SEND-based Source-Address Validation Implementation
draft-ietf-savi-send-06
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 7219.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Alberto Garcia-Martinez , Marcelo Bagnulo | ||
| Last updated | 2012-03-08 (Latest revision 2011-10-04) | ||
| Replaces | draft-bagnulo-savi-send | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | Jean-Michel Combes | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 7219 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-savi-send-06
SAVI Working Group M. Bagnulo
Internet-Draft A. Garcia-Martinez
Intended status: Standards Track UC3M
Expires: April 6, 2012 October 4, 2011
SEND-based Source-Address Validation Implementation
draft-ietf-savi-send-06
Abstract
This memo describes SEND SAVI, a mechanism to provide source address
validation using the SEND protocol. The proposed mechanism is
intended to complement ingress filtering techniques to provide a
finer granularity on the control of the source addresses used.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 6, 2012.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Non-normative Background to SEND SAVI . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Address Validation Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Binding Creation for SEND SAVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. SAVI Logging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. SEND SAVI Protection Perimeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. SEND SAVI Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. SEND SAVI Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. SEND SAVI Device Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Traffic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3.1. Transit Traffic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3.2. Local Traffic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.4. SEND SAVI Port Configuration Guidelines . . . . . . . . . 22
4.5. VLAN Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.6. Protocol Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1. Protection Against Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2. Protection Against Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . 26
5.3. Security Logging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
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1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Introduction
This memo describes SEND SAVI (SEcure Neighbor Discovery Source-
Address Validation Implementation), a mechanism to provide source
address validation for IPv6 networks using the SEND protocol
[RFC3971]. The proposed mechanism is intended to complement ingress
filtering techniques to provide a finer granularity on the control of
the source addresses used.
SEND SAVI uses DAD_NSOL (Duplicate Address Detection Neighbor
SOLicitation), DAD_NADV (DAD Neighbor ADVertisement), NUD_NSOL
(Neighbor Unreachability Detection Neigbor SOLicitation) and NUD_NADV
(NUD Neighbor ADVertisement) messages to validate the address
ownership claim of a node. In additon, SEND SAVI uses RADV (Router
ADVertisement) messages to identify routers, and therefore restrict
the nodes which can generate packets containing off-link IPv6 source
addresses. Using the information contained in these messages, host
and router IPv6 addresses are associated to layer-2 binding anchors,
so that data packets will be validated by checking for consistency in
this binding, as described in [I-D.ietf-savi-framework].
Scalability of a distributed SAVI system comprised of multiple SEND
SAVI devices is preserved by means of a deployment scenario in which
SEND SAVI devices form a "protection perimeter". In this deployment
scenario, validation is only performed when the packet ingress to the
protection perimeter.
The SEND SAVI specification, as defined in this document, is limited
to links and prefixes in which every IPv6 host and every IPv6 router
uses the SEND protocol [RFC3971] to protect the exchange of Neighbor
Discovery information.
SEND SAVI is designed to be deployed in existing SEND networks with a
minimum set of changes. In particular, SEND SAVI does not require
any changes in the nodes whose source address is to be verified.
This is due to the fact that verification solely relies in the usage
of already available protocols. Therefore, SEND SAVI does neither
define a new protocol, nor define any new message on existing
protocols, nor require that a host or router uses an existent
protocol message in a different way.
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An overview of the general framework about Source Address Validation
Implementation is presented in [I-D.ietf-savi-framework].
3. Non-normative Background to SEND SAVI
3.1. Address Validation Scope
The application scenario of SEND SAVI is limited to the local link.
This means that the goal of SEND SAVI is to verify that the source
addresses of the packets generated by the nodes attached to the local
link have not been spoofed, and that only legitimate routers generate
packets with off-link IPv6 source addresses.
In a link there usually are hosts and routers attached. Hosts
generate packets with their own addresses as the source address.
This is the so-called local traffic, while routers send packets
containing a source address other than their own, since they are
forwarding packets generated by other hosts (usually located in a
different link). This is the so-called transit traffic.
SEND SAVI allows the validation of the source address of the local
traffic, i.e. it allows to verify that the source addresses of the
packets generated by the nodes attached to the local link have not
been spoofed. In addition, since SEND does provide the means to
verify that a node claiming to act as a router is indeed authorized
to do so, SEND SAVI also provides means to prevent hosts from
generating packets with source addresses derived from off-link
prefixes. Note, however, that SEND SAVI does not provide the means
to verify if a given router is actually authorized to forward packets
containing a particular off-link source address. Other techniques,
like ingress filtering [RFC2827], are recommended to validate transit
traffic.
3.2. Binding Creation for SEND SAVI
Filtering is performed according to the binding existing between a
layer-2 anchor (the binding anchor) and an IPv6 address. These
bindings should allow legitimate nodes to use the bounded IPv6
address as source address, and prevent illegitimate nodes to do so.
SEND [RFC3971] provides tools to assure that a ND (Neighbor
Discovery) message containing a CGA option and signed by a RSA option
has been generated by the legitimate owner of the CGA IPv6 address.
It also provides tools to verify that a Router Advertisement (RADV)
message signed by a RSA option with a key bounded to a CGA [RFC3972]
or a certificate, has been generated by a legitimate router.
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SEND SAVI uses SEND validated messages to create bindings between the
binding anchor and the CGA. The events that trigger the binding
creation process in a SEND SAVI device are:
o The reception of a DAD_NSOL message, indicating the attempt of a
node to configure an address. This may occur when a node
configures an address for the first time or after being idle for
some time, or when the node has changed the physical attachment
point to the layer-2 infrastructure.
o The reception of any other packet (including data packets) with a
source address for which no binding exists. This would occur if a
DAD_NSOL message was lost, or if a node has changed the physical
attachment point to the layer-2 infrastructure without issuing a
DAD_NSOL message, a SAVI device loses a binding (for example, due
to a restart) or the link topology changes and the SAVI instances
through which the packets ingress to the protected perimeter do
not have a binding for the node.
When the binding creation process is triggered, the SEND SAVI device
has to assure that the node for which the binding is to be created is
the legitimate owner of the address. For a binding creation process
initiated by a DAD_NSOL exchange, the messages to consider for
address ownership validation are validated DAD_NSOL messages arriving
from other locations or a validated DAD_NADV message indicating that
other node had configured the address before. For the case in which
other packets than a DAD_NSOL initiate the creation of the binding,
the SEND SAVI device explicitly requires the node to prove address
ownership by issuing a secured NUD_NSOL which has to be answered by a
secured NUD_NADV by the probed node.
Bindings are refreshed periodically by means of a secured NUD_NSOL
message issued by the SEND SAVI device which has to be answered by a
valid NUD_NADV message by the node for which the binding exist.
Validated RADV messages are used to associate router authorization to
existing bindings (i.e. to an IPv6 address which is also associated
to a binding anchor). In this case, packets with off-link source
addresses are only forwarded if they are received with a binding
anchor which is associated to the IPv6 address of a router.
SEND SAVI could be sensible to replay attacks, i.e. situations in
which a secured SEND message is replayed by a non-legitimate node.
For example, if ports are used as binding anchors, a node could
immediately re-inject a valid SEND message being received from a
legitimate node to force, in the SAVI device to which it is attached
to, the creation of a binding for which it is not authorized. While
SEND provides some means to prevent the replaying of ND messages,
this built-in protection is not enough for SEND SAVI. SEND anti-
replay protection relies on the use of nonces to validate
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advertisements that were previously solicited, and the use of
timestamps to validate solicitation messages and unsolicited
advertisements. The emphasis for SEND anti-replay protection is to
assure that confidence in some information (for example, the
relationship between an IPv6 address and a layer-2 address) is not
kept for more time than reasonable. However, in SEND SAVI,
information which may be expected to be true for some period, like
the relationship of an IPv6 address and a layer-2 address, can be
abused to create an illegitimate SAVI binding in a time span shorter
than the time reasonable to consider the information aged. As a
consequence, SEND SAVI is designed to rely only on messages with a
low chance of being replayed:
o Unsolicited DAD_NSOL messages. According to the SEND SAVI
specification (Section 4.3.2), these messages can only be
forwarded to ports through which a previous binding for the same
IPv6 address existed.
o Valid NUD_NADV messages in response to a secured NUD_NSOL sent by
the SEND SAVI device, both exchanged through the same port.
Section 5.2 discusses the resulting protection provided by SEND SAVI
against replay attacks.
3.3. SAVI Logging
While the primary goal of SEND SAVI is simply to prevent improper use
of IP addresses, a secondary goal is to assist in traceability for
determining who an improper actor is. For example, if a remote site
reports that a DoS (or component of a DDoS) is coming from the SEND
SAVI site, SEND SAVI enforcement can be a useful component in a
response.
In order to support these and other similar activities, it is a good
idea if SAVI devices perform logging of the creation, modification,
or removal of address bindings. Any protocol support, such as SYSLOG
support for sending those logs to a common server, would be a topic
for a future separate document.
3.4. SEND SAVI Protection Perimeter
In order to reduce computing and state requirements in SEND SAVI
devices, SEND SAVI devices can form a "protection perimeter"
[I-D.ietf-savi-framework]. In this model, source address validation
is performed only when packets enter in a protected realm defined
through the protection perimeter. The perimeter is defined by
appropriate configuration of the roles of each port, which can be
'Validating ports' and 'Trusted ports':
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o Validating ports (VPs) are those in which SEND SAVI filtering and
binding creation is performed.
o Trusted ports (TPs) are those in which neither SEND SAVI filtering
nor binding creation are performed. So, packets received through
Trusted ports are not filtered by SEND SAVI. The only SEND
messages received through a Trusted port which are processed are
those related with certificates, prefix information and Neighbor
Advertisements for Duplicate Address Detection (DAD_NADV).
The following figure shows a typical topology involving trusted and
untrusted infrastructure.
+--+ +--+ +--+ +--+
|H1| |H2| |H3| |R1|
+--+ +--+ +--+ +--+
| | | |
+----------SEND SAVI-PROTECTION-PERIMETER-------------+
| | | | | |
| +-1-----2-+ +-1-----2-+ |
| | SEND- | | SEND- | |
| | SAVI1 | | SAVI2 | |
| +-3--4----+ +--3------+ |
| | | +--------------+ | |
| | +----------| |--------+ |
| | | SWITCH-A | |
| | +----------| |--------+ |
| | | +--------------+ | |
| +-1--2----+ +--1------+ |
| | SEND- | | SEND- | |
| | SAVI3 | | SAVI4 | |
| +-3-----4-+ +----4----+ |
| | | | |
+------------SEND SAVI-PROTECTION-PERIMETER-----------+
| | |
+--+ +--+ +---------+
|R2| |H4| |SWITCH-B |
+--+ +--+ +---------+
| |
+--+ +--+
|H5| |H6|
+--+ +--+
Trusted ports are used for connections with trusted infrastructure,
including the communication between SEND SAVI devices or other
trusted nodes.
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Port 3 of SEND-SAVI1 and port 1 of SEND-SAVI3 are trusted because
they connect two SAVI devices. Port 4 of SEND-SAVI1, port 3 of SEND-
SAVI2, port 2 of SEND-SAVI3 and port 1 of SEND-SAVI4 are trusted
because they connect to SWITCH-A to which only trusted nodes are
connected.
