Use of BGP for Routing in Large-Scale Data Centers
draft-ietf-rtgwg-bgp-routing-large-dc-11
Yes
(Alia Atlas)
(Alvaro Retana)
No Objection
(Alissa Cooper)
(Ben Campbell)
(Benoît Claise)
(Deborah Brungard)
(Jari Arkko)
(Mirja Kühlewind)
(Suresh Krishnan)
(Terry Manderson)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 11 and is now closed.
Alia Atlas Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
()
Unknown
Alvaro Retana Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
()
Unknown
Alissa Cooper Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Ben Campbell Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Benoît Claise Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Deborah Brungard Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Joel Jaeggli Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2016-06-14)
Unknown
Lionel Morand performed the opsdir review
Kathleen Moriarty Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2016-06-15)
Unknown
Thanks for addressing the SecDir review: https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg06610.html
Mirja Kühlewind Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Stephen Farrell Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2016-06-16)
Unknown
I would have liked to know a bit more about how these schemes behave if some of the servers or say a ToR device in the DC are considered as attackers e.g. having been compromised, but you only mention attacks from outside the DC. I assume the answer is to not accept servers as BGP speakers, but I'm not sure how you do that reliably. And I also don't know whether or not ToR devices are successfully attacked often.
Suresh Krishnan Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Terry Manderson Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown