Networks Connecting to Hybrid Cloud DCs: Gap Analysis
draft-ietf-rtgwg-net2cloud-gap-analysis-06
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| Authors | Linda Dunbar , Andrew G. Malis , Christian Jacquenet | ||
| Last updated | 2020-05-01 (Latest revision 2020-03-18) | ||
| Replaces | draft-dm-net2cloud-gap-analysis | ||
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draft-ietf-rtgwg-net2cloud-gap-analysis-06
Network Working Group L. Dunbar
Internet Draft Futurewei
Intended status: Informational A. Malis
Expires: November 1, 2020 Independent
C. Jacquenet
Orange
May 1, 2020
Networks Connecting to Hybrid Cloud DCs: Gap Analysis
draft-ietf-rtgwg-net2cloud-gap-analysis-06
Abstract
This document analyzes the technical gaps that may affect the
dynamic connection to workloads and applications hosted in hybrid
Cloud Data Centers from enterprise premises.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 1, 2020.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................3
2. Conventions used in this document..............................3
3. Gap Analysis for Accessing Cloud Resources.....................4
3.1. Multiple PEs connecting to virtual CPEs in Cloud DCs......7
3.2. Access Control for workloads in the Cloud DCs.............7
3.3. NAT Traversal.............................................8
3.4. BGP between PEs and remote CPEs via Internet..............8
3.5. Multicast traffic from/to the remote edges................9
4. Gap Analysis of Overlay Edge Node's WAN Port Management........9
5. Aggregating VPN paths and Internet paths......................11
5.1. Control Plane for Overlay over Heterogeneous Networks....12
5.2. Using BGP UPDATE Messages................................13
5.2.1. Lacking SD-WAN Segments Identifier..................13
5.2.2. Missing attributes in Tunnel-Encap..................13
5.3. SECURE-L3VPN/EVPN........................................15
5.4. Preventing attacks from Internet-facing ports............16
6. Gap Summary...................................................16
7. Manageability Considerations..................................17
8. Security Considerations.......................................17
9. IANA Considerations...........................................18
10. References...................................................18
10.1. Normative References....................................18
10.2. Informative References..................................18
11. Acknowledgments..............................................19
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1. Introduction
[Net2Cloud-Problem] describes the problems enterprises face today
when interconnecting their branch offices with dynamic workloads
hosted in third party data centers (a.k.a. Cloud DCs). In
particular, this document analyzes the routing protocols to identify
whether there are any gaps that may impede such interconnection
which may for example justify additional specification effort to
define proper protocol extensions.
For the sake of readability, an edge, an endpoint, C-PE, or CPE are
used interchangeably throughout this document. More precisely:
. Edge: may include multiple devices (virtual or physical);
. endpoint: refers to a WAN port of device located in the edge;
. C-PE: provider-owned edge, e.g. for SECURE-EVPN's PE-based
BGP/MPLS VPN, where PE is the edge node;
. CPE: device located in enterprise premises.
2. Conventions used in this document
Cloud DC: Third party Data Centers that usually host applications
and workload owned by different organizations or
tenants.
Controller: Used interchangeably with Overlay controller to manage
overlay path creation/deletion and monitor the path
conditions between sites.
CPE-Based VPN: Virtual Private Network designed and deployed from
CPEs. This is to differentiate from most commonly used
PE-based VPNs a la RFC 4364.
OnPrem: On Premises data centers and branch offices
SDWAN: Software Defined Wide Area Network, "SDWAN" refers to
the solutions of pooling WAN bandwidth from multiple
underlay networks to get better WAN bandwidth
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management, visibility & control. When the underlay is a
private network, traffic may be forwarded without any
additional encryption; when the underlay networks are
public, such as the Internet, some traffic needs to be
encrypted when passing through (depending on user-
provided policies).
3. Gap Analysis for Accessing Cloud Resources
Because of the ephemeral property of the selected Cloud DCs for
specific workloads/Apps, an enterprise or its network service
provider may not have direct physical connections to the Cloud DCs
that are optimal for hosting the enterprise's specific
workloads/Apps. Under those circumstances, an overlay network design
can be an option to interconnect the enterprise's on-premises data
centers & branch offices to its desired Cloud DCs.
However, overlay paths established over the public Internet can have
unpredictable performance, especially over long distances and across
operators' domains. Therefore, it is highly desirable to minimize
the distance or the number of segments that traffic had to be
forwarded over the public Internet.
The Metro Ethernet Forum's Cloud Service Architecture [MEF-Cloud]
also describes a use case of network operators using Overlay paths
over an LTE network or the public Internet for the last mile access
where the VPN service providers cannot always provide the required
physical infrastructure.
In these scenarios, some overlay edge nodes may not be directly
attached to the PEs that participate to the delivery and the
operation of the enterprise's VPN.
When using an overlay network to connect the enterprise's sites to
the workloads hosted in Cloud DCs, the existing C-PEs at
enterprise's sites have to be upgraded to connect to the said
overlay network. If the workloads hosted in Cloud DCs need to be
connected to many sites, the upgrade process can be very expensive.
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[Net2Cloud-Problem] describes a hybrid network approach that extends
the existing MPLS-based VPNs to the Cloud DC Workloads over the
access paths that are not under the VPN provider's control. To make
it work properly, a small number of the PEs of the BGP/MPLS VPN can
be designated to connect to the remote workloads via secure IPsec
tunnels. Those designated PEs are shown as fPE (floating PE or
smart PE) in Figure 3. Once the secure IPsec tunnels are
established, the workloads hosted in Cloud DCs can be reached by the
enterprise's VPN without upgrading all of the enterprise's CPEs. The
only CPE that needs to connect to the overlay network would be a
virtualized CPE instantiated within the cloud DC.
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+--------+ +--------+
| Host-a +--+ +----| Host-b |
| | | (') | |
+--------+ | +-----------+ ( ) +--------+
| +-+--+ ++-+ ++-+ +--+-+ (_)
| | CPE|--|PE| |PE+--+ CPE| |
+--| | | | | | | |---+
+-+--+ ++-+ ++-+ +----+
/ | |
/ | MPLS +-+---+ +--+-++--------+
+------+-+ | Network |fPE-1| |CPE || Host |
| Host | | | |- --| || d |
| c | +-----+ +-+---+ +--+-++--------+
+--------+ |fPE-2|-----+
+---+-+ (|)
(|) (|) Overlay
(|) (|) over any access
+=\======+=========+
// \ | Cloud DC \\
// \ ++-----+ \\
+ |
| vCPE |
+-+----+
----+-------+-------+-----
| |
+---+----+ +---+----+
| Remote | | Remote |
| App-1 | | App-2 |
+--------+ +--------+
Figure 1: VPN Extension to Cloud DC
In Figure 1, the optimal Cloud DC to host the workloads (as a
function of the proximity, capacity, pricing, or any other criteria
chosen by the enterprises) does not have a direct connection to the
PEs of the NGP/MPLS VPN that interconnects the enterprise's sites.
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3.1. Multiple PEs connecting to virtual CPEs in Cloud DCs
To extend BGP/MPLS VPNs to virtual CPEs in Cloud DCs, it is
necessary to establish secure tunnels (such as IPsec tunnels)
between the PEs and the vCPEs.
Even though a set of PEs can be manually selected for a specific
cloud data center, there are no standard protocols for those PEs to
interact with the vCPEs instantiated in the third party cloud data
centers over unsecure networks. The interaction includes exchanging
performance, route information, etc..
When there is more than one PE available for use (as there should be
for resiliency purposes or because of the need to support multiple
cloud DCs geographically scattered), it is not straightforward to
designate an egress PE to remote vCPEs based on applications. It
might not be possible for PEs to recognize all applications because
too much traffic traversing the PEs.
When there are multiple floating PEs that have established IPsec
tunnels with a remote CPE, the remove CPE can forward outbound
traffic to the optimal PE, which in turn forwards traffic to egress
PEs to reach the final destinations. However, it is not
straightforward for the ingress PE to select which egress PEs to
send traffic. For example, in Figure 1:
- fPE-1 is the optimal PE for communication between App-1 <->
Host-a due to latency, pricing or other criteria.
- fPE-2 is the optimal PE for communication between App-1 <->
Host-b.
3.2. Access Control for workloads in the Cloud DCs
There is widespread diffusion of access policy for Cloud Resource,
some of which is not easy for verification and validation. Because
there are multiple parties involved in accessing Cloud Resources,
policy enforcement points are not easily visible for policy
refinement, monitoring, and testing.
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The current state of the art for specifying access policies for
Cloud Resources could be improved by having automated and reliable
tools to map the user-friendly (natural language) rules into machine
readable policies and to provide interfaces for enterprises to self-
manage policy enforcement points for their own workloads.
3.3. NAT Traversal
Cloud DCs that only assign private IPv4 addresses to the
instantiated workloads assume that traffic to/from the workload
usually needs to traverse NATs.
An overlay edge node can solicit a STUN (Session Traversal of UDP
Through Network Address Translation, [RFC3489]) Server to get the
information about the NAT property, the public IP addresses and port
numbers so that such information can be communicated to the relevant
peers.
3.4. BGP between PEs and remote CPEs via Internet
Even though an EBGP (external BGP) Multi-Hop design can be used to
connect peers that are not directly connected to each other, there
are still some issues about extending BGP from MPLS VPN PEs to
remote CPEs via any access path (e.g., Internet).
The path between the remote CPEs and VPN PEs that maintain VPN
routes can traverse untrusted segments.
EBGP Multi-hop design requires configuration on both peers, either
manually or via NETCONF from a controller. To use EBGP between a PE
and remote CPEs, the PE has to be manually configured with the
"next-hop" set to the IP address of the CPEs. When remote CPEs,
especially remote virtualized CPEs are dynamically instantiated or
removed, the configuration of Multi-Hop EBGP on the PE has to be
changed accordingly.
Egress peering engineering (EPE) is not sufficient. Running BGP on
virtualized CPEs in Cloud DCs requires GRE tunnels to be
established first, which requires the remote CPEs to support
address and key management capabilities. RFC 7024 (Virtual Hub &
Spoke) and Hierarchical VPN do not support the required
properties.
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Also, there is a need for a mechanism to automatically trigger
configuration changes on PEs when remote CPEs' are instantiated or
moved (leading to an IP address change) or deleted.
EBGP Multi-hop design does not include a security mechanism by
default. The PE and remote CPEs need secure communication channels
when connecting via the public Internet.
Remote CPEs, if instantiated in Cloud DCs might have to traverse
NATs to reach PEs. It is not clear how BGP can be used between
devices located beyond the NAT and the devices located behind the
NAT. It is not clear how to configure the Next Hop on the PEs to
reach private IPv4 addresses.
3.5. Multicast traffic from/to the remote edges
Among the multiple floating PEs that are reachable from a remote
CPE, multicast traffic sent by the remote CPE towards the MPLS VPN
can be forwarded back to the remote CPE due to the PE receiving the
multicast packets forwarding the multicast/broadcast frame to other
PEs that in turn send to all attached CPEs. This process may cause
traffic loops.
This problem can be solved by selecting one floating PE as the CPE's
Designated Forwarder, similar to TRILL's Appointed Forwarders
[RFC6325].
BGP/MPLS VPNs do not have features like TRILL's Appointed
Forwarders.
4. Gap Analysis of Overlay Edge Node's WAN Port Management
Very often the Hybrid Cloud DCs are interconnected by overlay
networks that arch over many different types of networks, such as
VPN, public Internet, wireless and wired infrastructures, etc.
Sometimes the enterprises' VPN providers do not have direct access
to the Cloud DCs that host some specific applications or workloads
operated by the enterprise.
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Under those circumstances, the overlay network's edge nodes can have
WAN ports facing networks provided by different ISPs, some of these
networks may not be trustable, some others can be trusted like VPNs
(to some extent), etc.
If all WAN ports of an edge node are facing an untrusted network,
then all sensitive data to/from this edge node have to be encrypted,
usually by means of IPsec tunnels which can be terminated at the WAN
port address, at the edge node's loopback address if the loopback
address is routable in the wide area network, or even at the ingress
ports of the edge node.