Validating ports are used for connection with non-trusted
infrastructure and with routers. Therefore, hosts are normally
connected to Validating ports. Routers are also recommended to be
connected to Validating ports. Non-SEND SAVI switches that are
outside of the SAVI protection perimeter are also connected through
Validating ports. In particular, non-SEND-SAVI devices which connect
directly to hosts or which do not have a SEND SAVI capable device
between themselves and the hosts, are connected through a Validating
port. So, in the figure above, ports 1 and 2 of SEND-SAVI1, port 1
of SEND-SAVI2, port 4 of SEND-SAVI3 are Validating ports because they
connect to hosts. Port 2 of SEND-SAVI2 and port 3 of SEND-SAVI3 are
Validating ports because they connect to routers. Port 4 of SEND-
SAVI4 is also a Validating port because it is connected to SWITCH-B
which is a non-SEND-SAVI capable switch which is connected to hosts
H5 and H6.
4. SEND SAVI Specification
4.1. SEND SAVI Data Structures
The following three data structures are defined for SEND SAVI
operation:
SEND SAVI Data Base. The SEND SAVI function relies on state
information binding the source IPv6 address used in data packets to
the port through which the legitimate node connects. Such
information is stored in the SEND SAVI Data Base. The SEND SAVI Data
Base contains one entry for each of the IPv6 source addresses in use
on a Validating port of the SEND SAVI device. The SEND SAVI Data
Base is populated with the contents of validated SEND messages. Each
entry contains the following information:
o IPv6 source address
o Binding anchor, such as Layer-2 address, port through which the
packet was received, etc.
o Validating Port through which the packet was received. Note that
if the binding anchor used is also the port, the information
stored in both elements is the same.
o Lifetime
o Status: TENTATIVE_DAD, TENTATIVE_NUD, VALID, TESTING_VP,
TESTING_VP'
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o Alternative binding anchor, to be used when the entry is in
TESTING_VP' state
o Alternative Validating port, VP', to be used when the entry is in
TESTING_VP' state
o Creation time: the value of the local clock when the entry was
firstly created
SEND SAVI Prefix list. SEND SAVI devices need to know which are the
link prefixes, in order to identify local and off-link traffic. A
SEND SAVI device MUST be able to obtain this information from
validated RADV messages, either coming from Validating or Trusted
ports, as described in Section 4.3.2. This information is not
specific to a given port. The SEND SAVI Prefix list contains one
entry per prefix in use, as follows:
o Prefix
o Lifetime
When the SEND SAVI device boots, it MUST send a secured RSOL message.
The SAVI device SHOULD issue a secured RSOL in case the prefix entry
is about to expire.
SEND SAVI Router list. SEND SAVI keeps a table with one entry for
each authorized router in use connected to a Validating port of the
SAVI device. This entry is created for the IPv6 source address from
which a validated RADV message addressed to the all-nodes multicast
address or to the IPv6 address of the SEND SAVI device has been
received from a Validating port. The SAVI device SHOULD issue a
secured RSOL through the Validating port through which the router is
reachable (according to the information stored in the SEND SAVI Data
Base) in case the entry is about to expire, in order to ensure that
the node is still a router. The information stored in the table is
the following:
o Router IPv6 address. There MUST be an entry in the SEND SAVI Data
Base for the same IPv6 address. If the corresponding entry in the
SEND SAVI Data Base expires, the entry in this table MUST be
removed.
o Lifetime
4.2. SEND SAVI Device Configuration
In order to perform SEND SAVI operation, some basic parameters of the
SEND SAVI device have to be configured. Since a SEND SAVI device
operates as a SEND node to generate NUD_NSOL, RSOL or CPS message, it
o MUST be configured with a valid CGA address. Note that when the
SEND SAVI device configures this address, it MUST behave as
regular SEND node, i.e. using secured NSOL messages to perform
DAD, etc.
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o MUST be configured with at least one Trust anchor to validate the
Certification Paths that is used to validate router information.
o MAY be configured with Certification Paths. The alternative is
obtaining them by means of issuing Certification Path Solicitation
messages, as detailed in the SEND specification [RFC3971].
In addition, the port role for each port of the SEND SAVI device
SHOULD be configured. The guidelines for this configuration are
specified in Section 4.4. Unconfigured ports MUST be labeled as
Validating ports; in this case performance may be degraded, as
discussed in [I-D.ietf-savi-framework].
4.3. Traffic Processing
In this section we describe how packets are processed by a SEND SAVI
device. Behavior varies depending on if the packet belogn to local
or transit traffic. This is determined by checking if the prefix of
the source address is included in the SEND SAVI Prefix List (local
traffic) or not included (transit traffic).
4.3.1. Transit Traffic Processing
Transit traffic processing occurs as follows:
o If the transit traffic packet is received through a Trusted port,
the data packet is forwarded and no SAVI processing performed.
o If the transit traffic packet is received through a Validating
port, the packet is only forwarded if the binding anchor for the
packet is associated to the binding anchor of an IPv6 address for
which an entry in the Router list exists. If transit traffic is
received from a Validating port with a binding anchor which is not
associated to an entry in the SEND SAVI Router list, the SEND SAVI
device SHOULD discard the packets, and MAY send a RSOL message to
the all-routers multicast address to the port though which the
packet was received.
4.3.2. Local Traffic Processing
If the verification of the source address of a packet shows that it
belongs to local traffic, this packet is processed using the state
machine described in this section. SEND SAVI is designed to perform
source address validation for both hosts and routers, so in the
following description we will refer in general to nodes.
For the rest of the section, the following assumptions hold:
o When it is stated that a secured NUD_NSOL message is issued by a
SEND SAVI device through a port P, this means the following: the
SEND SAVI device generates NUD_NSOL messages according to the
Neighbor Unreachability Detection procedure described in
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[RFC4861], addressed to the IPv6 target address (source address of
the packet triggering the procedure). These messages are secured
by SEND as defined in [RFC3971]. The source address used for
issuing the NUD_NSOL is the source address of the SEND SAVI
device. The message is sent only through port P.
o When it is stated that a validated NUD_NADV message is received by
a SEND SAVI device, this means that: a SEND secured NUD_NADV
message has been received by the same port P through which the
corresponding NUD_NSOL message was issued, and the NUD_NADV
message has been validated according to [RFC3971] to prove
ownership for the IPv6 address under consideration and to prove
that it is a response for the previous NUD_NSOL message issued by
the SEND SAVI device (containing the same nonce value as the
NUD_NSOL message to which it answers).
We use VP to refer to a Validating port, and TP to refer to a Trusted
port.
The state machine is defined for a binding of a given source IP
address in a given SEND SAVI device. In the transitions considered,
packets described as inputs refer to the IPaddr IPv6 address
associated to the state machine.
The possible states for a given IPaddr are: NO_BIND, TENTATIVE_DAD,
TENTATIVE_NUD, VALID, TESTING_VP and TESTING_VP'. The NO_BIND state
represents that no binding exists for IPaddr; this is the state for
all addresses unless a binding is explicitly created.
The states can be classified into forwarding states, i.e. states in
which packets with the binding anchor associated to the IPv6 address
are forwarded, and non-forwarding states, i.e. states in which
packets coming from the binding anchor associated to the IPv6 address
different to the ones used for signaling are not forwarded. VALID,
TENTATIVE_DAD, TESTING_VP and TESTING_VP' are forwarding states,
while NO_BIND and TENTATIVE_NUD are non-forwarding states.
The state machine defined for SEND SAVI operation adheres to the
following design guidelines:
o The only events which trigger state changes from forwarding to
non-forwarding states and vice versa are the reception of
DAD_NSOL, DAD_NADV and NUD_NADV, or the expiration of a timer.The
other possible input to consider is 'any other packet', which
could generate changes to states belonging to the same forwarding
or non-forwarding class as the original state (i.e. when 'any
other packet' is received, the state cannot move from being
forwarding to non-forwarding and vice versa). A special case of
'any other packet' is when validated RADV are received, which can
result in the update of the SEND SAVI Prefix or Router lists.
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Note that non-validated SEND messages always belong to the 'any
other packet' category. The reduced set of messages being able to
trigger a change simplifies the processing at SEND SAVI devices.
o DAD_NADV and NUD_NADV are only processed when they are a response
to a DAD_NSOL or a NUD_NSOL message.
o ND messages are only used by SEND SAVI devices if they are valid.
If any of the ND messages used by SEND SAVI is not valid, it is
discarded. SEND SAVI devices SHOULD assume that such messages
received from Trusted ports have been validated by other SEND SAVI
devices, so they SHOULD NOT validate them in order to reduce
processing load at the SEND SAVI device.
o The only messages the SEND SAVI device is required to generate for
SEND SAVI operation are NUD_NSOL messages. This also simplifies
the state machine.
o Well-behaved nodes are expected to initiate communication by
sending secured DAD_NSOL messages. The SEND SAVI state machine is
tailored to efficiently process these events. The reception of
other packet types without receiving previously validated DAD_NSOL
messages is assumed to be consequence of bad-behaving nodes or
infrequent events (such as packet loss, a change in the topology
connecting the switches, etc.) While a binding will ultimately be
created for nodes affected by such events, simplicity of the state
machine is prioritized over any possible optimization for these
cases.
o If a node has an address configured, and it can prove the
ownership of this address, the binding is preserved regardless of
any indication that a binding for the same source address could be
configured in other SEND SAVI device. Bindings for the same
source address in two or more SEND SAVI devices may occur due to
several reasons, for example when a host moves (the two bindings
exist just for a short period of time), or when many nodes
generate the same address and the DAD procedure has failed. In
these infrequent cases, SEND SAVI preserves connectivity for the
resulting bindings.
The SEND SAVI device MUST join the Solicited Node Multicast group for
all the addresses which state is other than NO_BIND. This is needed
to make sure that the SEND SAVI device receives DAD_NSOL messages
issued for those addresses. Note that it may not be enough to relay
on the IGMP messages being sent by the node behind the Validating
port, for which a binding for the corresponding address exist, since
the node may move and after a while, and the packets for that
particular Solicited Node Multicast group will no longer be forwarded
to the SEND SAVI device.
SEND SAVI devices MUST be able to use validated CPA messages, sent in
reply to CPS messages, to acquire certificates used to validate ND
messages. In order to process a CPA message received from a
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Validating port, an entry for the source address of the message MUST
exist in the SEND SAVI Data Base. CPA messages received from Trusted
ports are always checked and processed.
SEND SAVI devices MUST use validated RADV messages to update the SEND
SAVI Prefix list and the SEND SAVI Router list. SEND SAVI devices
MAY only consider for this purpose (updating SEND SAVI Prefix and
Router lists) RADV messages addressed to either its own IPv6 address
or to the all-nodes multicast address. Validated RADV messages
received from Trusted ports MUST be used to update accordingly the
SEND SAVI Prefix and Router lists in the SEND SAVI device. Validated
RADV messages received from Validating ports MUST be processed
according to the specific rules defined in the state machine for
local traffic processing. In short, RADV messages received from
Validating ports are only processed for updating the SEND SAVI Router
and Prefix lists if a binding for the source IPv6 address of the RADV
message is in a forwarding state.
We next describe how different inputs are processed depending on the
state of the binding of the IP address 'IPaddr'. A Waiting_lifetime
timer is associated to each binding.
A simplified version is depicted in the next figure (note that all ND
messages are assumed to be validated):
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+-------------+
| |
| TESTING_VP' |
| |
+-------------+
| ^
Timeout / VP=VP' | |
VP_NUD_NADV | | VP'_DAD_NSOL/
| | NUD_NSOL
| |
v |
VP_DAD_NSOL +--------+
+------------- | |
| | VALID |< -------------------+
| +-------- >| | |
| | +--------+ |
| | ^ | |
| | VP_NUD_ | | Timeout, |
| | NADV/- | | TP_DAD_NSOL/NUD_NSOL |
| | | v |
| | +------------+ |
| | | | |
| | | TESTING_VP | |
| | | | |
| | +------------+ |
| | | |
| | | Timeout |
| | VP*, | |
| | Timeout/- | VP_NUD_NADV |
v | | |
+---------------+ | +---------------+
| | | | |
| TENTATIVE_DAD | | | TENTATIVE_NUD |
| | | | |
+---------------+ | +---------------+
^ | | | ^
| | | Timeout/- | |
| | TP_DAD_NSOL, | | |
| | TP_DAD_NADV/- | | |
| | v | |
| | +---------+ | |
| +--------- >| |< -----+ |
| | NO_BIND | |
+--------------| |-----------------+
VP_DAD_NSOL/- +---------+ VP*/VP_NUD_NSOL
Simplified SEND SAVI state machine
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NO_BIND
When the node is in this state, there are no unresolved DAD_NSOL or
NUD_NSOL messages (generated by SEND SAVI), so the only relevant
inputs are DAD_NSOL messages coming either from VP or TP, or any
packet other than DAD_NSOL coming from VP or TP. There are no timers
configured for this state.
o If a DAD_NSOL message is received from a Validating port VP, the
SEND SAVI device checks for its validity. If the message is not
valid, it MUST be discarded. If the message is valid, then the
SEND SAVI device forwards this message to all appropriate Trusted
ports (the subset of Trusted ports which belong to the forwarding
layer-2 topology, with the restrictions imposed by the MLD
snooping mechanism, if applied). DAD_NSOL messages are not sent
through any of the ports configured as Validating Ports. The SEND
SAVI device sets the Waiting_timer to TENT_LT, stores all the
information required for future validation of the corresponding
DAD_NADV message (such as the nonce of the message), creates a new
entry in the SEND SAVI Data Base for IPaddr and the binding anchor
of the received DAD_NSOL, and changes the state to TENTATIVE_DAD.
Creation time is set to the current value of the local clock.
Note that in this case it is not possible to check address
ownership by sending a NUD_NSOL because while the node is waiting
for a possible DAD_NADV its address is in tentative state and the
node cannot respond to NSOL messages [RFC4862].
o If any packet other than a DAD_NSOL is received through a
Validating port VP, the SEND SAVI device issues a secured NUD_NSOL
through port VP. The SEND SAVI device sets the Waiting_timer to
TENT_LT. The SEND SAVI device creates a new entry in the SEND
SAVI Data Base for IPaddr and the binding anchor of the received
packet, and the state is changed to TENTATIVE_NUD. Creation time
is set to the current value of the local clock. The SAVI device
MAY discard the packet while the DAD procedure is being executed,
or MAY store it in order to send it if the next transitions are
(strictly) TENTATIVE_NUD and then VALID.
o If a DAD_NSOL message containing IPaddr as the target address is
received through a Trusted port, the SEND SAVI device SHOULD
assume that the message has been validated. This message is not
forwarded through any of the Validating ports but they are sent
through the proper Trusted Ports (as defined by the switch
behavior that will depend on whether it performs MLD snooping or
not). The state is not changed.
o Any packet other than a DAD_NSOL received from a Trusted port is
forwarded to its destination. This packet is assumed to come from
a SEND SAVI device that has securely validated the binding
according to SEND SAVI rules (unless the SEND SAVI perimeter has
been breached). The state is not changed.
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TENTATIVE_DAD
To arrive to this state, the SEND SAVI device has received a
validated DAD_NSOL coming from port VP and it has forwarded it to the
appropriate TPs. The relevatn events occurring in this state are:
the reception of a DAD_NADV message from a TP, a DAD_NSOL message
from VP, other Validating port VP' or TP, a data packet from VP, and
the expiration of the timer initiated when the DAD_NSOL was received
at port VP.
o If a DAD_NADV is received from a Trusted port, the SEND SAVI
device SHOULD assume that the message has been validated. The
reception of a valid DAD_NADV message indicates that the binding
cannot be configured for port VP. The state is changed to
NO_BIND, and the Waiting_timer cleared.
o If a DAD_NSOL is received from a Trusted port, the SEND SAVI
device SHOULD assume that the message has been validated. The
reception of a valid DAD_NSOL indicates that a node connected to
another SEND SAVI device may be trying to configure the same
address at the same time. The DAD_NSOL message is forwarded to
port VP, so that the node at port VP will not configure the
address, as stated in [RFC4862]. The DAD_NSOL message is also
forwarded to all appropriate Trusted ports. Then, the
Waiting_timer is cleared, and the state is changed to NO_BIND.
o Any packet other than a validated DAD_NSOL or DAD_NADV received
from a Trusted port is forwarded to its destination. This packet
is assumed to come from a SEND SAVI device that has securely
validated the binding according to SEND SAVI rules (unless the
SEND SAVI perimeter has been breached). The state is not changed.
o If a DAD_NSOL is received from a Validating port VP' different to
VP, the SEND SAVI device checks for its validity. If the message
is not valid, it MUST be discarded. The reception of a valid
DAD_NSOL from port VP' indicates that a node connected to VP' may
be trying to configure the same address at the same time. The
DAD_NSOL message is forwarded to port VP, so that the node at port
VP will not configure the address, as stated in [RFC4862]. The
DAD_NSOL message is also forwarded to all appropriate Trusted
ports. Then, the entry in the SEND SAVI Data Base for IPaddr is
updated with the binding anchor of the DAD_NSOL received from port
VP', the Waiting_timer is set to TENT_LT, and the state remains in
TENTATIVE_DAD, although in this case with VP=VP'.
o Any other packet than a validated DAD_NSOL is received from a
Validating port VP' different from VP is discarded. The state is
not changed.
o If a DAD_NSOL is received from port VP, the SEND SAVI device
checks for its validity. If the message is not valid, it MUST be
discarded. If the DAD_NSOL message is valid, the Waiting_timer is
set to TENT_LT, and the state remains in TENTATIVE_DAD.
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o If any packet other than a DAD_NSOL is received from VP, it is
assumed that the node has configured its address, although it has
done it in less time than expected by the SEND SAVI device (less
than TENT_LT). Since the node proved address ownership by means
of the validated DAD_NSOL message, the Waiting_timer is set to
DEFAULT_LT, and the state is changed to VALID.
A particular case occur if the packet received is a RADV message.
The RADV message is checked for validity, and it is discarded if
it is not valid (and the Waiting_timer is not changed, and the
state reamins in TENTATIVE_DAD). If it is valid, the message is
forwarded to the appropriate Trusted ports. In addition, either
an entry for this IPv6 source address in the SEND SAVI Router List
is created, or the lifetime of an existing entry is updated with
the information received in this message. The SEND SAVI Prefix
list MUST also be updated according to the content of the RADV
message. The SEND SAVI device MAY not process (although it MUST
forward) RADV messages addressed to destinations other than the
all-nodes multicast address or to the IPv6 address of the SEND
SAVI device.
o If Waiting_timer expires, it is assumed that no other node has
configured this address. Therefore, the Validating port VP could
be bound to this IPv6 address. The Waiting_timer is set to
DEFAULT_LT, and the state is changed to VALID.
VALID
To arrive to this state, successful validation of address ownership
has been completed and a binding for IPaddr has been created.
Relevant transitions for this state are triggered by the reception of
DAD_NSOL from ports VP, VP' or TP, and any packet other than DAD_NSOL
from VP' or TP. The expiration of Waiting_timer is also relevant to
trigger a check for address ownership for the node at VP.
o If a DAD_NSOL with IPaddr as source address is received through
Validating port VP, the message is checked for validity. If the
message is not valid, it MUST be discarded. If the message is
valid, it is forwarded to the appropriate Trusted ports. The
Waiting_timer is set to TENT_LT and the state is changed to
TENTATIVE_DAD.
o Any packet other than a DAD_NSOL containing IPaddr as a source
address arriving from Validating port VP is forwarded
appropriately. The state is not changed.
A particular case occur if the packet received is a RADV message.
The RADV message is checked for validity, and it is discarded if
it is not valid. If it is valid, the message is forwarded to the
appropriate Trusted ports. In addition, either an entry for this
IPv6 source address in the SEND SAVI Router List is created, or
the lifetime of an existing entry is updated with the information
received in this message. The SEND SAVI Prefix list MUST also be
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updated according to the content of the RADV message. The SEND
SAVI device MAY not process (although it MUST forward) RADV
messages addressed to destinations other than the all-nodes
multicast address or to the IPv6 address of the SEND SAVI device.
o If a DAD_NSOL with IPaddr as source address is received through a
Trusted port, the SEND SAVI device SHOULD assume that the message
has been validated. The message is forwarded to VP. The
Waiting_timer is set to TENT_LT, a secured NUD_NSOL message is
sent to IPaddr through VP and the state is changed to TESTING_VP.
o If any packet other than a DAD_NSOL with IPaddr as source address
is received through a Trusted port, the packet is forwarded to VP
and to other appropriate Trusted ports. A secured NUD_NSOL is
sent to VP, the Waiting_timer is set to TENT_LT, and the state is
changed to TESTING_VP.
o If a DAD_NSOL packet with IPaddr as source address is received
through a Validating Port VP' (VP' different from the current
Validating port for this binding), the SEND SAVI device checks for
its validity. If the message is not valid, it MUST be discarded.
If the message is valid, the message is forwarded to VP. In
addition, a secured NUD_NSOL is sent to VP, the binding of the
DAD_NSOL received from VP' is stored in the Alternative Binding
Anchor for future use if the node at VP' is finally selected, the
Alternative Validating Port is set to VP', the Waiting_timer is
set to TENT_LT, and the state is changed to TESTING_VP'.
o If any packet other than a DAD_NSOL with IPaddr as source address
is received from a Validating port VP', different from the current
Validating port for this binding, VP, the packet is discarded.
The SEND SAVI device MAY issue a secured NUD_NSOL through port VP,
store the binding of the DAD_NSOL received from VP' in the
Alternative Binding Anchor for possible future use, set the
Alternative Validating Port to VP', set the Waiting_timer to
TENT_LT, and change the state to TESTING_VP'. An alternative to
this behavior is that the SEND SAVI device MAY not do anything (in
this case, the state would eventually change after a maximum
DEFAULT_LT time, if the node at VP does not respond to a NUD_NSOL
at TESTING_VP, the state is moved to NO_BIND). Then a packet
arriving from VP' would trigger a process that may end up with
binding for the node connecting to VP'.
o If Waiting_timer expires, a secured NUD_NSOL message is sent
through port VP to IPaddr, the Waiting_timer is set to TENT_LT,
and the state is changed to TESTING_VP. In the TESTING_VP state
packets are still being forwarded until the timer expires without
receiving a NUD_NADV.
TESTING_VP
When the SEND SAVI device enters in the TESTING_VP state, the current
Validating port is under check through a secured NUD_NSOL message
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generated by the SEND SAVI device. While testing, packets from the
current Validating port are forwarded. Packets coming from Trusted
ports are also forwarded. The relevant events for this state are the
reception of a NUD_NADV message from VP, the reception of a DAD_NSOL
message from VP, VP' or TP, the reception of any packet other than
the previous cases from VP, VP' or TP, and the expiration of the
timer associated to the reception of NUD_NADV.
o If a NUD_NADV packet is received from VP, the SEND SAVI device
checks for its validity. If the message is not valid, it MUST be
discarded. If the message is valid, the Waiting_timer is changed
to DEFAULT_LT, and the state is changed to VALID. The message is
not forwarded to any other port.
o If a DAD_NSOL message is received from VP, the SEND SAVI device
checks for its validity. If the message is not valid, it MUST be
discarded. If the message is valid, it is forwarded to the
appropriate Trusted ports, the Waiting_timer is set to DEFAULT_LT,
and the state is changed to TENTATIVE_DAD.
o If a RADV packet is received from VP, the message is checked for
validity, and it is discarded if it is not valid. If it is valid,
the message is forwarded appropriately. Either an entry for this
IPv6 source address in the SEND SAVI Router List is created, or
the lifetime of an existing entry is updated with the information
received in this message. The SEND SAVI Prefix list MUST also be
updated according to the content of the RADV message. The SEND
SAVI device MAY ignore and discard RADV messages addressed to
destinations other than the all-nodes multicast address or to the
IPv6 address of the SEND SAVI device. The state remains in
TESTING_VP. Note that if the timeout expires later, while still
in the TESTING_VP state, the entry of the SEND SAVI Router List
will also be removed.
o Any packet other than DAD_NSOL or NUD_NADV containing IPaddr as a
source address arriving from Validating port VP is forwarded.
Neither the Waiting_timer nor the state are changed.
o If a DAD_NSOL packet is received from a Trusted port, the SEND
SAVI device SHOULD assume that the message has been validated.
The message is forwarded to VP and the appropriate Trusted ports.
Neither the Waiting_timer nor the state are changed. The node at
VP port is under check: if it still is at port VP, it should
answer with a NUD_NADV, and also with a DAD_NADV. If it is not
there, neither the NUD_NADV nor the DAD_NADV will be received, the
timer will expire, the local state will move to NO_BIND, and the
state at the remote node will change to VALID.
o If a packet other than a DAD_NSOL arrives from a Trusted port, the
packet is forwarded. Neither the Waiting_timer nor the state are
changed.
o If a DAD_NSOL is received from a Validating port VP', the SEND
SAVI device checks for its validity. If the message is not valid,
it MUST be discarded. If it is valid, the message is forwarded to
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VP and to the appropriate Trusted ports. In addition, a secured
NUD_NSOL is sent to VP, the binding of the DAD_NSOL received from
VP' is stored in the Alternative Binding Anchor for future use if
the node at VP' is finally selected, the Alternative Validating
Port is set to VP', the Waiting_timer is set to TENT_LT, and the
state is changed to TESTING_VP'.
o Any other packet received from a Validating port VP' is discarded.
This may occur because the node has moved but have not issued a
DAD_NSOL or the DAD_NSOL message has been lost. The state will
eventually move to NO_BIND, and then the packets sent from VP'
will trigger the creation of the binding for VP'.
o If the Waiting_timer expires, the Waiting_timer is cleared and the
state is changed to NO_BIND.
TESTING_VP'
To arrive to this state an indication that a node at VP' wants to
send data with IPaddr as source address occurred while a binding
existed for VP. The binding anchor of the packet received through
VP' which triggered the change of the state to TESTING_VP' was
stored, so that it can be retrieved if the node at VP' is determined
as the legitimate owner of IPaddr. The SEND SAVI device has issued a
NUD_NSOL to IPaddr through port VP. The relevant events that may
occur in this case are the reception of a NUD_NADV from port VP, the
reception of DAD_NSOL from VP, VP', TP and VP" (VP" different from VP
and VP'), the reception of any other packet from VP, VP', TP or VP",
and the expiration of the timer.
o If a NUD_NADV is received from port VP, the SEND SAVI device
checks for its validity. If the message is not valid, it MUST be
discarded. The reception of a valid NUD_NADV indicates that the
node at VP is defending its address. The binding anchor in use is
kept, VP is kept as the Validating port, the Waiting_timer is set
to DEFAULT_LT, and the state is changed to VALID.
o If a DAD_NSOL is received from port VP, the SEND SAVI device
checks for its validity. If the message is not valid, it MUST be
discarded. If the message is valid, it is forwarded to VP'. The
binding anchor in use is kept, VP is kept as the Validating port,
the Waiting_timer is set to TENT_LT and the state is changed to
TENTATIVE_DAD. When the DAD_NSOL message is received by the node
at VP', this node is expected to unconfigure its address.
o If a RADV message is received from VP, it is checked for validity,
and it is discarded if it is not valid. If it is valid, the
message is forwarded appropriately. Either an entry for this IPv6
source address in the SEND SAVI Router List is created, or the
lifetime of an existing entry is updated with the information
received in this message. The SEND SAVI Prefix list MUST also be
updated according to the content of the RADV message. The SEND
SAVI device MAY ignore and discard RADV messages addressed to
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destinations other than the all-nodes multicast address or to the
IPv6 address of the SEND SAVI device. The state remains in
TESTING_VP' and the Waiting_timer is left unchanged. Note that if
the timeout expires later, while still in the TESTING_VP' state,
the entry of the SEND SAVI Router List will also be removed.
o Any packet other than a validated DAD_NSOL, a validated NUD_NADV
or a validated RADV coming from port VP, is forwarded, and the
state is not changed.
o If a DAD_NSOL is received from port VP', the SEND SAVI device
checks for its validity. If the message is not valid, it MUST be
discarded. If the message is valid, it is forwarded to VP. The
binding anchor in use is kept, the alternative binding anchor is
set to the binding anchor of the DAD_NSOL received from port VP',
VP' is kept as Alternative Validating Port, VP is kept as the
Validating port, the Waiting_timer is set to DEFAULT_LT, and the
state is not changed.
o Any packet other than a DAD_NSOL coming from port VP is discarded,
and the state is not changed.
o If a DAD_NSOL is received from port VP", different from VP and
VP', the SEND SAVI device checks for its validity. If the message
is not valid, it MUST be discarded. If the message is valid, it
is forwarded to VP and VP'. VP' is expected to unconfigure its
address if the message triggering the transition to this state was
a VP'_DAD_NSOL message (and not any other packet). The state
remains in TESTING_VP' although the binding of the DAD_NSOL
received from VP" is stored in the Alternative Binding Anchor for
future use if the node at VP" is finally selected, and the
Alternative Validating Port is set to VP". The Waiting_timer is
not changed.
o Any packet other than a DAD_NSOL received from port VP" is
discarded and does not affect to the state.
o If a DAD_NSOL is received from a Trusted port, the SEND SAVI
device SHOULD assume that the message has been validated. Then,
the message is forwarded to ports VP, VP' and other appropriate
Trusted ports. The Waiting_timer is left unchanged and the state
is changed to TESTING_VP. VP' is expected to unconfigure its
address if the packet triggering the transition to this state was
a VP'_DAD_NSOL message.
o Any packet other than a DAD_NSOL coming from a Trusted port is
forwarded appropriately, but the state is not changed.
o If Waiting_timer expires, it is assumed that the node for which
the binding existed is no longer connected through port VP.
