indicate conformance with this specification by including an
rdapConformance ([RFC9083]) value of "rdap_openidc_remote_level_0"
(to indicate support for one or more remote Authorization Servers),
"rdap_openidc_local_level_0" (to indicate support for a local
Authorization Server), or both values if the server supports both
remote and local OpenID Authorization Servers. The information
needed to register these values in the RDAP Extensions Registry is
described in Section 8.1.
Example rdapConformance structure with extension specified:
"rdapConformance" :
[
"rdap_level_0",
"rdap_openidc_remote_level_0"
]
Figure 13
8. IANA Considerations
8.1. RDAP Extensions Registry
IANA is requested to register the following values in the RDAP
Extensions Registry:
Extension identifier: rdap_openidc_remote_level_0
Registry operator: Any
Published specification: This document.
Contact: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Intended usage: This extension describes a federated
authentication method for RDAP using OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect,
and a remote Authorization Server.
Extension identifier: rdap_openidc_local_level_0
Registry operator: Any
Published specification: This document.
Contact: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
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Intended usage: This extension describes a federated
authentication method for RDAP using OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect,
and a local Authorization Server.
8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registry
IANA is requested to register the following values in the JSON Web
Token Claims Registry:
Claim Name: "purpose"
Claim Description: This claim describes the stated purpose for
submitting a request to access a protected RDAP resource.
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.4.1 of this document.
Claim Name: "dnt"
Claim Description: This claim contains a JSON boolean literal that
describes an End-User's "do not track" preference for identity
tracking, logging, or recording when accessing a protected RDAP
resource.
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.4.2 of this document.
8.3. RDAP Query Purpose Registry
IANA is requested to create a new protocol registry to manage RDAP
query purpose values. This registry should be named "Registration
Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query Purpose Values" and should appear
under the "Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" section of
IANA's protocol registries. The information to be registered and the
procedures to be followed in populating the registry are described in
Section 3.1.4.1.
Section at http://www.iana.org/protocols: Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP)
Name of registry: Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query
Purpose Values
Registration Procedure: Specification Required
Reference: This document
Required information: See Section 3.1.4.1.
Review process: "Specification Required" as described in RFC 5226
[RFC5226].
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Size, format, and syntax of registry entries: See Section 3.1.4.1.
Initial assignments and reservations:
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: domainNameControl
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
creating and managing and monitoring a registrant's own domain
name, including creating the domain name, updating information
about the domain name, transferring the domain name, renewing the
domain name, deleting the domain name, maintaining a domain name
portfolio, and detecting fraudulent use of the Registrant's own
contact information.
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: personalDataProtection
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
identifying the accredited privacy/proxy provider associated with
a domain name and reporting abuse, requesting reveal, or otherwise
contacting the provider.
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: technicalIssueResolution
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include (but
are not limited to) working to resolve technical issues, including
email delivery issues, DNS resolution failures, and web site
functional issues.
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: domainNameCertification
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include a
Certification Authority (CA) issuing an X.509 certificate to a
subject identified by a domain name.
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-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: individualInternetUse
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
identifying the organization using a domain name to instill
consumer trust, or contacting that organization to raise a
customer complaint to them or file a complaint about them.
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: businessDomainNamePurchaseOrSale
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include making
purchase queries about a domain name, acquiring a domain name from
a registrant, and enabling due diligence research.
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: academicPublicInterestDNSRResearch
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
academic public interest research studies about domain names
published in the registration data service, including public
information about the registrant and designated contacts, the
domain name's history and status, and domain names registered by a
given registrant (reverse query).
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: legalActions
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
investigating possible fraudulent use of a registrant's name or
address by other domain names, investigating possible trademark
infringement, contacting a registrant/licensee's legal
representative prior to taking legal action and then taking a
legal action if the concern is not satisfactorily addressed.
-----END FORM-----
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-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: regulatoryAndContractEnforcement
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include tax
authority investigation of businesses with online presence,
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) investigation,
contractual compliance investigation, and registration data escrow
audits.
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: criminalInvestigationAndDNSAbuseMitigation
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
reporting abuse to someone who can investigate and address that
abuse, or contacting entities associated with a domain name during
an offline criminal investigation.
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: dnsTransparency
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose involve
querying the registration data made public by registrants to
satisfy a wide variety of use cases around informing the general
public.
-----END FORM-----
9. Implementation Status
NOTE: Please remove this section and the reference to RFC 7942 prior
to publication as an RFC.
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942
[RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is
intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing
drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual
implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.
Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information
presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not
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intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available
implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that
other implementations may exist.
According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit".
Version -09 of this specification introduced changes that are
incompatible with earlier implementations. Implementations that are
consistent with this specification will be added as they are
identified.
9.1. Editor Implementation
Location: https://procuratus.net/rdap/
Description: This implementation is a functionally-limited RDAP
server that supports only the path segments described in this
specification. It uses the "jumbojett/OpenID-Connect-PHP" library
found on GitHub, which appears to no longer be under active
development. The library was modified to add support for the
device authorization grant. Session variable management is still
a little buggy. Supported OPs include Google (Gmail) and Yahoo.
Level of Maturity: This is a "proof of concept" research
implementation.
Coverage: This implementation includes all of the features
described in this specification.
Version compatibility: Version -11+ of this specification.
Contact Information: Scott Hollenbeck, shollenbeck@verisign.com
9.2. Verisign Labs
Responsible Organization: Verisign Labs
Location: https://rdap.verisignlabs.com/
Description: This implementation includes support for domain
registry RDAP queries using live data from the .cc and .tv country
code top-level domains and the .career generic top-level domain.
