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SEND-based Source-Address Validation Improvement
draft-ietf-savi-send-11

Document type: Active Internet-Draft (savi WG)
Document stream: IETF
Last updated: 2014-02-03 (latest revision 2014-01-20)
Intended RFC status: Proposed Standard
Other versions: plain text, pdf, html

IETF State: Submitted to IESG for Publication
Consensus: Yes
Document shepherd: Jean-Michel Combes
Shepherd Write-Up: Last changed 2014-01-07

IESG State: RFC Ed Queue
IANA Action State: No IC
RFC Editor State: AUTH48
Responsible AD: Ted Lemon
IESG Note: The Document Shepherd is Jean-Michel Combes (jeanmichel.combes at gmail.com).
Send notices to: savi-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-savi-send@tools.ietf.org

SAVI Working Group                                            M. Bagnulo
Internet-Draft                                        A. Garcia-Martinez
Intended status: Standards Track                                    UC3M
Expires: July 24, 2014                                  January 20, 2014

            SEND-based Source-Address Validation Improvement
                        draft-ietf-savi-send-11

Abstract

   This memo specifies SEND SAVI, a mechanism to provide source address
   validation using the SEND protocol.  The proposed mechanism
   complements ingress filtering techniques to provide a finer
   granularity on the control of IPv6 source addresses.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 24, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Bagnulo & Garcia-Martinez  Expires July 24, 2014                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                  SEND SAVI                   January 2014

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Background to SEND SAVI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Address Validation Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  Binding Creation for SEND SAVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.3.  SEND SAVI Protection Perimeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.4.  Special cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   3.  SEND SAVI Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.1.  SEND SAVI Data Structures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.2.  SEND SAVI Device Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.3.  Traffic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.3.1.  Transit Traffic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       3.3.2.  Local Traffic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.4.  SEND SAVI Port Configuration Guidelines  . . . . . . . . . 25
     3.5.  VLAN Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     3.6.  Protocol Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   4.  Protocol Walkthrough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     4.1.  Change of the attachment point of a host . . . . . . . . . 26
       4.1.1.  Moving to a port of the same switch  . . . . . . . . . 26
       4.1.2.  Moving to a port of a different switch . . . . . . . . 28
     4.2.  Attack of a malicious host . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
       4.2.1.  M attaches to the same switch as the victim's
               switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
       4.2.2.  M attaches to a different switch to the victim's
               switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     5.1.  Protection Against Replay Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     5.2.  Protection Against Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . 32
     5.3.  Considerations on the deployment model for trust
           anchors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
     5.4.  Residual threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     5.5.  Privacy considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
   7.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

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