If an edge node has some WAN ports facing trusted networks and
others facing untrusted networks, sensitive data can be forwarded
through ports facing the trusted networks natively (i.e., without
encryption) and forwarded through ports facing untrusted networks
assuming encryption. To achieve this flexibility of sending traffic
either encrypted or not encrypted depending on egress WAN ports, it
is necessary to have the IPsec tunnels terminated at the WAN ports
facing the untrusted networks.
In order to establish peer-wise secure encrypted communications
among those WAN ports of two edge nodes, it is necessary for the
edge nodes (peers) to be informed of the WAN port properties.
Some of those overlay networks (such as some deployed SDWAN
networks) use the modified NHRP protocol [RFC2332] to register WAN
ports of the edge nodes with their Controller (or NHRP server),
which then maps a private VPN address to a public IP address of the
destination node/port. DSVPN [DSVPN] or DMVPN [DMVPN] are used to
establish tunnels between WAN ports of SDWAN edge nodes.
NHRP was originally intended for ATM address resolution, and as a
result, it misses many attributes that are necessary for dynamic
endpoint C-PE registration to the controller, such as:
- Interworking with the MPLS VPN control plane. An overlay edge can
have some ports facing the MPLS VPN network over which packets can
be forwarded without any encryption and some ports facing the
public Internet over which sensitive traffic needs to be
encrypted.
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- Scalability: NHRP/DSVPN/DMVPN work fine with small numbers of edge
nodes. When a network has more than 100 nodes, these protocols do
not scale well.
- NHRP does not have the IPsec attributes, which are needed for
peers to build Security Associations over the public Internet.
- NHRP messages do not have any field to encode the C-PE supported
encapsulation types, such as IPsec-GRE or IPsec-VxLAN.
- NHRP messages do not have any field to encode C-PE Location
identifiers, such as Site Identifier, System ID, and/or Port ID.
- NHRP messages do not have any field to describe the gateway(s) to
which the C-PE is attached. When a C-PE is instantiated in a Cloud
DC, it is desirable for the C-PE's owner to be informed about how
and where the C-PE is attached.
- NHRP messages do not have any field to describe C-PE's NAT
properties if the C-PE is using private IPv4 addresses, such as
the NAT type, Private address, Public address, Private port,
Public port, etc.
[BGP-SDWAN-PORT] describes how to use BGP to distribute SDWAN edge
properties to peers. SDWAN is an overlay network with specific
properties, such as application-based forwarding, augmented
transport, and user specified policies. There is a need to extend
the protocol to register WAN port properties of an edge node to the
overlay controller, which then propagates the information to other
overlay edge nodes that are authenticated and authorized to
communicate with them.
5. Aggregating VPN paths and Internet paths
Most likely, enterprises (especially the largest ones) already have
their C-PEs interconnected by VPN service providers, based upon VPN
techniques like EVPN, L2VPN, or L3VPN, and which can be lead to PE-
based or CPE-based VPN service designs. The commonly used PE-based
BGP/MPLS VPNs have C-PEs directly attached to PEs, the communication
between C-PEs and PEs is considered as secure as they are connected
by direct physical links albeit there could be routes leaking or
unauthorized routes being injected. MP-BGP can be used to learn &
distribute routes among C-PEs, but sometimes routes among C-PEs are
statically configured on the C-PEs.
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For enterprises already interconnected by VPNs, if there are short
term high traffic volume that can't justify increasing the VPNs
capacity, it is desirable for the CPE to aggregate the bandwidth
that pertains to VPN paths and Internet paths by adding ports that
connect the CPE to the public Internet. Under this scenario, which
is referred to as the Overlay scenario throughout this document, it
is necessary for the C-PEs to manage and communicate with the
controller on how traffic is distributed among multiple
heterogeneous underlay networks, and also to manage secure tunnels
over untrusted networks.
When using NHRP for WAN port registration purposes, C-PEs need to
run two separate control planes: EVPN&BGP for CPE-based VPNs, and
NHRP & DSVPN/DMVPN for ports connected to the Internet. Two separate
control planes not only add complexity to C-PEs, but also increase
operational costs.