Three access levels are provided based on the authenticated
identity of the client:
1. Unauthenticated: Limited information is returned in response
to queries from unauthenticated clients.
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2. Basic: Clients who authenticate using a publicly available
identity provider like Google Gmail or Microsoft Hotmail will
receive all of the information available to an unauthenticated
client plus additional registration metadata, but no
personally identifiable information associated with entities.
3. Advanced: Clients who authenticate using a more restrictive
identity provider will receive all of the information
available to a Basic client plus whatever information the
server operator deems appropriate for a fully authorized
client. Currently supported identity providers include those
developed by Verisign Labs
(https://testprovider.rdap.verisignlabs.com/) and CZ.NIC
(https://www.mojeid.cz/).
Level of Maturity: This is a "proof of concept" research
implementation.
Coverage: This implementation includes all of the features
described in this specification.
Version compatibility: Version -07 of this specification.
Contact Information: Scott Hollenbeck, shollenbeck@verisign.com
9.3. Viagenie
Responsible Organization: Viagenie
Location: https://auth.viagenie.ca
Description: This implementation is an OpenID identity provider
enabling users and registries to connect to the federation. It
also includes a barebone RDAP client and RDAP server in order to
test the authentication framework. Various level of purposes are
available for testing.
Level of Maturity: This is a "proof of concept" research
implementation.
Coverage: This implementation includes most features described in
this specification as an identity provider.
Version compatibility: Version -07 of this specification.
Contact Information: Marc Blanchet, marc.blanchet@viagenie.ca
10. Security Considerations
Security considerations for RDAP can be found in RFC 7481 [RFC7481].
Security considerations for OpenID Connect Core [OIDCC] and OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] can be found in their reference specifications. OpenID
Connect defines optional mechanisms for robust signing and encryption
that can be used to provide data integrity and data confidentiality
services as needed.
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10.1. Authentication and Access Control
Having completed the client identification, authorization, and
validation process, an RDAP server can make access control decisions
based on a comparison of client-provided information and local
policy. For example, a client who provides an email address (and
nothing more) might be entitled to receive a subset of the
information that would be available to a client who provides an email
address, a full name, and a stated purpose. Development of these
access control policies is beyond the scope of this document.
11. Acknowledgments
The author would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
their contributions to the development of this document: Marc
Blanchet, Tom Harrison, Russ Housley, Jasdip Singh, Rhys Smith,
Jaromir Talir, Rick Wilhelm, and Alessandro Vesely. In addition, the
Verisign Registry Services Lab development team of Joseph Harvey,
Andrew Kaizer, Sai Mogali, Anurag Saxena, Swapneel Sheth, Nitin
Singh, and Zhao Zhao provided critical "proof of concept"
implementation experience that helped demonstrate the validity of the
concepts described in this document.
Mario Loffredo provided significant feedback based on implementation
experience that led to welcome improvements in several sections of
this document. His contributions are greatly appreciated.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[OIDC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect",
<http://openid.net/connect/>.
[OIDCC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Core incorporating
errata set 1", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[OIDCD] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0
incorporating errata set 1", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-
1_0.html>.
[OIDCL] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout 1.0
- draft 01", August 2020, <https://openid.net/specs/
openid-connect-rpinitiated-1_0.html>.
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[OIDCR] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Dynamic Client
Registration 1.0 incorporating errata set 1", November
2014, <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-
registration-1_0.html>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth
2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009,
August 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 7480, DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7480>.
[RFC7481] Hollenbeck, S. and N. Kong, "Security Services for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 7481, DOI 10.17487/RFC7481, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7481>.
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[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8628] Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
"OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant", RFC 8628,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8628, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8628>.
[RFC8693] Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J.,
and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8693>.
[RFC9082] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", STD 95, RFC 9082,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9082, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9082>.
[RFC9083] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 9083, DOI 10.17487/RFC9083, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9083>.
12.2. Informative References
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.
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Appendix A. Change Log
00: Initial working group version ported from draft-hollenbeck-
regext-rdap-openid-10.
01: Modified ID Token delivery approach to note proper use of an
HTTP bearer authorization header.
02: Modified token delivery approach (Access Token is the bearer
token) to note proper use of an HTTP bearer authorization header,
fixing the change made in -01.
03: Updated OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant description and
reference due to publication of RFC 8628.
04: Updated OAuth 2.0 token exchange description and reference due
to publication of RFC 8693. Corrected the RDAP conformance
identifier to be registered with IANA.
05: Keepalive refresh.
06: Keepalive refresh.
07: Added "login_hint" description to Section 3.1.3.2. Added some
text to Section 3.1.4.2 to note that "do not track" requires
compliance with local regulations.
08: Rework of token management processing in Sections 4 and 5.
09: Updated RDAP specification references. Added text to describe
both local and remote Authorization Server processing. Removed
text that described passing of ID Tokens as query parameters.
10: Updated Section 3.1.3.1. Replaced token processing queries with
"login", "session", and "logout" queries.
11: Replaced queries with "session/*" queries. Added description of
"rdap" OAuth scope. Added implementation status information.
12: Updated data structure descriptions. Updated Section 8. Minor
formatting changes due to a move to xml2rfc-v3 markup.
Author's Address
Scott Hollenbeck
Verisign Labs
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190
United States of America
Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com
URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com/
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