Secure Asset Transfer Protocol (SATP) Core
draft-ietf-satp-core-10
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (satp WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Martin Hargreaves , Thomas Hardjono , Rafael Belchior , Venkatraman Ramakrishna , Alexandru Chiriac | ||
| Last updated | 2025-07-04 | ||
| Replaces | draft-hargreaves-sat-core | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
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draft-ietf-satp-core-10
Secure Asset Transfer Protocol M. Hargreaves
Internet-Draft Quant Network
Intended status: Informational T. Hardjono
Expires: 5 January 2026 MIT
R. Belchior
Tecnico Lisboa, Blockdaemon
V. Ramakrishna
IBM
A. Chiriac
Quant Network
4 July 2025
Secure Asset Transfer Protocol (SATP) Core
draft-ietf-satp-core-10
Abstract
This memo describes the Secure Asset Transfer (SAT) Protocol for
digital assets. SAT is a protocol operating between two gateways
that conducts the transfer of a digital asset from one gateway to
another, each representing their corresponding digital asset
networks. The protocol establishes a secure channel between the
endpoints and implements a 2-phase commit (2PC) to ensure the
properties of transfer atomicity, consistency, isolation and
durability.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://ietf-
satp.github.io/draft-ietf-satp-core/draft-ietf-satp-core.html.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-satp-core/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Secure Asset Transfer
Protocol Working Group mailing list (mailto:sat@ietf.org), which is
archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/sat/. Subscribe
at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sat/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/ietf-satp/draft-ietf-satp-core.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 January 2026.
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Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. The Secure Asset Transfer Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. SAT Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Stages of the Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. Gateway Cryptographic Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. SATP Message Format, identifiers and Descriptors . . . . . . 8
5.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. SATP Message Digital Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. SATP Message Format and Payloads . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3.1. Protocol version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3.2. Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3.3. Digital Asset Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3.4. Asset Profile Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3.5. Transfer-Context ID: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3.6. Session ID: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3.7. Gateway Credential Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3.8. Gateway Credential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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5.3.9. Gateway Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3.10. Payload Hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3.11. Signature Algorithms Supported . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3.12. Lock assertion Claim and Format . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4. Negotiation of Security Protocols and Parameters . . . . 12
5.4.1. TLS Secure Channel Establishment . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4.2. Client offers supported credential schemes . . . . . 12
5.4.3. Server selects supported credential scheme . . . . . 13
5.4.4. Client asserts or proves identity . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.4.5. Messages can now be exchanged . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Overview of Message Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Identity and Asset Verification Stage (Stage 0) . . . . . . . 14
8. Transfer Initiation Stage (Stage 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.1. Transfer Initialization Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.2. Conveyance of Gateway and Network Capabilities . . . . . 17
8.3. Transfer Proposal Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.4. Transfer Proposal Receipt Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.5. Reject Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.6. Transfer Commence Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.7. Commence Response Message (ACK-Commence) . . . . . . . . 23
9. Lock Assertion Stage (Stage 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.1. Lock Assertion Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.2. Lock Assertion Receipt Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10. Commitment Preparation and Finalization (Stage 3) . . . . . . 26
10.1. Commit Preparation Message (Commit-Prepare) . . . . . . 26
10.2. Commit Ready Message (Commit-Ready) . . . . . . . . . . 27
10.3. Commit Final Assertion Message (Commit-Final) . . . . . 28
10.4. Commit-Final Acknowledgement Receipt Message
(ACK-Final-Receipt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
10.5. Transfer Complete Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
10.6. Error Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
10.7. Session abort message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
11. SATP Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
11.1. Primary-Backup Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . 33
11.2. Recovery Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
12. Error Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12.1. Session Termination Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12.2. Connection Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12.3. SATP Protocol Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
12.4. Effectiveness of Session Aborts . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
13. Security Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
14. IANA Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
16. Appendix: Error Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
16.1. Transfer Proposal and Receipt errors . . . . . . . . . . 38
16.2. Transfer Commence and Acknowledgement errors . . . . . . 39
16.3. Lock Assertion errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
16.4. Lock Assertion Receipt errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
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16.5. Commit Preparation errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
16.6. Commit Ready errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
16.7. Commit Final Assertion errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
16.8. Commit Final Acknowledgement Receipt errors . . . . . . 41
16.9. Transfer Complete errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1. Introduction
This memo proposes a secure asset transfer protocol (SATP) that is
intended to be deployed between two gateway endpoints to transfer a
digital asset from an origin asset network to a destination asset
network. Readers are directed first to [ARCH] for a description of
the architecture underlying the current protocol.
Both the origin and destination asset networks are assumed to be
opaque in the sense that the interior construct of a given network is
not read/write accessible to unauthorized entities.
The protocol utilizes the asset burn-and-mint paradigm whereby the
asset to be transferred is permanently disabled or destroyed (burned)
at the origin asset network and is re-generated (minted) at the
destination asset network. This is achieved through the coordinated
actions of the peer gateways handling the unidirectional transfer at
the respective networks.
A gateway is assumed to be trusted to perform the tasks involved in
the asset transfer.
The overall aim of the protocol is to ensure that the state of assets
in the origin and destination networks remain consistent, and that
asset movements into (out of) networks via gateways can be accounted
for.
There are several desirable technical properties of the protocol.
The protocol must ensure that the properties of atomicity,
consistency, isolation, and durability (ACID) are satisfied.
The requirement of consistency implies that the asset transfer
protocol always leaves both asset networks in a consistent state
(that the asset is located in one system/network only at any time).
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Atomicity means that the protocol must guarantee that either the
transfer commits (completes) or entirely fails, where failure is
taken to mean there is no change to the state of the asset in the
origin (sender) asset network.
The property of isolation means that while a transfer is occurring to
a digital asset from an origin network, no other state changes can
occur to the asset.
The property of durability means that once the transfer has been
committed by both gateways, that this commitment must hold regardless
of subsequent unavailability (e.g. crash) of the gateways
implementing the SAT protocol.
All messages exchanged between gateways are assumed to run over
TLS1.2 or higher, and the endpoints at the respective gateways are
associated with a certificate indicating the legal owner (or
operator) of the gateway. HTTPS/S must be used intead of plain HTTP.
2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [REQ-LEVEL].
In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation
only when in ALL CAPS. Lower case uses of these words are not to be
interpreted as carrying significance described in RFC 2119.
3. Terminology
The following are some terminology used in the current document, some
borrowed from [NIST]:
* Digital asset: digital representation of a value or of a right
that is able to be transferred and stored electronically using
distributed ledger technology or similar technology [MICA].
* Asset network: A monolithic system or a set of distributed systems
that manage digital assets.
* Client application: This is the application employed by a user to
interact with a gateway.
* Gateway: The computer system functionally capable of acting as a
gateway in an asset transfer.
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* Sender gateway: The gateway that initiates a unidirectional asset
transfer.
* Recipient gateway: The gateway that is the recipient side of a
unidirectional asset transfer.
* Claim: An assertion made by an Entity [JWT].
* Claim Type: Syntax used for representing a Claim Value [JWT].
* Gateway Claim: An assertion made by a Gateway regarding the status
or condition of resources (e.g. assets, public keys, etc.)
accessible to that gateway (e.g. within its asset network or
system).
In the remainder of this document, for brevity of description the
term “asset network” will often be shorted to "network".
4. The Secure Asset Transfer Protocol
4.1. Overview
The Secure Asset Transfer Protocol (SATP) is a gateway-to-gateway
protocol used by a sender gateway with a recipient gateway to perform
a unidirectional transfer of a digital asset.
The protocol defines a number of API endpoints, resources and
identifier definitions, and message flows corresponding to the asset
transfer between the two gateways.
The current document pertains to the interaction between gateways
through API2 [SATP-ARCH].
+----------+ +----------+
| Client | | Off-net |
------ | (App) | | Resource |
| +----------+ +----------+
| | | API3 |
| | +----------+
| | ^
| V |
| +---------+ |
V | API1 | |
+-----+ +---------+----+ +----+---------+ +-----+
| | | | | | | | | |
| Net.| | Gateway |API2| |API2| Gateway | | Net.|
| NW1 |---| G1 | |<------>| | G2 |---| NW2 |
| | | | | | | | | |
+-----+ +---------+----+ +----+---------+ +-----+
Figure 1
4.2. SAT Model
The model for SATP is shown in Figure 1 [SATP-ARCH]. The Client
(application) interacts with its local gateway (G1) over an interface
(API1) in order to provide instructions to the gateway with regards
to actions to assets and related resources located in the local
system or network (NW1).
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Gateways interact with each other over a gateway interface (API2). A
given gateway may be required to access resources that are not
located in network NW1 or network NW2. Access to these types of
resources are performed over an off-network interface (API3).
4.3. Stages of the Protocol
The SAT protocol defines three (3) stages for a unidirectional asset
transfer:
* Transfer Initiation stage (Stage-1): These flows deal with
commencing a transfer from one gateway to another. In this stage
the sender gateway delivers a proposal containing the parameters
agreed upon in Stage-0.
* Lock-Assertion stage (Stage-2): These flows deal with the
conveyance of signed assertions from the sender gateway to the
receiver gateway regarding the locked status of an asset at the
origin network.
* Commitment Preparation and Finalization stage (Stage-3): These
flows deal with the asset transfer and commitment establishment
between two gateways.
In order to clarify discussion, the interactions between the peer
gateways prior to the transfer initiation stage is referred to as the
setup stage (Stage-0), which is outside the scope of the current
specification.
The Stage-1, Stage-2 and Stage-3 flows will be discussed below.
4.4. Gateway Cryptographic Keys
SATP recognizes the following cryptographic keys which are intended
for distinct purposes within the different stages of the protocol.
* Gateway signature public key-pair: This is the key-pair utilized
by a gateway to digitally sign assertions and receipts.
* Gateway secure channel establishment public key-pair: This is the
key-pair utilized by peer gateways to establish a secure channel
(e.g. TLS) for a transfer session.
* Gateway identity public key pair: This is the key-pair that
uniquely identifies a gateway.
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* Gateway-owner identity public key pair: This is the key-pair that
identifies the owner (e.g. legal entity) who is the legal owner of
a gateway.
This document assumes that the relevant X.509 certificates are
associated with these keys. However, the mechanisms to obtain X.509
certificates is outside the scope of this specification.
5. SATP Message Format, identifiers and Descriptors
5.1. Overview
This section describes the SATP message-types, the format of the
messages exchanged between two gateways, the format for resource
descriptors and other related parameters.
The mandatory fields are determined by the message type exchanged
between the two gateways (see Section 7).
5.2. SATP Message Digital Signatures
All SATP messages exchanged between gateways must be signed, using
JSON Web Signatures mechanism (RFC7515).
All gateways implementing SATP must support the ECDSA signature
algorithm with the P-256 curve and the SHA-256 hash function.
Additional signature algorithms and keying parameters may be
negotiated by peer gateways. However, the negotiation protocol is
outside the scope of this specification.
5.3. SATP Message Format and Payloads
SATP messages are exchanged between peer gateways, where depending on
the message type one gateway may act as a client of the other (and
vice versa).
All SATP messages exchanged between gateways are in JSON format
[RFC8259], with the relevant payloads Base64 encoded.
5.3.1. Protocol version
This refers to SATP protocol Version, encoded as "major.minor"
(separated by a period symbol).
The current version is "1.0".
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5.3.2. Message Type
This refers to the type of request or response to be conveyed in the
message.
The possible values are:
* transfer-proposal-msg: This is the transfer proposal message from
the sender gateway carrying the set of proposed parameters for the
transfer.
* proposal-receipt-msg: This is the signed receipt message
indicating acceptance of the proposal by the receiver gateway.
* reject-msg: This is a reject message from a gateway to the peer
gateway in the session, indication the reason and the resulting
action.
* transfer-commence-msg: Request to begin the commencement of the
asset transfer.
* ack-commence-msg: Response to accept the commencement of the asset
transfer.
* lock-assert-msg: Sender gateway has performed the lock of the
asset in the origin network.
* assertion-receipt-msg: Receiver gateway acknowledges receiving the
signed lock-assert-msg.
* commit-prepare-msg: Sender gateway requests the start of the
commitment stage.
* ack-prepare-msg: Receiver gateway acknowledges receiving the
previous commit-prepare-msg and agrees to start the commitment
stage.
* commit-final-msg: Sender gateway has performed the extinguishment
(burn) of the asset in the origin network.
* ack-commit-final-msg: Receiver gateway acknowledges receiving the
signed commit-final-msg and has performed the asset creation and
assignment in the destination network.
* commit-transfer-complete-msg: Sender gateway indicates closure of
the current transfer session.
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* error-msg: This message is used to indicate that an error has
occured at the SATP layer. It can be transmitted by either
gateways.
* session-abort-msg: This message is used by a gateway to abort the
current session.
5.3.3. Digital Asset Identifier
This is the identifier that uniquely identifies the digital asset in
the origin network which is to be transferred to the destination
network.
The digital asset identifier is a value that is derived by the
applications utilized by the originator and the beneficiary prior to
starting the asset transfer.
The mechanism used to derive the digital asset identifier is outside
the scope of the current document.
5.3.4. Asset Profile Identifier
This is the unique identifier of the asset schema or asset profile
which defines the class or type of asset in question. The asset
profile is relevant from a regulatory perspective.
In some cases the profile identifier may be needed by the receiver
gateway at the destination network in order to evaluate whether the
asset is permitted to enter the destination network.
The formal specification of asset profiles and their identification
is outside the scope of this document.
5.3.5. Transfer-Context ID:
This is the unique immutable identifier representing the application
layer context of a single unidirectional transfer. The method to
generate the transfer-context ID is outside the scope of the current
document.
The transfer-context may be a complex data structure that contains
all information related to a SATP execution instance. Examples of
information contained in a transfer-context may include identifiers
of sessions, gateways, networks or assets related to the specific
SATP execution instance.
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The sender gateway provides this value to the receiver gateway.
Mechanisms to establish this value between the sender and receiver
gateways may be utilized prior commencing the SAT protocol. However,
these are out of scope.
5.3.6. Session ID:
This is the unique identifier representing a session between two
gateways handling a single unidirectional transfer. This may be
derived from the Transfer-Context ID at the application level. There
may be several session IDs related to a SATP execution instance.
Only one Session ID may be active for a given SATP execution
instance. Session IDs may be stored in the transfer-context for
audit trail purposes.
The sender gateway provides this value to the receiver gateway.
5.3.7. Gateway Credential Type
This is the type of authentication mechanism supported by the gateway
(e.g. SAML, OAuth, X.509)
5.3.8. Gateway Credential
This payload is the actual credential of the gateway (token,
certificate, string, etc.).
5.3.9. Gateway Identifier
This is the unique identifier of the gateway service. The gateway
identifier MUST be uniquely bound to its SAT endpoint (e.g. via X.509
certificates).
This gateway identifier is distinct from the gateway operator
business identifier (e.g., legal entity identifier (LEI) number). A
gateway operator may operate multiple gateways. Each of these
gateways MUST have a unique gateway identifier.
The mechanisms to establish the gateway identifier or the operator
identifier is outside the scope of this specification.
5.3.10. Payload Hash
This is the hash of the current message payload.
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5.3.11. Signature Algorithms Supported
This is the list of digital signature algorithm supported by a
gateway, with the base default being the NIST ECDSA signature
algorithm with the P-256 curve and the SHA-256 hash function.
5.3.12. Lock assertion Claim and Format
This is the format of the claim regarding the state of the asset in
the origin network. The claim is network-dependent in the sense that
different asset networks or systems may utilize a different asset
locking (disablement) mechanism.
The sender gateway provides the choice of the format to the receiver
gateway. Mechanisms to establish this value between the sender and
receiver gateways may be utilized prior commencing the SAT protocol.
However, these are out of scope.
5.4. Negotiation of Security Protocols and Parameters
The peer gateways in SATP must establish a TLS session between them
prior to starting the transfer initiation stage (Stage-0). The TLS
session continues until the transfer is completed at the end of the
commitment establishment stage (Stage-3).
In the following, the sender gateway is referred to as the client
while the received gateway as the server.
5.4.1. TLS Secure Channel Establishment
TLS 1.2 or higher MUST be implemented to protect gateway
communications. TLS 1.3 or higher SHOULD be implemented where both
gateways support TLS 1.3 or higher.
5.4.2. Client offers supported credential schemes
Prior to commecing the TLS 1.3 secure channel establishment, the
client (sender gateway) may choose to send a JSON block containing
information regarding the client's supported credential schemes.
The purpose of the credential scheme is to enable the client to
deliver to server the relevant identity information in that scheme
regarding the gateway-identity and gateway-owner identity
information.
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5.4.3. Server selects supported credential scheme
If the client (sender gateway) transmits a list of supported
credential schemes, the server (recipient gateway) selects one
acceptable credential scheme from the offered schemes.
If no acceptable credential scheme was offered, a "No Acceptable
Scheme" error is returned by the server.
5.4.4. Client asserts or proves identity
The details of the assertion/verification step are specific to the
chosen credential scheme and are outside the scope of this document.
5.4.5. Messages can now be exchanged
Handshaking is complete at this point, and the client and server can
begin exchanging SATP messages.
6. Overview of Message Flows
The SATP message flows are logically divided into three (3) stages
[ARCH], with the preparatory stage denoted as Stage-0. How the tasks
are achieved in Stage-0 is out of the scope of the current
specification.
The Stage-1 flows pertains to the initialization of the transfer
between the two gateways.
After both gateways agree to commence the transfer at the start of
Stage-2, the sender gateway G1 must deliver a signed assertion that
it has correctly performed the relevant action on the asset within
the origin network (NW1). Examples of actions by G1 include
performing a temporary lock on the asset, or performing a permanent
disablement (burn) of the asset in NW1.
If that signed assertion is accepted by gateway G2, it must in return
transmit a signed receipt to gateway G1 that it has correctly
performed the relevant corresponding action on destination network
(NW2). Examples of actions by G2 include creating (minting) a
temporary asset under its control in NW2.
The Stage-3 flows commit gateways G1 and G2 to the burn and mint in
Stage-2. The sender gateway G1 must make the lock on the asset in
the origin network NW1 to be permanent (burn). The receiver gateway
G2 must assign (mint) the asset in the destination network NW2 to the
correct beneficiary.
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The reader is directed to [ARCH] for further discussion of this
model.
App1 NW1 G1 G2 NW2 App2
..|.....|............|......................|............|.....|..
| | | Stage 1 | | |
| | | | | |
| | (1.1)|--Transf. Proposal -->| | |
| | | | | |
| | |<--Proposal Receipt---|(1.2) | |
| | | | | |
| | (1.3)|---Transf. Commence-->| | |
| | | | | |
| | |<----ACK Commence-----|(1.4) | |
| | | | | |
..|.....|............|......................|............|.....|..
| | | Stage 2 | | |
| | | | | |
| |<---Lock----|(2.1) | | |
| | | | | |
| | (2.2)|----Lock-Assertion--->| | |
| | | | | |
| | | (2.3)|--Record--->| |
| | | | | |
| | |<--Assertion Receipt--|(2.4) | |
| | | | | |
..|.....|............|......................|............|.....|..
| | | Stage 3 | | |
| | | | | |
| | (3.1)|----Commit Prepare--->| | |
| | | | | |
| | | (3.2)|----Mint--->| |
| | | | | |
| | |<----Commit Ready-----|(3.3) | |
| | | | | |
| |<---Burn----|(3.4) | | |
| | | | | |
| | (3.5)|-----Commit Final---->| | |
| | | | | |
| | | (3.6)|---Assign-->| |
| | | | | |
| | |<-----ACK Final-------|(3.7) | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| |<--Record---|(3.8) | | |
| | | | | |
| | (3.9)|--Transfer Complete-->| | |
..|.....|............|......................|............|.....|..
Figure 2
7. Identity and Asset Verification Stage (Stage 0)
Prior to commencing the asset transfer from the sender gateway
(client) to the recipient gateway (server), both gateways must
perform a number of verification steps. The types of information
required by both the sender and recipient are use-case dependent and
asset-type dependent.
The verifications include, but not limited to, the following:
* Verification of the gateway signature public key: The sender
gateway and receiver gateway must validate their respective
signature public keys that will later be used to sign assertions
and claims. This may include validating the X509 certificates of
these keys.
* Gateway owner verification: This is the verification of the
identity (e.g. LEI) of the owners of the gateways.
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* Gateway device and state validation: This is the device
attestation evidence [RFC9334] that a gateway must collect and
convey to each other, where a verifier is assumed to be available
to decode, parse and appraise the evidence.
* Originator and beneficiary identity verification: This is the
identity and public-key of the entity (originator) in the origin
network seeking to transfer the asset to another entity
(beneficiary) in the destination network.
These are considered out of scope in the current specifications, and
are assumed to have been successfully completed prior to the
commencement of the transfer initiation flow. The reader is directed
to [ARCH] for further discussion regarding Stage-0.
8. Transfer Initiation Stage (Stage 1)
This section describes the transfer initiation stage, where the
sender gateway and the receiver gateway prepare for the start of the
asset transfer.
The sender gateway proposes the set of transfer parameters and asset-
related artifacts for the transfer to the receiver gateway. These
are contained in the Transfer Initiation Claim.
If the receiver gateway accepts the proposal, it returns a signed
receipt message for the proposal indicating it agrees to proceed to
the next stage. If the receiver gateway rejects any parameters or
artifacts in the proposal, it can provide a counteroffer to the
sender gateway by responding with a proposal reject message carrying
alternative parameters.
Gateways MUST support the use of the HTTP GET and POST methods
defined in RFC 2616 [RFC2616] for the endpoint.
Clients (sender gateway) MAY use the HTTP GET or POST methods to send
messages in this stage to the server (recipient gateway). If using
the HTTP GET method, the request parameters may be serialized using
URI Query String Serialization.
(NOTE: Flows occur over TLS. Nonces are not shown).
8.1. Transfer Initialization Claim
This is set of artifacts pertaining to the asset that must be agreed
upon between the client (sender gateway) and the server (recipient
gateway).
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The Transfer Initialization Claim consists of the following:
* digitalAssetId REQUIRED: This is the globally unique identifier
for the digital asset located in the origin network.
* assetProfileId REQUIRED: This is the globally unique identifier
for the asset-profile definition (document) on which the digital
asset was issued.
* verifiedOriginatorEntityId REQUIRED: This is the identity data of
the originator entity (person or organization) in the origin
network. This information must be verified by the sender gateway.
* verifiedBeneficiaryEntityId REQUIRED: This is the identity data of
the beneficiary entity (person or organization) in the destination
network. This information must be verified by the receiver
gateway.
* originatorPubkey REQUIRED. This is the public key of the asset
owner (originator) in the origin network or system.
* beneficiaryPubkey REQUIRED. This is the public key of the
beneficiary in the destination network.
* senderGatewaySignaturePublicKey REQUIRED. This is the public key
of the key-pair used by the sender gateway to sign assertions and
receipts.
* receiverGatewaySignaturePublicKey REQUIRED. This is the public
key of the key-pair used by the recevier gateway to sign
assertions and receipts.
* senderGatewayId REQUIRED. This is the identifier of the sender
gateway.
* recipientGatewayId REQUIRED. This is the identifier of the
receiver gateway.
* senderGatewayNetworkId REQUIRED. This is the identifier of the
origin network or system behind the client.
* recipientGatewayNetworkId REQUIRED. This is the identifier of the
destination network or system behind the server.
* senderGatewayDeviceIdentityPubkey OPTIONAL. The device public key
of the sender gateway (client).
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* receiverGatewayDeviceIdentityPubkey OPTIONAL. The device public
key of the receiver gateway
* senderGatewayOwnerId OPTIONAL: This is the identity information of
the owner or operator of the sender gateway.
* receiverGatewayOwnerId OPTIONAL: This is the identity information
of the owner or operator of the recipient gateway.
Here is an example representation in JSON format:
{ "digitalAssetId": "2c949e3c-5edb-4a2c-9ef4-20de64b9960d",
"assetProfileId": "38561",
"verifiedOriginatorEntityId": "CN=Alice, OU=Example Org Unit,
O=Example, L=New York, C=US",
"verifiedBeneficiaryEntityId": "CN=Bob, OU=Case Org Unit, O=Case,
L=San Francisco, C=US",
"originatorPubkey": "0304b9f34d3898b27f85b3d88fa069a879abe14db5060dde
466dd1e4a31ff75e44",
"beneficiaryPubkey": "02a7bc058e1c6f3a79601d046069c9b6d0cb8ea5afc99e6
074a5997284756fc9ae",
"senderGatewaySignaturePublicKey": "02a7bc058e1c6f3a79601d046069c9b6d
0cb8ea5afc99e6074a5997284756fc9ae",
"receiverGatewaySignaturePublicKey": "0243b12ada6515ada3bf99a7da32e84
f00383b5765fd7701528e660449ba5ef260",
"senderGatewayId": "GW1",
"recipientGatewayId": "GW2",
"senderGatewayNetworkId": "1",
"recipientGatewayNetworkId": "43114",
"senderGatewayDeviceIdentityPubkey": "0245785e34b4a7b457dd4683a297ea3
d78bab35f8b2583df55d9df8c69604d0e73",
"receiverGatewayDeviceIdentityPubkey": "03763f0bc48ff154cff45ea533a9d
8a94349d65a45573e4de6ad6495b6e834312b",
"senderGatewayOwnerId": "CN=GatewayOps, OU=GatewayOps Systems,
O=GatewayOps LTD, L=Austin, C=US",
"receiverGatewayOwnerId": "CN=BridgeSolutions, OU=BridgeSolutions
Engineering, O=BridgeSolutions LTD, L=Austin, C=US"
}
8.2. Conveyance of Gateway and Network Capabilities
This is set of parameters pertaining to the origin network and the
destination network, and the technical capabilities supported by the
peer gateways.
Some network-specific parameters regarding the origin network may be
relevant for a receiver gateway to evaluate its ability to process
the proposed transfer.
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For example, the average duration of time of a lock to be held by a
sender gateway may inform the receiver gateway about delay
expectations.
The gateway and network capabilities list is as follows:
* gatewayDefaultSignatureAlgorithm REQUIRED: The default digital
signature algorithm (algorithm-id) used by a gateway to sign
claims.
* gatewaySupportedSignatureAlgorithms OPTIONAL: The list of other
digital signature algorithm (algorithm-id) supported by a gateway
to sign claims
* networkLockType REQUIRED: The default locking mechanism used by a
network. These can be (i) timelock, (ii) hashlock, (iii)
hashtimelock, and so on.
* networkLockExpirationTime REQUIRED: The duration of time (in
seconds) for a lock to expire in the network.
* gatewayCredentialProfile REQUIRED: Specify type of auth (e.g.,
SAML, OAuth, X.509).
* gatewayLoggingProfile REQUIRED: contains the profile regarding the
logging procedure. Default is local store
* gatewayAccessControlProfile REQUIRED: the profile regarding the
confidentiality of the log entries being stored. Default is only
the gateway that created the logs can access them.
Here is an example representation in JSON format:
{ "gatewayDefaultSignatureAlgorithm": "ECDSA",
"gatewaySupportedSignatureAlgorithms": ["ECDSA", "RSA"],
"networkLockType": "HASH_TIME_LOCK",
"networkLockExpirationTime": 120,
"gatewayCredentialProfile": "OAUTH",
"gatewayLoggingProfile": "LOCAL_STORE",
"gatewayAccessControlProfile": "RBAC"
}
8.3. Transfer Proposal Message
The purpose of this message is for the sender gateway as the client
to initiate an asset transfer session with the receiver gateway as
the server.
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The client transmits a proposal message that carries the claim
related to the asset to be transferred. This message must be signed
by the client.
This message is sent from the client to the Transfer Initialization
Endpoint at the server.
The parameters of this message consist of the following:
* version REQUIRED: SAT protocol Version (major, minor).
* messageType REQUIRED: urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:transfer-proposal-msg.
* sessionId REQUIRED: A unique identifier chosen by the client to
identify the current session.
* transferContextId REQUIRED: A unique identifier used to identify
the current transfer session at the application layer.
* transferInitClaim REQUIRED: The set of artifacts and parameters as
the basis for the current transfer.
* transferInitClaimFormat REQUIRED: The format of the transfer
initialization claim.
* gatewayAndNetworkCapabilities REQUIRED: The set of origin gateway
and network parameters reported by the client to the server.
Here is an example of the message request body:
{ "version": "1.0",
"messageType": "urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:transfer-proposal-msg",
"sessionId": "d66a567c-11f2-4729-a0e9-17ce1faf47c1",
"transferContextId": "89e04e71-bba2-4363-933c-262f42ec07a0",
"transferInitClaim": {
"digitalAssetId": "2c949e3c-5edb-4a2c-9ef4-20de64b9960d",
"assetProfileId": "38561",
"verifiedOriginatorEntityId": "CN=Alice, OU=Example Org Unit,
O=Example, L=New York, C=US",
"verifiedBeneficiaryEntityId": "CN=Bob, OU=Case Org Unit, O=Case,
L=San Francisco, C=US",
"originatorPubkey": "0304b9f34d3898b27f85b3d88fa069a879abe14db5060dde
466dd1e4a31ff75e44",
"beneficiaryPubkey": "02a7bc058e1c6f3a79601d046069c9b6d0cb8ea5afc99e6
074a5997284756fc9ae",
"senderGatewaySignaturePublicKey": "02a7bc058e1c6f3a79601d046069c9b6d
0cb8ea5afc99e6074a5997284756fc9ae",
"receiverGatewaySignaturePublicKey": "0243b12ada6515ada3bf99a7da32e84
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f00383b5765fd7701528e660449ba5ef260",
"senderGatewayId": "GW1",
"recipientGatewayId": "GW2",
"senderGatewayNetworkId": "1",
"recipientGatewayNetworkId": "43114",
"senderGatewayDeviceIdentityPubkey": "0245785e34b4a7b457dd4683a297ea3
d78bab35f8b2583df55d9df8c69604d0e73",
"receiverGatewayDeviceIdentityPubkey": "03763f0bc48ff154cff45ea533a9d
8a94349d65a45573e4de6ad6495b6e834312b",
"senderGatewayOwnerId": "CN=GatewayOps, OU=GatewayOps Systems,
O=GatewayOps LTD, L=Austin, C=US",
"receiverGatewayOwnerId": "CN=BridgeSolutions, OU=BridgeSolutions
Engineering, O=BridgeSolutions LTD, L=Austin, C=US"
},
"transferInitClaimFormat": "TRANSFER_INIT_CLAIM_FORMAT_1",
"gatewayAndNetworkCapabilities": {
"gatewayDefaultSignatureAlgorithm": "ECDSA",
"gatewaySupportedSignatureAlgorithms": ["ECDSA", "RSA"],
"networkLockType": "HASH_TIME_LOCK",
"networkLockExpirationTime": 120,
"gatewayCredentialProfile": "OAUTH",
"gatewayLoggingProfile": "LOCAL_STORE",
"gatewayAccessControlProfile": "RBAC"
},
}
8.4. Transfer Proposal Receipt Message
The purpose of this message is for the server to indicate explicit
acceptance of the parameters in the claim part of the transfer
proposal message.
The message must be signed by the server.
The message is sent from the server to the Transfer Proposal Endpoint
at the client.
The parameters of this message consist of the following:
* version REQUIRED: SAT protocol Version (major, minor).
* messageType REQUIRED: urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:proposal-receipt-msg.
* sessionId REQUIRED: A unique identifier chosen by the client to
identify the current session.
* transferContextId REQUIRED: A unique identifier used to identify
the current transfer session at the application layer.
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* hashTransferInitClaim REQUIRED: Hash of the Transfer
Initialization Claim received in the Transfer Proposal Message.
* timestamp REQUIRED: timestamp referring to when the Initialization
Request Message was received.
Here is an example of the message request body:
{
"version": "1.0",
"messageType": "urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:proposal-receipt-msg",
"sessionId": "d66a567c-11f2-4729-a0e9-17ce1faf47c1",
"transferContextId": "89e04e71-bba2-4363-933c-262f42ec07a0",
"hashTransferInitClaim":
"154dfaf0406038641e7e59509febf41d9d5d80f367db96198690151f4758ca6e",
"timestamp": "2024-10-03T12:02+00Z",
}\
8.5. Reject Message
The purpose of this message is for the server to indicate explicit
rejection of the the previous message received from the client. This
message can be sent at any time in the session. The server MUST
include an error code in this message. A reject message is taken to
mean an immediate termination of the session.
The message must be signed by the server.
The parameters of this message consist of the following:
* version REQUIRED: SAT protocol Version (major, minor).
* messageType REQUIRED: urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:reject-msg
* sessionId REQUIRED: A unique identifier chosen by the client to
identify the current session.
* transferContextId REQUIRED: A unique identifier used to identify
the current transfer session at the application layer.
* hashPrevMessage REQUIRED: The hash of the last message that caused
the rejection to occur.
* reasonCode REQUIRED: the error code causing the rejection.
* timestamp REQUIRED: timestamp of this message.
Here is an example of the message request body:
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{
"version": "1.0",
"messageType": "urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:reject-msg",
"sessionId": "d66a567c-11f2-4729-a0e9-17ce1faf47c1",
"transferContextId": "89e04e71-bba2-4363-933c-262f42ec07a0",
"hashPrevMessage":
"154dfaf0406038641e7e59509febf41d9d5d80f367db96198690151f4758ca6e",
"reasonCode": "err_2.1",
"timestamp": "2024-10-03T12:02+00Z",
}
8.6. Transfer Commence Message
The purpose of this message is for the client to signal to the server
that the client is ready to start the transfer of the digital asset.
This message must be signed by the client.
This message is sent by the client as a response to the Transfer
Proposal Receipt Message previously received from the server.
This message is sent by the client to the Transfer Commence Endpoint
at the server.
The parameters of this message consist of the following:
* messageType REQUIRED. MUST be the value
urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:transfer-commence-msg.
* sessionId REQUIRED: A unique identifier chosen earlier by the
client in the Initialization Request Message.
* transferContextId REQUIRED: A unique identifier used to identify
the current transfer session at the application layer.
* hashTransferInitClaim REQUIRED: Hash of the Transfer
Initialization Claim in the Transfer Proposal message.
* hashPrevMessage REQUIRED. The hash of the last message, in this
case the Transfer Proposal Receipt message.
For example, the client makes the following HTTP request using TLS:
{
"messageType": "urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:transfer-commence-msg",
"sessionId": "d66a567c-11f2-4729-a0e9-17ce1faf47c1",
"transferContextId": "89e04e71-bba2-4363-933c-262f42ec07a0",
"hashTransferInitClaim":
"154dfaf0406038641e7e59509febf41d9d5d80f367db96198690151f4758ca6e",
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"hashPrevMessage":
"0b0aecc2680e0d8a86bece6b54c454fba67068799484f477cdf2f87e6541db66",
}
8.7. Commence Response Message (ACK-Commence)
The purpose of this message is for the server to indicate agreement
to proceed with the asset transfer, based on the artifacts found in
the previous Transfer Proposal Message.
This message is sent by the server to the Transfer Commence Endpoint
at the client.
The message must be signed by the server.
The parameters of this message consist of the following: The
parameters of this message consist of the following:
* messageType REQUIRED urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:ack-commence-msg
* sessionId REQUIRED: A unique identifier chosen earlier by the
client in the Initialization Request Message.
* transferContextId REQUIRED: A unique identifier used to identify
the current transfer session at the application layer.
* hashPrevMessage REQUIRED.The hash of the last message, in this
case the the Transfer Commence Message.
An example of a success response could be as follows:
{
"messageType": "urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:ack-commence-msg",
"sessionId": "d66a567c-11f2-4729-a0e9-17ce1faf47c1",
"transferContextId": "89e04e71-bba2-4363-933c-262f42ec07a0",
"hashPrevMessage":
"dd5a61a26fc8f5d72e5ca6052c2a1fca1613115e5582d9417d336375c196db89",
}
9. Lock Assertion Stage (Stage 2)
The messages in this stage pertain to the sender gateway providing
the recipient gateway with a signed assertion that the asset in the
origin network has been locked or disabled and under the control of
the sender gateway.
In the following, the sender gateway takes the role of the client
while the recipient gateway takes the role of the server.
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The flow follows a request-response model. The client makes a
request (POST) to the Lock-Assertion Endpoint at the server.
Gateways MUST support the use of the HTTP GET and POST methods
defined in RFC 2616 [RFC2616] for the endpoint.
Clients MAY use the HTTP GET or POST methods to send messages in this
stage to the server. If using the HTTP GET method, the request
parameters may be serialized using URI Query String Serialization.
(NOTE: Flows occur over TLS. Nonces are not shown).
9.1. Lock Assertion Message
The purpose of this message is for the client (sender gateway) to
convey a signed claim to the server (receiver gateway) declaring that
the asset in question has been locked or escrowed by the client in
the origin network (e.g. to prevent double-spending).
The format of the claim is dependent on the network or system of the
client and is outside the scope of this specification.
This message is sent from the client to the Lock Assertion Endpoint
at the server.
The server must validate the claim (payload) in this message prior to
the next step.
The message must be signed by the client.
The parameters of this message consist of the following:
* messageType REQUIRED urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:lock-assert-msg.
* sessionId REQUIRED: A unique identifier chosen earlier by the
client in the Initialization Request Message.
* transferContextId REQUIRED: A unique identifier used to identify
the current transfer session at the application layer.
* lockAssertionClaim REQUIRED. The lock assertion claim or
statement by the client.
* lockAssertionClaimFormat REQUIRED. The format of the claim.
* lockAssertionExpiration REQUIRED. The duration of time of the
lock or escrow upon the asset.
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* hashPrevMessage REQUIRED. The hash of the previous message.
Example:
{
"messageType": "urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:lock-assert-msg",
"sessionId": "d66a567c-11f2-4729-a0e9-17ce1faf47c1",
"transferContextId": "89e04e71-bba2-4363-933c-262f42ec07a0",
"lockAssertionClaim": {},
"lockAssertionClaimFormat": "LOCK_ASSERTION_CLAIM_FORMAT_1",
"lockAssetionExpiration": "2024-12-23T23:59:59.999Z",
"hashPrevMessage":
"b2c3e916703c4ee4494f45bcf52414a2c3edfe53643510ff158ff4a406678346",
}
9.2. Lock Assertion Receipt Message
The purpose of this message is for the server (receiver gateway) to
indicate acceptance of the claim in the lock-assertion message
delivered by the client (sender gateway) in the previous message.
This message is sent from the server to the Assertion Receipt
Endpoint at the client.
The message must be signed by the server.
The parameters of this message consist of the following:
* messageType REQUIRED urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:assertion-receipt-msg.
* sessionId REQUIRED: A unique identifier chosen earlier by the
client in the Initialization Request Message.
* transferContextId REQUIRED: A unique identifier used to identify
the current transfer session at the application layer.
* hashPrevMessage REQUIRED. The hash of the previous message.
Example:
{
"messageType": "urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:assertion-receipt-msg",
"sessionId": "d66a567c-11f2-4729-a0e9-17ce1faf47c1",
"transferContextId": "89e04e71-bba2-4363-933c-262f42ec07a0",
"hashPrevMessage":
"16c983122d7506c78f906c15ca1dcc7142a0fa94552cdea9578fe87419c2c5d0",
}
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10. Commitment Preparation and Finalization (Stage 3)
This section describes the transfer commitment agreement between the
client (sender gateway) and the server (receiver gateway).
This stage must be completed within the time specified in the
lockAssertionExpiration value in the lock-assertion message.
In the following, the sender gateway takes the role of the client
while the recipient gateway takes the role of the server.
The flow follows a request-response model. The client makes a
request (POST) to the Transfer Commitment endpoint at the server.
Gateways MUST support the use of the HTTP GET and POST methods
defined in RFC 2616 [RFC2616] for the endpoint.
Clients MAY use the HTTP GET or POST methods to send messages in this
stage to the server. If using the HTTP GET method, the request
parameters may be serialized using URI Query String Serialization.
The client and server may be required to sign certain messages in
order to provide standalone proof (for non-repudiation) independent
of the secure channel between the client and server. This proof may
be required for audit verifications post-event.
(NOTE: Flows occur over TLS. Nonces are not shown).
10.1. Commit Preparation Message (Commit-Prepare)
The purpose of this message is for the client to indicate its
readiness to begin the commitment of the transfer.
This message is sent from the client to the Commit Prepare Endpoint
at the server.
The message must be signed by the client.
The parameters of this message consist of the following:
* messageType REQUIRED. It MUST be the value
urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:commit-prepare-msg
* sessionId REQUIRED: A unique identifier chosen earlier by the
client in the Initialization Request Message.
* transferContextId REQUIRED: A unique identifier used to identify
the current transfer session at the application layer.
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* hashPrevMessage REQUIRED. The hash of the previous message.
Example:
{
"messageType": "urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:commit-prepare-msg",
"sessionId": "d66a567c-11f2-4729-a0e9-17ce1faf47c1",
"transferContextId": "89e04e71-bba2-4363-933c-262f42ec07a0",
"hashPrevMessage":
"399bdadc07fe0bd57c4dfdd6cc176ceeca50a5e744f774154eccbeee8908fbaa",
}
10.2. Commit Ready Message (Commit-Ready)
The purpose The purpose of this message is for the server to indicate
to the client that: (i) the server has created (minted) an equivalent
asset in the destination network; (ii) that the newly minted asset
has been self-assigned to the server; and (iii) that the server is
ready to proceed to the next step.
This message is sent from the server to the Commit Ready Endpoint at
the client.
The message must be signed by the server.
The parameters of this message consist of the following:
* messageType REQUIRED. It MUST be the value
urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:commit-ready-msg.
* sessionId REQUIRED: A unique identifier chosen earlier by client
in the Initialization Request Message.
* transferContextId REQUIRED: A unique identifier used to identify
the current transfer session at the application layer.
* hashPrevMessage REQUIRED. The hash of the previous message.
* mintAssertionClaim REQUIRED. The mint assertion claim or
statement by the server.
* mintAssertionFormat REQUIRED. The format of the assertion
payload.
Example:
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{
"messageType": "urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:commit-ready-msg",
"sessionId": "d66a567c-11f2-4729-a0e9-17ce1faf47c1",
"transferContextId": "89e04e71-bba2-4363-933c-262f42ec07a0",
"hashPrevMessage":
"8dcc8dc4e6c2c979474b42d24d3747ce4607a92637d1a7b294857ff7288b8e46",
"mintAssertionClaim": {},
"mintAssertionClaimFormat": "MINT_ASSERTION_CLAIM_FORMAT_1",
}
10.3. Commit Final Assertion Message (Commit-Final)
The purpose of this message is for the client to indicate to the
server that the client (sender gateway) has completed the
extinguishment (burn) of the asset in the origin network.
The message must contain a standalone claim related to the
extinguishment of the asset by the client. The standalone claim must
be signed by the client.
This message is sent from the client to the Commit Final Assertion
Endpoint at the server.
The message must be signed by the server.
The parameters of this message consist of the following:
* messageType REQUIRED. It MUST be the value
urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:commit-final-msg.
* sessionId REQUIRED: A unique identifier chosen earlier by the
client in the Initialization Request Message.
* transferContextId REQUIRED: A unique identifier used to identify
the current transfer session at the application layer.
* hashPrevMessage REQUIRED. The hash of the previous message.
* burnAssertionClaim REQUIRED. The burn assertion signed claim or
statement by the client.
* burnAssertionClaimFormat REQUIRED. The format of the claim.
Example:
{
"messageType": "urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:commit-final-msg",
"sessionId": "d66a567c-11f2-4729-a0e9-17ce1faf47c1",
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"transferContextId": "89e04e71-bba2-4363-933c-262f42ec07a0",
"hashPrevMessage":
"b92f13007216c58f2b51a8621599c3aef6527b02c8284e90c6a54a181d898e02",
"burnAssertionClaim": {},
"burnAssertionClaimFormat": "BURN_ASSERTION_CLAIM_FORMAT_1",
}
10.4. Commit-Final Acknowledgement Receipt Message (ACK-Final-Receipt)
The purpose of this message is to indicate to the client that the
server has completed the assignment of the newly minted asset to the
intended beneficiary at the destination network.
This message is sent from the server to the Commit Final Receipt
Endpoint at the client.
The message must be signed by the server.
The parameters of this message consist of the following:
* messageType REQUIRED. It MUST be the value
urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:ack-commit-final-msg.
* sessionId REQUIRED: A unique identifier chosen earlier by client
in the Initialization Request Message.
* transferContextId REQUIRED: A unique identifier used to identify
the current transfer session at the application layer.
* hashPrevMessage REQUIRED. The hash of the previous message.
* assignmentAssertionClaim REQUIRED. The claim or statement by the
server that the asset has been assigned by the server to the
intended beneficiary.
* assignmentAssertionClaimFormat REQUIRED. The format of the claim.
Example:
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{
"messageType": "urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:ack-commit-final-msg",
"sessionId": "d66a567c-11f2-4729-a0e9-17ce1faf47c1",
"transferContextId": "89e04e71-bba2-4363-933c-262f42ec07a0",
"hashPrevMessage":
"9c8f07c22ccf6888fc0306fee0799325efb87dfd536d90bb47d97392f020e998",
"assignmentAssertionClaim": {},
"assignmentAssertionClaimFormat":
"ASSIGNMENT_ASSERTION_CLAIM_FORMAT_1",
}
10.5. Transfer Complete Message
The purpose of this message is for the client to indicate to the
server that the asset transfer session (identified by sessionId) has
been completed and no further messages are to be expected from the
client in regards to this transfer instance.
The message closes the first message of Stage 2 (Transfer Commence
Message).
This message is sent from the client to the Transfer Complete
Endpoint at the server.
The message must be signed by the client.
The parameters of this message consist of the following:
* messageType REQUIRED. It MUST be the value
urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:commit-transfer-complete-msg.
* sessionId REQUIRED: A unique identifier chosen earlier by the
client in the Initialization Request Message.
* transferContextId REQUIRED: A unique identifier used to identify
the current transfer session at the application layer.
* hashPrevMessage REQUIRED. The hash of the previous message.
* hashTransferCommence REQUIRED. The hash of the Transfer Commence
message at the start of Stage 2.
Example:
{
"messageType": "urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:commit-transfer-complete-msg",
"sessionId": "d66a567c-11f2-4729-a0e9-17ce1faf47c1",
"transferContextId": "89e04e71-bba2-4363-933c-262f42ec07a0",
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"hashPrevMessage":
"9c8f07c22ccf6888fc0306fee0799325efb87dfd536d90bb47d97392f020e998",
"hashTransferCommence":
"4ba76c69265f4215b4e2d2f24fe56e708512fdb49e27f50d2ac0095928e1531b",
}
10.6. Error Message
The purpose of this message is for either the sender or the receiver
gateways to indicate to its peer that an error has occurred within
the transfer protocol flow.
This message must contain the error type (see the appendix) and the
course of action indicated by the severity level. Typicaly, the
action taken will be the immediate termination of the session.
* messageType REQUIRED. It MUST be the value
urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:error-msg.
* sessionId REQUIRED: This is the current session in which the error
pertains.
* errorMsgType: The pevious msg-type that was erronous.
* errorType REQUIRED: This is the error code.
* errorSeverity REQUIRED: This is the severity level of the error,
leading to the action.
Futher discussion on protocol errors can be found below.
10.7. Session abort message
The purpose of this message is to indicate that one of the peer
gateways have decided not to proceed with the session. No further
messages will be delivered after the abort message.
* messageType REQUIRED. It MUST be the value
urn:ietf:satp:msgtype:session-abort-msg.
* sessionId REQUIRED: This is the current session in which the abort
occurs.
The effect of session aborts on the state of the asset is discussed
below.
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11. SATP Session Resumption
This section answers the question of how can a backup gateway build
trust with the counterparty gateway to resume the execution of the
protocol, in the presence of errors and crashes?
Gateways may enter a faulty state at any time while executing the
protocol. The faulty state can manifest itself in incorrect
behavior, leading to gateways emitting alerts and errors.
In some instances, gateways may crash. We employ either the primary-
backup or self-healing paradigm, meaning that the crashed gateway
will eventually be replaced by a functioning one, or recover,
respectively.
When a crash occurs, we initiate a recovery procedure by the backup
gateway or the recovered gateway, as defined in the crash recovery
draft [I-D.draft-belchior-satp-gateway-recovery]. In either case, if
the recovery happens within a time period defined as max_timeout (in
Stage 2), the recovered gateway triggers a session resumption. The
schema and order of the recovered messages are specified in the crash
recovery draft.
In the case where there is no answer from the gateway within the
specified max_timeout, the counterparty gateway rollbacks the process
until that stage. Upon recovery, the crashed gateway learns that the
counterparty gateway has initiated a rollback, and it proceeds
accordingly (by also initiating a rollback). Note that rollbacks can
also happen in case of unresolved errors.
The non-crashed gateway that conducts the rollback tries to
communicate with the crashed gateway from time to time (self-healing)
or to contact the backup gateways (primary-backup). In any case,
upon the completion of a rollback, the non-crashed gateway sends a
ROLLBACK message to the recovered gateway to notify that a rollback
happened. The recovered gateway should answer with ROLLBACK-ACK.
Since the self-healing recovery process does not require changes to
the protocol (since from the counterparty gateway perspective, the
sender gateway is just taking longer than normal; there are no new
actions done or logs recorded), we focus on the primary-backup
paradigm.
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11.1. Primary-Backup Session Resumption
Upon a gateway recovering using primary-backup, a new gateway
(recovered gateway) takes over the crashed gateway. The counterparty
gateway assures that the recovered gateway is legitimate (according
to the crash recovery specification).
After the recovery, the gateways exchange information about their
current view of the protocol, since the crashed gateway may have been
in the middle of executing the protocol when it crashed.
After that, the gateways agree on the current state of the protocol.
11.2. Recovery Messages
We have omitted the logging procedure (only focusing on the different
messages). As defined in the crash recovery draft
[I-D.draft-belchior-satp-gateway-recovery], there is a set of
messages that are exchanged between the recovered gateway and
counterparty gateway:
* RECOVER: when a gateway crashes and recovers, it sends a RECOVER
message to the counterparty gateway, informing them of its most
recent state. The message contains various parameters such as the
session ID, message type, SATP stage, context ID, a flag
indicating if the sender is a backup gateway, the new public key
if the sender is a backup, the timestamp of the last known log
entry, and the sender's digital signature.
* RECOVER-UPDATE: Upon receiving the RECOVER message, the
counterparty gateway sends a RECOVER-UPDATE message. The message
includes parameters such as the session ID, message type, the hash
of the previous message, the list of log messages that the
recovered gateway needs to update, and the sender's digital
signature.
* RECOVER-SUCCESS: The recovered gateway responds with a RECOVER-
SUCCESS message if its logs have been successfully updated. If
there are inconsistencies detected, the recovered gateway
initiates a dispute with a RECOVER-DISPUTE message. The message
parameters include session ID, message type, the hash of the
previous message, a boolean indicating success, a list of hashes
of log entries that were appended to the recovered gateway log,
and the sender's digital signature.
In case the recovery procedure has failed and a rollback process is
needed, the following messages are used:
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* ROLLBACK: A gateway that initiates a rollback sends a ROLLBACK
message. The message parameters include session ID, message type,
a boolean indicating success, a list of actions performed to
rollback a state (e.g., UNLOCK, BURN), a list of proofs specific
to the DLT [SATP], and the sender's digital signature.
* ROLLBACK-ACK: Upon successful rollback, the counterparty gateway
sends a ROLLBACK-ACK message to the recovered gateway
acknowledging that the rollback has been performed successfully.
The message parameters are similar to those of the ROLLBACK
message.
12. Error Messages
SATP distinguishes between session termination initiated by the user
at the application layer from session termination cased by errors at
the SATP protocol layer.
A gateway can transmit an error message at any point in the SATP
protocol flow to its peer gateway.
The default action to be taken by the transmitting gateway is to
terminate the session immediately.
Error messages at the SATP protocol layer is distinct from time-outs
due to gateway crashes.
12.1. Session Termination Notification
Session closure initiated at the application layer is not considered
to be an error at the SATP protocol layer.
The message type used for application-initiated session termination:
session-abort-msg.
The message type used to indicate protocols errors: error-msg.
A gateway can transmit the session abort message at any point in the
SATP protocol flow. No further messages will be sent by the gateway.
Any data received after the session termination message MUST be
ignored.
12.2. Connection Errors
Errors may occur at the connection layer, independent of the flows at
the SATP layer and the errors there.
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(a) connectionError: There is an error in the TLS session
establishment (TLS error codes should be reported-up to the gateway
level)
(b) badCertificate: The gateway TLS certificate was corrupt,
contained signatures, that did not verify correctly, etc. (Some
common TLS level errors: unsupported_certificate,
certificate_revoked, certificate_expired, certificate_unknown,
unknown_ca).
12.3. SATP Protocol Errors
The errors at the SATP level pertain to protocol flow and the
information carried within each message. These are enumerated in the
appendix.
12.4. Effectiveness of Session Aborts
The effectiveness of a session-abort message on the state of the
asset depends on where the abort message occurs in the SATP protocol
flow in Figure 2.
Note that a session-abort message by be lost and never be received by
the peer gateway. Gateways can crash prior to receiving an abort
message.
If gateway G2 transmits a session-abort message after gateway G1
performs a lock (msgtype:lock-assert-msg) on the asset in network
NW1, the gateway G1 can always unlock the asset and restore its
state.
If either gateway G1 or gateway G2 transmits a session-abort message
after gateway G1 sends a lock-assert message (msgtype:lock-assert-
msg) but before G2 sends the commit ready message (msgtype:commit-
ready-msg), the gateway G1 can always unlock the asset and restore
its state in network NW1.
Similarly, if either gateway G1 or gateway G2 transmits a session-
abort message immediately after gateway G1 sends a commit-prepare
message (msgtype:commit-prepare-msg) but before G2 sends the commit
ready message (msgtype:commit-ready-msg), the gateway G2 can always
reverse the changes made by G2 to NW2 (i.e. reverse the assignment-
to-self of the minted asset).
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However, an abort message (occurring in either direction) after
gateway G1 transmits the commit final message (msgtype:commit-final-
msg) will not be effective. This is because G1 has already burned
the asset in NW1 and G2 has already minted the asset in NW2 and has
legally agreed to assign the asset to the appropriate beneficiary in
NW2.
In general, the termination of sessions or aborts occurring before
the sender gateway G1 disables (burns) the asset in NW1 (in flow 3.4
in Figure 2) will incur a minimal cost in terms of computing
resources or fees on the part of both gateways G1 and G2.
13. Security Consideration
Gateways may be of interest to attackers because they enable the
transferal of digital assets across networks and therefore are an
important function in the digital economy.
* Disruptions in transfers and denial of service: Disruptions to a
transfer session may cause not only resource waste (e.g. CPU
usage), but in some cases may result in financial loss on the part
of the gateway operator (e.g. fees charged by network). Denial-
of-service attacks by third parties to a run of the protocol may
result in the termination of the current run (e.g. time-outs at
the SATP layer), and for new attempts to be conducted. If the
gateway selection mechanisms are utilized by networks NW1 and NW2,
such attacks may incur more delays because new gateways may have
to be elected at either network.
* Dishonest gateways: The SATP protocol requires gateways to sign
messages related to the transfer layer, not only to provide
message source authentication and integrity but also to maintain
honesty on the part of the gateways. Gateway-operators may take-
on legal and financial liabilities in certain jurisdictions by
digitally signing messages. Dishonest gateways may intentionally
delay the delivery of certain messages or intentionally fail
(abort) the protocol run at certain crucial points [ARCH]. Two
such crucial points in the message flows are the following: (i)
the commit-final-msg, where the sender G1 asserts it has
extinguished (burned) the asset in the origin network, and (ii)
the ack-prepare-msg where the receiver gateway G2 asserts it is
ready to proceed with the final commitment. If gateway G1
intentionally drops the commit-final-msg (commit-final) such that
gateway G2 times-out, then G2 may suffer financial loss due to
roll-back costs in network NW2. Similarly, if G2 intentionally
drops the ack-prepare-msg to signal that it is ready to proceed
with the commitment (commit-ready), then gateway G1 may time-out
and terminate the protocol run, causing resource waste at G1.
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Operators of gateways should utilize relevant tools to detect
possible dishonest behavior of certain gateways, and select to
have their gateways peer with other reliable gateways.
* Protection of gateway keys: It is crucial to protect the
cryptographic keys utilized by gateways. This includes keys for
secure session establishment (TLS1.3) and keys utilized for
signing SATP messages. Loss of gateway keys may incur financial
loss on the part of the gateway-operator. Implementation of
gateways should consider utilizing tamper-resistant hardware to
store and manage the relevant keys for gateways operational
functions.
* Gateway identification: Mechanisms must be utilized to provide
unique identifiers to gateway implementations to ensure global
uniqueness and reachability. Existing identification mechanisms
such a X509 certificates and Verifiable Credentials (VC) and
Selective Disclosure CBOR Web Tokens (SD-CWT) may be applied for
gateway identification.
* Identification of networks: There needs to be mechanism for
gateways to declare or disclose the asset networks it current
serves. Combined with strong gateway identification, this allows
remote gateways to quickly locate suitable gateways to peer with
for the purposes of asset transfers.
14. IANA Consideration
(TBD)
15. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the following people for their input
and support:
Andre Augusto, Denis Avrilionis, Rafael Belchior, Alexandru Chiriac,
Anthony Culligan, Claire Facer, Martin Gfeller, Wes Hardaker, David
Millman, Krishnasuri Narayanam, Anais Ofranc, Luke Riley, John
Robotham, Orie Steele, Yaron Scheffer, Peter Somogyvari, Weijia
Zhang.
16. Appendix: Error Types
The following lists the error associated with the SATP messages.
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16.1. Transfer Proposal and Receipt errors
The following is the list of errors related to the Transfer Proposal
and Receipt.
Errors related to the transfer context ID and session ID:
* err_1.1.1: Badly formed message: invalid transferContextId.
* err_1.1.2: Badly formed message: invalid sessionId.
* err_1.1.3: Badly formed message: incorect transferInitClaimFormat.
* err_1.1.4: Badly formed message: bad signature.
Errors within one of more claims in the transfer initialization
claim-set:
* err_1.1.11: Badly formed claim: invalid digitalAssetId.
* err_1.1.12: Badly formed claim: invalid assetProfileId.
* err_1.1.13: Badly formed claim: invalid
verifiedOriginatorEntityId.
* err_1.1.14: Badly formed claim: invalid
verifiedBeneficiaryEntityId.
* err_1.1.15: Badly formed claim: invalid originatorPubkey.
* err_1.1.16: Badly formed claim: invalid beneficiaryPubkey.
* err_1.1.17: Badly formed claim: invalid
senderGatewaySignaturePublicKey.
* err_1.1.18: Badly formed claim: invalid
receiverGatewaySignaturePublicKey.
* err_1.1.19: Badly formed claim: invalid senderGatewayId.
* err_1.1.20: Badly formed claim: invalid recipientGatewayId.
Errors within one of more parameters in the gateway and network
capabilities claim-set:
* err_1.1.31: Badly formed parameter: unsupported
gatewayDefaultSignatureAlgorithm.
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* err_1.1.32: Badly formed parameter: unsupported networkLockType.
* err_1.1.33: Badly formed parameter: unsupported
networkLockExpirationTime.
* err_1.1.34: Badly formed parameter: unsupported
gatewayCredentialProfile.
* err_1.1.35: Badly formed parameter: unsupported
gatewayLoggingProfile.
* err_1.1.36: Badly formed parameter: unsupported
gatewayAccessControlProfile.
Errors related to the proposal receipt message:
* err_1.2.1: Badly formed message: mismatch transferContextId.
* err_1.2.2: Badly formed message: mismatch sessionId.
* err_1.2.3: Badly formed message: mismatch hashTransferInitClaim.
* err_1.2.4: Badly formed message: bad signature.
16.2. Transfer Commence and Acknowledgement errors
The following is the list of errors related to the Transfer Commence:
* err_1.3.1: Badly formed message: mismatch transferContextId.
* err_1.3.2: Badly formed message: mismatch sessionId.
* err_1.3.3: Badly formed message: mismatch hashTransferInitClaim.
* err_1.3.4: Badly formed message: mismatch hashPrevMessage.
* err_1.3.5: Badly formed message: bad signature.
The following is the list of errors related to the ACK Commence:
* err_1.4.1: Badly formed message: mismatch transferContextId.
* err_1.4.2: Badly formed message: mismatch sessionId.
* err_1.4.3: Badly formed message: mismatch hashPrevMessage.
* err_1.4.4: Badly formed message: bad signature.
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16.3. Lock Assertion errors
The following is the list of errors related to Lock Assertion:
* err_2.2.1: Badly formed message: mismatch transferContextId.
* err_2.2.2: Badly formed message: mismatch sessionId.
* err_2.2.3: Badly formed message: unsupported
lockAssertionClaimFormat.
* err_2.2.4: Badly formed message: unsupported
lockAssertionExpiration.
* err_2.2.5: Badly formed message: mismatch hashPrevMessage.
* err_2.2.6: Badly formed message: bad signature.
16.4. Lock Assertion Receipt errors
The following is the list of errors related to Lock Assertion
Receipt:
* err_2.4.1: Badly formed message: mismatch transferContextId.
* err_2.4.2: Badly formed message: mismatch sessionId.
* err_2.4.3: Badly formed message: mismatch hashPrevMessage.
* err_2.4.4: Badly formed message: bad signature.
16.5. Commit Preparation errors
The following is the list of errors related to Commit Preparation:
* err_3.1.1: Badly formed message: mismatch transferContextId.
* err_3.1.2: Badly formed message: mismatch sessionId.
* err_3.1.3: Badly formed message: mismatch hashPrevMessage.
* err_3.1.4: Badly formed message: bad signature.
16.6. Commit Ready errors
The following is the list of errors related to Commit Ready:
* err_3.3.1: Badly formed message: mismatch transferContextId.
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* err_3.3.2: Badly formed message: mismatch sessionId.
* err_3.3.3: Badly formed message: mismatch hashPrevMessage.
* err_3.3.4: Badly formed message: unsupported mintAssertionFormat.
* err_3.3.5: Badly formed message: bad signature.
16.7. Commit Final Assertion errors
The following is the list of errors related to Commit Final
Assertion:
* err_3.5.1: Badly formed message: mismatch transferContextId.
* err_3.5.2: Badly formed message: mismatch sessionId.
* err_3.5.3: Badly formed message: mismatch hashPrevMessage.
* err_3.5.4: Badly formed message: unsupported
burnAssertionClaimFormat.
* err_3.5.5: Badly formed message: bad signature.
16.8. Commit Final Acknowledgement Receipt errors
The following is the list of errors related to Commit Final
Acknowledgement Receipt:
* err_3.7.1: Badly formed message: mismatch transferContextId.
* err_3.7.2: Badly formed message: mismatch sessionId.
* err_3.7.3: Badly formed message: mismatch hashPrevMessage.
* err_3.7.4: Badly formed message: unsupported
assignmentAssertionClaimFormat.
* err_3.7.5: Badly formed message: bad signature.
16.9. Transfer Complete errors
The following is the list of errors related to Commit Final
Assertion:
* err_3.9.1: Badly formed message: mismatch transferContextId.
* err_3.9.2: Badly formed message: mismatch sessionId.
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* err_3.9.3: Badly formed message: mismatch hashPrevMessage.
* err_3.9.4: Badly formed message: mismatch hashTransferCommence.
* err_3.9.5: Badly formed message: bad signature.
17. References
17.1. Normative References
[JSON] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.
[REQ-LEVEL]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
17.2. Informative References
[ARCH] Hardjono, T., Hargreaves, M., Smith, N., and V.
Ramakrishna, "Secure Asset Transfer (SAT) Interoperability
Architecture", June 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-satp-
architecture/>.
[ECDSA] "Digital Signature Standard (FIPS 186-5)", February 2023,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5>.
[I-D.draft-belchior-satp-gateway-recovery]
Belchior, R., Correia, M., Augusto, A., and T. Hardjono,
"Secure Asset Transfer Protocol (SATP) Gateway Crash
Recovery Mechanism", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-belchior-satp-gateway-recovery-03, 20 January 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-belchior-
satp-gateway-recovery-03>.
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[MICA] European Commission, "EU Directive on Markets in Crypto-
Assets Regulation (MiCA)", June 2023,
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/esmas-activities/digital-
finance-and-innovation/markets-crypto-assets-regulation-
mica>.
[NIST] Yaga, D., Mell, P., Roby, N., and K. Scarfone, "NIST
Blockchain Technology Overview (NISTR-8202)", October
2018, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8202>.
[RFC5939] Andreasen, F., "Session Description Protocol (SDP)
Capability Negotiation", September 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5939>.
[RFC9334] Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture
(RATS)", January 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9334>.
Authors' Addresses
Martin Hargreaves
Quant Network
Email: martin.hargreaves@quant.network
Thomas Hardjono
MIT
Email: hardjono@mit.edu
Rafael Belchior
INESC-ID, Tecnico Lisboa, Blockdaemon
Email: rafael.belchior@tecnico.ulisboa.pt
Venkatraman Ramakrishna
IBM
Email: vramakr2@in.ibm.com
Alex Chiriac
Quant Network
Email: alexandru.chiriac@quant.network
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