A Security Threat Analysis for Routing Protocol for Low-power and lossy networks (RPL)
draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-06

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (roll WG)
Last updated 2013-12-23 (latest revision 2013-12-15)
Replaces draft-ietf-roll-security-framework
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Routing Over Low-Power and Lossy Networks                        T. Tsao
Internet-Draft                                              R. Alexander
Intended status: Informational                      Cooper Power Systems
Expires: June 18, 2014                                         M. Dohler
                                                                    CTTC
                                                                 V. Daza
                                                               A. Lozano
                                                Universitat Pompeu Fabra
                                                           M. Richardson
                                                Sandelman Software Works
                                                       December 15, 2013

A Security Threat Analysis for Routing Protocol for Low-power and lossy
                             networks (RPL)
                  draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-06

Abstract

   This document presents a security threat analysis for the Routing
   Protocol for Low-power and lossy networks (RPL, ROLL).  The
   development builds upon previous work on routing security and adapts
   the assessments to the issues and constraints specific to low-power
   and lossy networks.  A systematic approach is used in defining and
   evaluating the security threats.  Applicable countermeasures are
   application specific and are addressed in relevant applicability
   statements.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
   2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Tsao, et al.              Expires June 18, 2014                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft    Security Threat Analysis for ROLL RPL    December 2013

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 18, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Considerations on RPL Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Routing Assets and Points of Access . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  The ISO 7498-2 Security Reference Model . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Issues Specific to or Amplified in LLNs . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.4.  RPL Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.  Threat Sources  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Threats and Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.1.  Threats due to failures to Authenticate . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.1.1.  Node Impersonation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.1.2.  Dummy Node  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.1.3.  Node Resource Spam  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.2.  Threats and Attacks on Confidentiality  . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.2.1.  Routing Exchange Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       5.2.2.  Routing Information (Routes and Network Topology)
               Exposure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.3.  Threats and Attacks on Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       5.3.1.  Routing Information Manipulation  . . . . . . . . . .  15
       5.3.2.  Node Identity Misappropriation  . . . . . . . . . . .  16
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