+---+
+--------------|RR |----------+
/ Untrusted +-+-+ \
/ \
/ \
+----+ +---------+ packets encrypted over +------+ +----+
| TN3|--| A1-----+ Untrusted +------ B1 |--| TN1|
+----+ | C-PE A2-\ | C-PE | +----+
+----+ | A A3--+--+ +---+---B2 B | +----+
| TN2|--| | |PE+--------------+PE |---B3 |--| TN3|
+----+ +---------+ +--+ trusted +---+ +------+ +----+
| WAN |
+----+ +---------+ +--+ packets +---+ +------+ +----+
| TN1|--| C1--|PE| go natively |PE |-- D1 |--| TN1|
+----+ | C-PE C2--+--+ without encry+---+ | C-PE | +----+
| C | +--------------+ | D |
| | | |
+----+ | C3--| without encrypt over | | +----+
| TN2|--| C4--+---- Untrusted --+------D2 |--| TN2|
+----+ +---------+ +------+ +----+
Figure 2: CPEs interconnected by VPN paths and Internet Paths
5.1. Control Plane for Overlay over Heterogeneous Networks
As described in [BGP-SDWAN-Usage], the Control Plane for Overlay
network over heterogeneous networks has three distinct properties:
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- WAN Port Property registration to the Overlay Controller.
o To inform the Overlay controller and authorized peers of
the WAN port properties of the Edge nodes. When the WAN
ports are assigned private IPv4 addresses, this step can
register the type of NAT that translates these addresses
into public ones.
- Controller-facilitated IPsec SA management and NAT information
distribution
o The Overlay controller facilitates and manages the IPsec
configuration and peer authentication for all IPsec
tunnels terminated at the edge nodes.
- Establishing and Managing the topology and reachability for
services attached to the client ports of overlay edge nodes.
o This is for the overlay layer's route distribution, so
that a C-PE can populate its overlay routing table with
entries that identify the next hop for reaching a specific
route/service attached to remote nodes. [SECURE-EVPN]
describes EVPN and other options.
5.2. Using BGP UPDATE Messages
5.2.1. Lacking SD-WAN Segments Identifier
There could be multiple SD-WAN networks with their edge nodes
exchanging BGP UPDATE messages with the BGP RR. The multiple SD-WAN
networks could have common underlay networks. Therefore, it is very
important to have an identifier to differentiate BGP UPDATE messages
belonging to different SD-WAN networks (or sometimes called SD-WAN
Segmentations). Today's BGP doesn't have this feature yet, unless
there are multiple BGP instances and their corresponding RRs.
5.2.2. Missing attributes in Tunnel-Encap
[Tunnel-Encap] describes the BGP UPDATE Tunnel Path Attribute that
advertises endpoints' tunnel encapsulation capabilities for the
respective attached client routes encoded in the MP-NLRI Path
Attribute. The receivers of the BGP UPDATE can use any of the
supported encapsulations encoded in the Tunnel Path Attribute for
the routes encoded in the MP-NLRI Path Attribute.
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Here are some of the issues raised by the use of [Tunnel-Encap] to
distribute Edge WAN port properties:
- [Tunnel-Encap] doesn't have the encoding to describe the NAT
information for WAN ports that are assigned private IPv4 addresses
yet. The NAT information needs to be propagated to the trusted
peers such as the virtual C-PEs instantiated in public Cloud DCs
via Controllers.
- The mechanism defined in [Tunnel-Encap] does not facilitate the
exchange of IPsec SA-specific parameters independently from
advertising the attached clients' routes, even after adding a new
IPsec tunnel type.
[Tunnel-Encap] requires all tunnels updates to be associated with
routes. There can be many client routes associated with an IPsec
tunnel established between two C-PEs' WAN ports; the corresponding
destination prefixes (as announced by the aforementioned routes)
may also be reached through the VPN underlay without any
encryption.
The establishment of an IPsec tunnel can fail, e.g., because the
two endpoints support different encryption algorithms. Multiple
negotiation messages that carry the IPsec SA parameters between
two end-points may be exchanged. This is why it is cleaner to
separate the establishment of an IPsec SA association between two
end-points from the policies enforced to map routes to a specific
IPSec SA.
