Generic Threats to Routing Protocols
draft-ietf-rpsec-routing-threats-07
Yes
(Bill Fenner)
(Ross Callon)
No Objection
(Brian Carpenter)
(David Kessens)
(Jari Arkko)
(Lars Eggert)
(Lisa Dusseault)
(Magnus Westerlund)
(Mark Townsley)
(Russ Housley)
(Ted Hardie)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 07 and is now closed.
Bill Fenner Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
()
Unknown
Ross Callon Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
()
Unknown
Brian Carpenter Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Cullen Jennings Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2006-04-26)
Unknown
ID Nits comes up with some problems including boilerplates being wrong - thought I have no idea what the policy would be for a document last submitted in 2004 - and some non ascii smart quotes around "trust".
Dan Romascanu Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2006-04-26)
Unknown
I would have expected Section 4.4 to include some text about spoofing the identity of a management station. This is also related to the last bullet in the list of Adversary Capabilities in section 3.1.1.2 which mentions the capability of an attacker to assume the identity of a management workstation and lead to consequences like the disruption of the routing protocol or forwarding capabilities of a router.
David Kessens Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Lars Eggert Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Lisa Dusseault Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Magnus Westerlund Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Mark Townsley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Russ Housley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Ted Hardie Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown