A Model for Reputation Reporting
draft-ietf-repute-model-01

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (repute WG)
Last updated 2012-03-05
Replaces draft-kucherawy-reputation-model
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status (None)
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Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd None
IESG IESG state AD is watching
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Responsible AD Pete Resnick
Send notices to repute-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-repute-model@tools.ietf.org
REPUTE Working Group                                       N. Borenstein
Internet-Draft                                                  Mimecast
Intended status: Informational                              M. Kucherawy
Expires: September 6, 2012                                     Cloudmark
                                                        A. Sullivan, Ed.
                                                               Dyn, Inc.
                                                           March 5, 2012

                    A Model for Reputation Reporting
                       draft-ietf-repute-model-01

Abstract

   This document describes a general architecture for a reputation-based
   service and a model for the exchange of reputation information on the
   Internet.  The document roughly follows the recommendations of
   RFC4101 for describing a protocol model.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  High-Level Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   3.  Terminology and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     3.1.  Response Set  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   4.  Information Represented in a Response Set . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   5.  Information Flow in the Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     7.1.  Biased Reputation Agents  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
     7.2.  Malformed Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   8.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   Appendix A.  Public Discussion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

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1.  Introduction

   Traditionally Internet protocols have operated between
   unauthenticated entities.  For example, an email message's author
   field (From) [MAIL] can contain any display name or address and is
   not verified by the recipient or other agents along the delivery
   path.  Similarly, a sending email server using [SMTP] trusts that the
   [DNS] has led it to the intended receiving server.  Both kinds of
   trust are easily betrayed, opening the door for spam, phishing, and a
   host of other ills.

   In recent years, stronger identity mechanisms have begun to see wider
   deployment.  For example, the [DKIM] protocol permits associating a
   validated identifier to a message.  While this is a major step
   forward, it does not distinguish between identifiers owned by good
   actors versus bad.  Even if it is possible to validate the domain
   name in an author field, such as "@trustworthy.example.com," there is
   no basis for knowing whether it is associated with a good actor
   worthy of trust.  As a practical matter, both bad actors and good
   adopt basic authentication mechanisms, like DKIM.  In fact, bad
   actors tend to adopt them even more rapidly than the good actors do
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