If C-PEs need to establish a WAN Port-based IPsec SA, the
information encoded in the Tunnel Path Attribute should only apply
to the WAN ports and should be independent from the clients'
routes.
In addition, the Overlay IPsec SA Tunnel is very likely to be
established before clients' routes are attached.
- When an overlay network spans across large geographic regions
(such as countries or continents), one C-PE in one region may not
even be aware of remote CPEs in other regions that it needs to
communicate. Therefore, the distribution of the Overlay Edge WAN
ports information need to be restricted to the authorized peers.
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5.3. SECURE-L3VPN/EVPN
[SECURE-L3VPN] describes a method to enrich BGP/MPLS VPN [RFC4364]
capabilities to allow some PEs to connect to other PEs via public
networks. [SECURE-L3VPN] introduces the concept of Red Interface &
Black Interface used by PEs, where the RED interfaces are used to
forward traffic into the VPN, and the Black Interfaces are used
between WAN ports through which only IPsec-formatted packets are
forwarded to the Internet or to any other backbone network, thereby
eliminating the need for MPLS transport in the backbone.
[SECURE-L3VPN] assumes PEs use MPLS over IPsec when sending traffic
through the Black Interfaces.
[SECURE-EVPN] describes a solution where point-to-multipoint BGP
signaling is used in the control plane for the Scenario #1 described
in [BGP-SDWAN-Usage]. It relies upon a BGP cluster design to
facilitate the key and policy exchange among PE devices to create
private pair-wise IPsec Security Associations without IKEv2 point-
to-point signaling or any other direct peer-to-peer session
establishment messages.
Both [SECURE-L3VPN] and [SECURE-EVPN] are useful, however, they both
miss the aspects of aggregating VPN and Internet underlays. In
summary:
- Both documents assume that an IPsec tunnel is associated with
client traffic. Regardless of which WAN ports the traffic egress
from the edge, the client traffic associated with IPsec is always
encrypted. Within the context of an overlay architecture that
relies upon minimizing resource used for encryption, traffic sent
from an edge node can be encrypted once and forwarded through a
WAN port towards an untrusted network, but can also remain
unencrypted and be forwarded at different times through a WAN port
to the BGP/MPLS VPN.
- The [SECURE-L3VPN] assumes that a CPE "registers" with the RR.
However, it does not say how. It assumes that the remote CPEs are
pre-configured with the IPsec SA manually. For overlay networks to
connect Hybrid Cloud DCs, Zero Touch Provisioning is expected.
Manual configuration is not an option.
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- The [SECURE-L3VPN] assumes that C-PEs and RRs are connected via an
IPsec tunnel. For management channel, TLS/DTLS is more economical
than IPsec. The following assumption made by [SECURE-L3VPN] can be
difficult to meet in the environment where zero touch provisioning
is expected:
A CPE must also be provisioned with whatever additional
information is needed in order to set up an IPsec SA with
each of the red RRs
- IPsec requires periodic refreshment of the keys. The draft does
not provide any information about how to synchronize the
refreshment among multiple nodes.
- IPsec usually sends configuration parameters to two endpoints only
and lets these endpoints negotiate the key. The [SECURE-L3VPN]
assumes that the RR is responsible for creating/managing the key
for all endpoints. When one endpoint is compromised, all other
connections may be impacted.
5.4. Preventing attacks from Internet-facing ports
When C-PEs have Internet-facing ports, additional security risks are
raised.
To mitigate security risks, in addition to requiring Anti-DDoS
features on C-PEs, it is necessary for C-PEs to support means to
determine whether traffic sent by remote peers is legitimate to
prevent spoofing attacks, in particular.
