Security Considerations for WebRTC
draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-09

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (rtcweb WG)
Last updated 2017-12-07 (latest revision 2017-10-29)
Replaces draft-rescorla-rtcweb-security
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RTC-Web                                                      E. Rescorla
Internet-Draft                                                RTFM, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                        October 29, 2017
Expires: May 2, 2018

                   Security Considerations for WebRTC
                     draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-09

Abstract

   WebRTC is a protocol suite for use with real-time applications that
   can be deployed in browsers - "real time communication on the Web".
   This document defines the WebRTC threat model and analyzes the
   security threats of WebRTC in that model.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 2, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Rescorla                   Expires May 2, 2018                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               WebRTC Security                October 2017

   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
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   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  The Browser Threat Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Access to Local Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Same Origin Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Bypassing SOP: CORS, WebSockets, and consent to
           communicate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Security for WebRTC Applications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Access to Local Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.1.1.  Threats from Screen Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.2.  Calling Scenarios and User Expectations . . . . . . .   8
         4.1.2.1.  Dedicated Calling Services  . . . . . . . . . . .   8
         4.1.2.2.  Calling the Site You're On  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.1.3.  Origin-Based Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.1.4.  Security Properties of the Calling Page . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  Communications Consent Verification . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.2.1.  ICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.2.2.  Masking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.2.3.  Backward Compatibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.2.4.  IP Location Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.3.  Communications Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       4.3.1.  Protecting Against Retrospective Compromise . . . . .  16
       4.3.2.  Protecting Against During-Call Attack . . . . . . . .  17
         4.3.2.1.  Key Continuity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
         4.3.2.2.  Short Authentication Strings  . . . . . . . . . .  18
         4.3.2.3.  Third Party Identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
         4.3.2.4.  Page Access to Media  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
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