Security Requirements For TRACK
draft-ietf-rmt-pi-track-security-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(rmt WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Thomas Hardjono , Brian Whetten | ||
| Last updated | 2001-04-06 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document discusses the security issues within the TRee-based ACKnowledgement (TRACK) reliable multicast protocol instantiation, and identifies some constraints and requirements for security provisions for this protocol. Based on the constraints and requirements, the document proposes a separation of data packet confidentiality and authentication, from transport layer protection. It proposes that TRACK be primarily concerned with group authentication of control and data packets, to protect against attacks on the transport infrastructure. It proposes that data confidentiality and source authentication be provided separately from this low level group authentication, ideally at the application level. We show that this is particularly important for TRACK, because of the requirement that the interior control nodes only OPTIONALLY have access to the data packet payload.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)