6. Gap Summary
Here is the summary of the technical gaps discussed in this
document:
- For Accessing Cloud Resources
a) When a remote vCPE can be reached by multiple PEs of one
provider VPN network, it is not straightforward to designate
which egress PE to the remote vCPE based on applications
b) Need automated and reliable tools to map the user-friendly
(natural language) access rules into machine readable
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policies and to provide interfaces for enterprises to self-
manage policy enforcement points for their own workloads.
c) NAT Traversal. An enterprise's network controller needs to be
informed of the NAT properties for its workloads in Cloud
DCs. If the workloads are attached to the enterprise's own
vCPEs instantiated in the Cloud DCs, the task can be
achieved.
d) The multicast traffic to/from remote vCPE needs a feature
like Appointed Forwarder specified by TRILL to prevent
multicast data frames from looping around.
e) BGP between PEs and remote CPEs via untrusted networks.
f) Traffic Path Management
- Overlay Edge Node's WAN Port Management: BGP UPDATE propagate
client's routes information, but don't distinguish network facing
ports.
- Aggregating VPN paths and Internet paths
a) Control Plane for Overlay over Heterogeneous Networks is not
clear.
b) BGP UPDATE Messages missing properties:
- Lacking SD-WAN Segments Identifier
- Missing attributes in Tunnel-Encap
c) SECURE-L3VPN/EVPN is not enough
d) Missing clear methods in preventing attacks from Internet-
facing ports
7. Manageability Considerations
Zero touch provisioning of overlay networks to interconnect Hybrid
Clouds is highly desired. It is necessary for a newly powered up
edge node to establish a secure connection (by means of TLS, DTLS,
etc.) with its controller.
8. Security Considerations
Cloud Services are built upon shared infrastructures, therefore
not secure by nature.
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Secure user identity management, authentication, and access
control mechanisms are important. Developing appropriate security
measurements can enhance the confidence needed by enterprises to
fully take advantage of Cloud Services.
9. IANA Considerations
This document requires no IANA actions. RFC Editor: Please remove
this section before publication.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC8192] S. Hares, et al, "Interface to Network Security Functions
(I2NSF) Problem Statement and Use Cases", July 2017
[RFC5521] P. Mohapatra, E. Rosen, "The BGP Encapsulation Subsequent
Address Family Identifier (SAFI) and the BGP Tunnel
Encapsulation Attribute", April 2009.
[BGP-SDWAN-PORT]L. Dunbar, et al, "Subsequent Address Family
Indicator for SDWAN Ports", draft-dunbar-idr-sdwan-port-
safi-00, Work-in-progress, March 2019.
[BGP-SDWAN-Usage] L. Dunbar, et al, "Framework of Using BGP for
SDWAN Overlay Networks", draft-dunbar-idr-sdwan-framework-
00, work-in-progress, Feb 2019.
[Tunnel-Encap]E. Rosen, et al, "The BGP Tunnel Encapsulation
Attribute", draft-ietf-idr-tunnel-encaps-10, July 2018.
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[SECURE-EVPN A. Sajassi, et al, draft-sajassi-bess-secure-evpn-01,
work in progress, March 2019.
[SECURE-L3VPN] E. Rosen, "Provide Secure Layer L3VPNs over Public
Infrastructure", draft-rosen-bess-secure-l3vpn-00, work-
in-progress, July 2018
[DMVPN] Dynamic Multi-point VPN:
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/dynamic-
multipoint-vpn-dmvpn/index.html
[DSVPN] Dynamic Smart VPN:
http://forum.huawei.com/enterprise/en/thread-390771-1-
1.html
[ITU-T-X1036] ITU-T Recommendation X.1036, "Framework for creation,
storage, distribution and enforcement of policies for
network security", Nov 2007.
[Net2Cloud-Problem] L. Dunbar and A. Malis, "Seamless Interconnect
Underlay to Cloud Overlay Problem Statement", draft-dm-
net2cloud-problem-statement-02, June 2018
11. Acknowledgments
Acknowledgements to John Drake for his review and contributions.
Many thanks to John Scudder for stimulating the clarification
discussion on the Tunnel-Encap draft so that our gap analysis can be
more accurate.
This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.
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Authors' Addresses
Linda Dunbar
Futurewei
Email: ldunbar@futurewei.com
Andrew G. Malis
Independent
Email: agmalis@gmail.com
Christian Jacquenet
Orange
Rennes, 35000
France
Email: Christian.jacquenet@orange.com
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