Generic Threats to Routing Protocols
draft-ietf-rpsec-routing-threats-07

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 07 and is now closed.

Lars Eggert No Objection

(Bill Fenner; former steering group member) Yes

(Ross Callon; former steering group member) Yes

(Brian Carpenter; former steering group member) No Objection

(Cullen Jennings; former steering group member) No Objection

ID Nits comes up with some problems including boilerplates being wrong - thought I have no idea what the policy would be for a document last submitted in 2004 -  and some non ascii smart quotes around "trust".

(Dan Romascanu; former steering group member) No Objection

I would have expected Section 4.4 to include some text about spoofing the identity of a management station. This is also related to the last bullet in the list of Adversary Capabilities in section 3.1.1.2 which mentions the capability of an attacker to assume the identity of a management workstation and lead to consequences like the disruption of the routing protocol or forwarding capabilities of a router.

(David Kessens; former steering group member) No Objection

(Jari Arkko; former steering group member) No Objection

(Lisa Dusseault; former steering group member) No Objection

(Magnus Westerlund; former steering group member) No Objection

(Mark Townsley; former steering group member) No Objection

(Russ Housley; former steering group member) No Objection

(Ted Hardie; former steering group member) No Objection