Endpoint Security Posture Assessment - Enterprise Use Cases
draft-ietf-sacm-use-cases-04
Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring WG D. Waltermire
Internet-Draft NIST
Intended status: Informational D. Harrington
Expires: April 24, 2014 Effective Software
October 21, 2013
Endpoint Security Posture Assessment - Enterprise Use Cases
draft-ietf-sacm-use-cases-04
Abstract
This memo documents a sampling of use cases for securely aggregating
configuration and operational data and evaluating that data to
determine an organization's security posture. From these operational
use cases, we can derive common functional capabilities and
requirements to guide development of vendor-neutral, interoperable
standards for aggregating and evaluating data relevant to security
posture.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 24, 2014.
Copyright Notice
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Endpoint Posture Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Definition and Publication of Automatable Configuration
Guides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Automated Checklist Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Organizational Software Policy Compliance . . . . . . . . 7
2.4. Detection of Posture Deviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5. Search for Signs of Infection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6. Remediation and Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.7. Endpoint Information Analysis and Reporting . . . . . . . 8
2.8. Asynchronous Compliance/Vulnerability Assessment at Ice
Station Zebra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.9. Vulnerable Endpoint Identification . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.10. Compromised Endpoint Identification . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.11. Suspicious Endpoint Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.12. Traditional endpoint assessment with stored results . . . 11
2.13. NAC/NAP connection with no stored results using an
endpoint evaluator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.14. NAC/NAP connection with no stored results using a third-
party evaluator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.15. Repository Interaction - A Full Assessment . . . . . . . 12
2.16. Repository Interaction - Filtered Delta Assessment . . . 12
2.17. Direct Human Retrieval of Ancillary Materials. . . . . . 12
2.18. Register with repository for immediate notification of
new security vulnerability content that match a
selection filter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.19. Others... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. -03- to -04- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2. -02- to -03- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.3. -01- to -02- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.4. -00- to -01- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.5. draft-waltermire-sacm-use-cases-05 to draft-ietf-sacm-
use-cases-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.6. waltermire -04- to -05- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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1. Introduction
Our goal with this document is to improve our agreement on which
problems we're trying to solve. We need to start with short, simple
problem statements and discuss those by email and in person. Once we
agree on which problems we're trying to solve, we can move on to
propose various solutions and decide which ones to use.
This document describes example use cases for endpoint posture
assessment for enterprises. It provides a sampling of use cases for
securely aggregating configuration and operational data and
evaluating that data to determine the security posture of individual
endpoints, and, in the aggregate, the security posture of an
enterprise.
These use cases cross many IT security information domains. From
these operational use cases, we can derive common concepts, common
information expressions, functional capabilities and requirements to
guide development of vendor-neutral, interoperable standards for
aggregating and evaluating data relevant to security posture.
Using this standard data, tools can analyze the state of endpoints,
user activities and behaviour, and evaluate the security posture of
an organization. Common expression of information should enable
interoperability between tools (whether customized, commercial, or
freely available), and the ability to automate portions of security
processes to gain efficiency, react to new threats in a timely
manner, and free up security personnel to work on more advanced
problems.
The goal is to enable organizations to make informed decisions that
support organizational objectives, to enforce policies for hardening
systems, to prevent network misuse, to quantify business risk, and to
collaborate with partners to identify and mitigate threats.
It is expected that use cases for enterprises and for service
providers will largely overlap, but there are additional
complications for service providers, especially in handling
information that crosses administrative domains.
The output of endpoint posture assessment is expected to feed into
additional processes, such as policy-based enforcement of acceptable
state, verification and monitoring of security controls, and
compliance to regulatory requirements.
2. Endpoint Posture Assessment
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Endpoint posture assessment involves orchestrating and performing
data collection and evaluating the posture of a given endpoint.
Typically, endpoint posture information is gathered and then
published to appropriate data repositories to make collected
information available for further analysis supporting organizational
security processes.
Endpoint posture assessment typically includes:
o Collecting the attributes of a given endpoint;
o Making the attributes available for evaluation and action; and
o Verifying that the endpoint's posture is in compliance with
enterprise standards and policy.
As part of these activities it is often necessary to identify and
acquire any supporting content that is needed to drive data
collection and analysis.
The following is a typical workflow scenario for assessing endpoint
posture:
1. Some type of trigger initiates the workflow. For example, an
operator or an application might trigger the process with a
request, or the endpoint might trigger the process using an
event-driven notification.
QUESTION: Since this is about security automation, can we drop
the User and just use Application? Is there a better term to
use here? Once the policy is selected, the rest seems like
something we definitely would want to automate, so I dropped
the User part.
2. A user/application selects a target endpoint to be assessed.
3. A user/application selects which policies are applicable to the
target.
4. The application determines which (sets of) posture attributes
need to be collected for evaluation.
QUESTION: It was suggested that mentioning several common
acquisition methods, such as local API, WMI, Puppet, DCOM,
SNMP, CMDB query, and NEA, without forcing any specific method
would be good. I have concerns this could devolve into a
"what about my favorite?" contest. OTOH, the charter does
specifically call for use of existing standards where
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applicable, so the use cases document might be a good neutral
location for such information, and might force us to consider
what types of external interfaces we might need to support
when we consider the requirements. It appears that the
generic workflow sequence would be a good place to mention
such common acquisition methods.
5. The application might retrieve previously collected information
from a cache or data store, such as a data store populated by an
asset management system.
6. The application might establish communication with the target,
mutually authenticate identities and authorizations, and collect
posture attributes from the target.
7. The application might establish communication with one or more
intermediary/agents, mutually authenticate their identities and
determine authorizations, and collect posture attributes about
the target from the intermediary/agents. Such agents might be
local or external.
8. The application communicates target identity and (sets of)
collected attributes to an evaluator, possibly an external
process or external system.
9. The evaluator compares the collected posture attributes with
expected values as expressed in policies.
QUESTION: Evaluator generates a report or log or notification
of some type?
The following subsections detail specific use cases for data
collection, analysis, and related operations pertaining to the
publication and use of supporting content.
2.1. Definition and Publication of Automatable Configuration Guides
A vendor manufactures a number of specialized endpoint devices. They
also develop and maintain an operating system for these devices that
enables end-user organizations to configure a number of security and
operational settings. As part of their customer support activities,
they publish a number of secure configuration guides that provide
minimum security guidelines for configuring their devices.
Each guide they produce applies to a specific model of device and
version of the operating system and provides a number of specialized
configurations depending on the devices intended function and what
add-on hardware modules and software licenses are installed on the
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device. To enable their customers to evaluate the security posture
of their devices to ensure that all appropriate minimal security
settings are enabled, they publish an automatable configuration
checklist using a popular data format that defines what settings to
collect using a network management protocol and appropriate values
for each setting. They publish these guides to a public content
repository that customers can query to retrieve applicable guides for
their deployed enterprise network infrastructure endpoints.
Guides could also come from sources other than a device vendor, such
as industry groups or regulatory authorities, or enterprises could
develop their own checklists.
2.2. Automated Checklist Verification
A financial services company operates a heterogeneous IT environment.
In support of their risk management program, they utilize vendor
provided automatable security configuration checklists for each
operating system and application used within their IT environment.
Multiple checklists are used from different vendors to insure
adequate coverage of all IT assets.
To identify what checklists are needed, they use automation to gather
an inventory of the software versions utilized by all IT assets in
the enterprise. This data gathering will involve querying existing
data stores of previously collected endpoint software inventory
posture data and actively collecting data from reachable endpoints as
needed utilizing network and systems management protocols.
Previously collected data may be provided by periodic data
collection, network connection-driven data collection, or ongoing
event-driven monitoring of endpoint posture changes.
Using the gathered software inventory data and associated asset
management data indicating the organizational defined functions of
each endpoint, they locate and query each vendors content repository
for the appropriate checklists. These checklists are cached locally
to reduce the need to download the checklist multiple times.
Driven by the setting data provided in the checklist, a combination
of existing configuration data stores and data collection methods are
used to gather the appropriate posture information from each
endpoint. Specific data is gathered based on the defined enterprise
function and software inventory of each endpoint. The data
collection paths used to collect software inventory posture will be
used again for this purpose. Once the data is gathered, the actual
state is evaluated against the expected state criteria in each
applicable checklist. Deficiencies are identified and reported to
the appropriate endpoint operators for remedy.
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Checklists could also come from sources other than the application or
OS vendor, such as industry groups or regulatory authorities, or
enterprises could develop their own checklists.
2.3. Organizational Software Policy Compliance
Example Corporation, in support of compliance requirements, has
identified a number of secure baselines for different endpoint types
that exist across their enterprise IT environment. Determining which
baseline applies to a given endpoint is based on the organizationally
defined function of the device.
Each baseline, defined using an automatable standardized data format,
identifies the expected hardware, software and patch inventory, and
software configuration item values for each endpoint type. As part
of their compliance activities, they require that all endpoints
connecting to their network meet the appropriate baselines. The
configuration settings of each endpoint are collected and compared to
the baseline to make sure the configuration complies with the
appropriate baseline whenever it connects to the network and at least
once a day thereafter. These daily compliance checks evaluate the
posture of each endpoint and report on its compliance with the
appropriate baseline.
[TODO: Need to speak to how the baselines are identified for a given
endpoint connecting to the network.]
2.4. Detection of Posture Deviations
Example corporation has established secure configuration baselines
for each different type of endpoint within their enterprise
including: network infrastructure, mobile, client, and server
computing platforms. These baselines define an approved list of
hardware, software (i.e., operating system, applications, and
patches), and associated required configurations. When an endpoint
connects to the network, the appropriate baseline configuration is
communicated to the endpoint based on its location in the network,
the expected function of the device, and other asset management data.
It is checked for compliance with the baseline indicating any
deviations to the device's operators. Once the baseline has been
established, the endpoint is monitored for any change events
pertaining to the baseline on an ongoing basis. When a change occurs
to posture defined in the baseline, updated posture information is
exchanged allowing operators to be notified and/or automated action
to be taken.
2.5. Search for Signs of Infection
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The Example Corporation carefully manages endpoint security with
tools that implement the SACM standards. One day, the endpoint
security team at Example Corporation learns about a stealthy malware
package. This malware has just been discovered but has already
spread widely around the world. Certain signs of infection have been
identified (e.g. the presence of certain files). The security team
would like to know which endpoints owned by the Example Corporation
have been infected with this malware. They use their tools to search
for the signs of infection and generate a list of infected endpoints.
The search for infected endpoints may be performed by gathering new
endpoint posture information regarding the presence of the signs of
infection. However, this might miss finding endpoints that were
previously infected but where the infection has now erased itself.
Such previously infected endpoints may be detected by searching a
database of posture information previously gathered for the signs of
infection. However, this will not work if the malware hides its
presence carefully or if the signs of infection were not included in
previous posture assessments. In those cases, the database may be
used to at least detect which endpoints previously had software
vulnerable to infection by the malware.
2.6. Remediation and Mitigation
When Example Corporation discovers that one of its endpoints is
vulnerable to infection, a process of mitigation and remediation is
triggered. The first step is mitigating the impact of the
vulnerability, perhaps by placing the endpoint into a safe network or
blocking network traffic that could infect the endpoint. The second
step is remediation: fixing the vulnerability. In some cases, these
steps may happen automatically and rapidly. In other cases, they may
require human intervention either to decide what response is most
appropriate or to complete the steps, which are sometimes complex.
These same steps of mitigation and remediation may be used when
Example Corporation discovers that one of its endpoints has become
infected with some malware. Alternatively, the infected endpoint may
simply be monitored or even placed into a honeynet or similar
environment to observe the malware's behavior and lead the attackers
astray.
QUESTION: Is remediation and mitigation within the scope of the WG,
and should the use case be included here?
2.7. Endpoint Information Analysis and Reporting
Freed from the drudgery of manual endpoint compliance monitoring, one
of the security administrators at Example Corporation notices (not
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using SACM standards) that five endpoints have been uploading lots of
data to a suspicious server on the Internet. The administrator
queries the SACM database of endpoint posture to see what software is
installed on those endpoints and finds that they all have a
particular program installed. She then searches the database to see
which other endpoints have that program installed. All these
endpoints are monitored carefully (not using SACM standards), which
allows the administrator to detect that the other endpoints are also
infected.
This is just one example of the useful analysis that a skilled
analyst can do using the database of endpoint posture that SACM can
provide.
2.8. Asynchronous Compliance/Vulnerability Assessment at Ice Station
Zebra
A university team receives a grant to do research at a government
facility in the arctic. The only network communications will be via
an intermittent low-speed high-latency high-cost satellite link.
During their extended expedition they will need to show continue
compliance with the security policies of the university, the
government, and the provider of the satellite network as well as keep
current on vulnerability testing. Interactive assessments are
therefore not reliable, and since the researchers have very limited
funding they need to minimize how much money they spend on network
data.
Prior to departure they register all equipment with an asset
management system owned by the university, which will also initiate
and track assessments.
On a periodic basis -- either after a maximum time delta or when the
content repository has received a threshold level of new
vulnerability definitions -- the university uses the information in
the asset management system to put together a collection request for
all of the deployed assets that encompasses the minimal set of
artifacts necessary to evaluate all three security policies as well
as vulnerability testing.
In the case of new critical vulnerabilities this collection request
consists only of the artifacts necessary for those vulnerabilities
and collection is only initiated for those assets that could
potentially have a new vulnerability.
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[Optional] Asset artifacts are cached in a local CMDB. When new
vulnerabilities are reported to the content repository, a request to
the live asset is only done if the artifacts in the CMDB are
incomplete and/or not current enough.
The collection request is queued for the next window of connectivity.
The deployed assets eventually receive the request, fulfill it, and
queue the results for the next return opportunity.
The collected artifacts eventually make it back to the university
where the level of compliance and vulnerability expose is calculated
and asset characteristics are compared to what is in the asset
management system for accuracy and completeness.
2.9. Vulnerable Endpoint Identification
Typically vulnerability reports identify an executable or library
that is vulnerable, or worst case the software that is vulnerable.
This information is used to determine if an organization has one or
more endpoints that have exposure to a vulnerability (i.e., what
endpoints are vulnerable?). It is often necessary to know where you
are running vulnerable code and what configurations are in place on
the endpoint and upstream devices (e.g., IDS, firewall) that may
limit the exposure. All of this information, along with details on
the severity and impact of a vulnerability, is necessary to
prioritize remedies.
2.10. Compromised Endpoint Identification
Along with knowing if one or more endpoints are vulnerable, it is
also important to know if you have been compromised. Indicators of
compromise provide details that can be used to identify malware
(e.g., file hashes), identify malicious activity (e.g. command and
control traffic), presence of unauthorized/malicious configuration
items, and other indicators. While important, this goes beyond
determining organizational exposure.
2.11. Suspicious Endpoint Behavior
This Use Case describes the collaboration between specific
participants in an information security system specific to detecting
a connection attempt to a known-bad Internet host by a botnet zombie
that has made its way onto an organization's Information Technology
systems. The primary human actor is the Security Operations Center
Analyst, and the primary software actor is the configuration
assessment tool. Note, however, the dependencies on other tools,
such as asset management, intrusion detection, and messaging.
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2.12. Traditional endpoint assessment with stored results
An external trigger initiates an assessment of an endpoint. The
Controller uses the data in the Datastore to look up authentication
information for the endpoint and passes that along with the
assessment request details to the Evaluator. The Evaluator uses the
Endpoint information to request taxonomy information from the
Collector on the endpoint, which responds with those attributes. The
Evaluator uses that taxonomy information along with the information
in the original request from the Controller to request the
appropriate content from the Content Repository. The Evaluator uses
the content to derive the minimal set of endpoint attributes needed
to perform the assessment and makes that request. The Evaluator uses
the Collector response to do the assessment and returns the results
to the Controller. The Controller puts the results in the Datastore.
2.13. NAC/NAP connection with no stored results using an endpoint
evaluator
A mobile endpoint makes a VPN connection request. The NAC/NAP broker
requests the results of the VPN connection assessment from the
Controller. The Controller requests the VPN attributes from a
Content Repository. The Controller requests an evaluation of the
collected attributes from the Evaluator on the endpoint. The
endpoint performs the assessment and returns the results. The
Controller completes the original assessment request by returning the
results to the NAC/NAP broker, which uses them to set the level of
network access allowed to the endpoint.
QUESTION: I edited these from Gunnar's email of 9/11, to try to
reduce the use of "assessment", to focus on collection and
evaluation, and deal with use cases rather than architecture. I am
not sure I got all the concepts properly identified.
2.14. NAC/NAP connection with no stored results using a third-party
evaluator
A mobile endpoint makes a VPN connection request. The NAC/NAP broker
requests the results of the VPN connection assessment from the
Controller. The Controller requests the VPN attributes from a
Content Repository. The Controller requests an evaluation of the
collected attributes from an Evaluator in the network (rather than
trusting an evaluator on the endpoint). The evaluator performs the
evaluation and returns the results. The Controller completes the
original assessment request by returning the results to the NAC/NAP
broker, which uses them to set the level of network access allowed to
the endpoint.
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QUESTION: I edited these from Gunnar's email of 9/11, to try to
reduce the use of "assessment", to focus on collection and
evaluation, and deal with use cases rather than architecture. I am
not sure I got all the concepts properly identified.
2.15. Repository Interaction - A Full Assessment
An auditor at a health care provider needs to know the current
compliance level of his network, including enumeration of known
vulnerabilities, so she initiates a full enterprise-wide assessment.
For each endpoint on the network, after determining its taxonomical
classification, the assessment system queries the content repository
for all materials that apply to that endpoint.
2.16. Repository Interaction - Filtered Delta Assessment
Before heading out on a road trip, a rep checks out an iOS tablet
computer from the IT department. Before turning over the laptop the
IT administrator first initiates a quick assessment to see if any new
vulnerabilities that potentially yield remote access or local
privilege escalation have been identified for that device type since
the last time the device had had a full assessment.
2.17. Direct Human Retrieval of Ancillary Materials.
Preceding a HIPAA assessment the local SSO wants to review the HIPAA
regulations to determine which assets do or do not fall under the
regulation. Following the assessment he again queries the content
repository for more information about remediation strategies and
employee training materials.
2.18. Register with repository for immediate notification of new
security vulnerability content that match a selection filter.
Interested in reducing the exposure time to new vulnerabilities and
compliance policy changes, the IT administrator registers with his
subscribed content repository(s) to receive immediate notification of
any changes to the vulnerability and compliance content that apply to
his managed assets. Receipt of notifications trigger an immediate
delta assessment against those assets that potentially match.
2.19. Others...
Additional use cases will be identified as we work through other
domains.
3. IANA Considerations
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This memo includes no request to IANA.
4. Security Considerations
This memo documents, for Informational purposes, use cases for
security automation. While it is about security, it does not affect
security.
5. Acknowledgements
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and/or the
MITRE Corporation have developed specifications under the general
term "Security Automation" including languages, protocols,
enumerations, and metrics.
Adam Montville edited early versions of this draft.
Kathleen Moriarty and Stephen Hanna contributed text describing the
scope of the document.
Steve Hanna provided use cases for Search for Signs of Infection,
Remediation and Mitigation, and Endpoint Information Analysis and
Reporting.
Gunnar Engelbach provided the use case about Ice Station Zebra, and
use cases regarding the content repository.
6. Change Log
6.1. -03- to -04-
Added four new use cases regarding content repository.
6.2. -02- to -03-
Expanded the workflow description based on ML input.
Changed the ambiguous "assess" to better separate data collection
from evaluation.
Added use case for Search for Signs of Infection.
Added use case for Remediation and Mitigation.
Added use case for Endpoint Information Analysis and Reporting.
Added use case for Asynchronous Compliance/Vulnerability Assessment
at Ice Station Zebra.
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Added use case for Traditional endpoint assessment with stored
results.
Added use case for NAC/NAP connection with no stored results using an
endpoint evaluator.
Added use case for NAC/NAP connection with no stored results using a
third-party evaluator.
Added use case for Compromised Endpoint Identification.
Added use case for Suspicious Endpoint Behavior.
Added use case for Vulnerable Endpoint Identification.
Updated Acknowledgements
6.3. -01- to -02-
Changed title
removed section 4, expecting it will be moved into the requirements
document.
removed the list of proposed caabilities from section 3.1
Added empty sections for Search for Signs of Infection, Remediation
and Mitigation, and Endpoint Information Analysis and Reporting.
Removed Requirements Language section and rfc2119 reference.
Removed unused references (which ended up being all references).
6.4. -00- to -01-
o Work on this revision has been focused on document content
relating primarily to use of asset management data and functions.
o Made significant updates to section 3 including:
* Reworked introductory text.
* Replaced the single example with multiple use cases that focus
on more discrete uses of asset management data to support
hardware and software inventory, and configuration management
use cases.
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* For one of the use cases, added mapping to functional
capabilities used. If popular, this will be added to the other
use cases as well.
* Additional use cases will be added in the next revision
capturing additional discussion from the list.
o Made significant updates to section 4 including:
* Renamed the section heading from "Use Cases" to "Functional
Capabilities" since use cases are covered in section 3. This
section now extrapolates specific functions that are needed to
support the use cases.
* Started work to flatten the section, moving select subsections
up from under asset management.
* Removed the subsections for: Asset Discovery, Endpoint
Components and Asset Composition, Asset Resources, and Asset
Life Cycle.
* Renamed the subsection "Asset Representation Reconciliation" to
"Deconfliction of Asset Identities".
* Expanded the subsections for: Asset Identification, Asset
Characterization, and Deconfliction of Asset Identities.
* Added a new subsection for Asset Targeting.
* Moved remaining sections to "Other Unedited Content" for future
updating.
6.5. draft-waltermire-sacm-use-cases-05 to draft-ietf-sacm-use-cases-00
o Transitioned from individual I/D to WG I/D based on WG consensus
call.
o Fixed a number of spelling errors. Thank you Erik!
o Added keywords to the front matter.
o Removed the terminology section from the draft. Terms have been
moved to: draft-dbh-sacm-terminology-00
o Removed requirements to be moved into a new I/D.
o Extracted the functionality from the examples and made the
examples less prominent.
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o Renamed "Functional Capabilities and Requirements" section to "Use
Cases".
* Reorganized the "Asset Management" sub-section. Added new text
throughout.
+ Renamed a few sub-section headings.
+ Added text to the "Asset Characterization" sub-section.
o Renamed "Security Configuration Management" to "Endpoint
Configuration Management". Not sure if the "security" distinction
is important.
* Added new sections, partially integrated existing content.
* Additional text is needed in all of the sub-sections.
o Changed "Security Change Management" to "Endpoint Posture Change
Management". Added new skeletal outline sections for future
updates.
6.6. waltermire -04- to -05-
o Are we including user activities and behavior in the scope of this
work? That seems to be layer 8 stuff, appropriate to an IDS/IPS
application, not Internet stuff.
o I removed the references to what the WG will do because this
belongs in the charter, not the (potentially long-lived) use cases
document. I removed mention of charter objectives because the
charter may go through multiple iterations over time; there is a
website for hosting the charter; this document is not the correct
place for that discussion.
o I moved the discussion of NIST specifications to the
acknowledgements section.
o Removed the portion of the introduction that describes the
chapters; we have a table of concepts, and the existing text
seemed redundant.
o Removed marketing claims, to focus on technical concepts and
technical analysis, that would enable subsequent engineering
effort.
o Removed (commented out in XML) UC2 and UC3, and eliminated some
text that referred to these use cases.
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o Modified IANA and Security Consideration sections.
o Moved Terms to the front, so we can use them in the subsequent
text.
o Removed the "Key Concepts" section, since the concepts of ORM and
IRM were not otherwise mentioned in the document. This would seem
more appropriate to the arch doc rather than use cases.
o Removed role=editor from David Waltermire's info, since there are
three editors on the document. The editor is most important when
one person writes the document that represents the work of
multiple people. When there are three editors, this role marking
isn't necessary.
o Modified text to describe that this was specific to enterprises,
and that it was expected to overlap with service provider use
cases, and described the context of this scoped work within a
larger context of policy enforcement, and verification.
o The document had asset management, but the charter mentioned
asset, change, configuration, and vulnerability management, so I
added sections for each of those categories.
o Added text to Introduction explaining goal of the document.
o Added sections on various example use cases for asset management,
config management, change management, and vulnerability
management.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC
2865, June 2000.
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Authors' Addresses
David Waltermire
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20877
USA
Email: david.waltermire@nist.gov
David Harrington
Effective Software
50 Harding Rd
Portsmouth, NH 03801
USA
Email: ietfdbh@comcast.net
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