Therefore, the Validating port VP' could be bound to this IPv6
address. The Waiting_timer is set to DEFAULT_LT and the state is
changed to VALID.
TENTATIVE_NUD
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To arrive to this state, a data packet has been received through port
VP without any existing binding in the SEND SAVI device. The SEND
SAVI device has sent a NUD_NSOL message to VP. The relevant events
for this case are the reception of a NUD_NADV from port VP, the
reception of DAD_NSOL from port VP, VP' or TP, and the reception of
any packet other than DAD_NSOL and NUD_NADV for port VP, and
different from DAD_NSOL for VP' or TP. In addition, the
Waiting_timer may expire.
o If a NUD_NADV message is received through port VP, the SEND SAVI
device checks for its validity. If the message is not valid, it
MUST be discarded. If the message is valid, the Waiting_timer is
set to TENT_LT, and the state is changed to VALID. The message is
not forwarded to any port.
o If a DAD_NSOL message is received through port VP, the SEND SAVI
device checks for its validity. If the message is not valid, it
MUST be discarded. If the message is valid, it is forwarded to
the appropriate Trusted ports, the Waiting_timer is set to TENT_LT
and the state is changed to TENTATIVE_DAD.
o Any packet other than NUD_NADV or DAD_NSOL received through port
VP is discarded.
o If a DAD_NSOL message is received through port VP' different from
port VP, the SEND SAVI device checks for its validity. If the
message is not valid, it MUST be discarded. If the message is
valid, it is forwarded to the appropriate Trusted ports, the
Waiting_timer is set to TENT_LT, the binding anchor of the
DAD_NSOL message received from port VP' is set as the binding
anchor, the Validating Port set to VP', and the state is changed
to TENTATIVE_DAD.
o Any packet other than DAD_NSOL received through port VP' MUST NOT
be forwarded unless the next state for the binding is VALID. The
packets received MAY be discarded or MAY be stored for being sent
if the state changes later to VALID. The state is left unchanged.
o If a DAD_NSOL message is received through a Trusted port, the SEND
SAVI device SHOULD assume that the message has been validated.
The message is forwarded to port VP, and the state is left
unchanged.
o Any other packet received from a Trusted port is forwarded
appropriately. This packet may come from a SEND SAVI device that
has securely validated the attachment of the node to its
Validating port according to SEND SAVI rules. The state is left
unchanged.
o If Waiting_timer expires, the Waiting_timer is cleared and the
state is changed to NO_BIND.
4.4. SEND SAVI Port Configuration Guidelines
The detailed guidelines for port configuration in SEND SAVI devices
are:
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o Ports that are connected to another SEND SAVI devices SHOULD be
configured as Trusted ports. Not doing so will increase
significantly the CPU time, memory consumption and signaling
traffic due to SEND SAVI validation, in both the SEND SAVI devices
and the node whose address is being validated.
o Ports connected to hosts SHOULD be configured as Validating ports.
Not doing so will allow the host connected to that port to send
packets with spoofed source address.
o Ports connected to routers SHOULD be configured as Validating
ports. However, the SEND SAVI specification also allows the
routers to be connected to Trusted ports, as they are assumed to
be part of the trusted infrastructure. When connected through a
Trusted port, a router can generate traffic with any source
address, even those belonging to the link, while when connected
through a Validating port it can only send traffic using off-link
source addresses, or its own source addresses. When routers are
connected to Validating, authorization for the routing function is
bound to the binding anchor of the router itself, instead of being
bound to a port configured in a switch.
o Ports connected to a chain of one or more legacy switches that
have hosts connected SHOULD be configured as Validating ports.
Not doing so will allow the host connected to any of these
switches to send packets with spoofed source address.
o Ports connected to a chain of one or more legacy switches that
have other SEND SAVI devices but had no routers or hosts attached
to them SHOULD be configured as Trusted ports. Not doing so will
significantly increase the memory consumption in the SEND SAVI
devices and increase the signaling traffic due to SEND SAVI
validation.
o Ports connected to a chain of one or more legacy switches that
have hosts and possibly a mix of SEND SAVI devices and/or routers,
SHOULD be configured as Validating ports. Not doing so will allow
the host connected to that port to send packets with spoofed
source address.
4.5. VLAN Support
In the case the SAVI device is a switch that supports VLANs, the SAVI
implementation will behave as if there was one SAVI process per VLAN.
The SAVI process of each VLAN will store the binding information
corresponding the nodes attached to that particular VLAN.
4.6. Protocol Constants
TENT_LT is 500 milliseconds.
DEFAULT_LT is 5 minutes.
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5. Security Considerations
It should be noted that any SAVI solution is as strong as the binding
anchor that it uses. In particular, if the binding anchor is
forgeable, then the resulting SAVI solution will be weak. For
example, if the binding anchor is a MAC address that can be easily
spoofed, then the resulting SAVI will not be stronger than that. On
the other hand, if we use switch ports as binding anchors (and there
is only one node connected to each port) it is likely that the
resulting SAVI solution will be considerably more secure.
SEND SAVI performs its function by binding an IP source address to a
binding anchor. If the attacker manages to send packets using the
binding anchor associated to a given IP address, SEND SAVI validation
will be successful and the SEND SAVI device will allow the packet
through. This can be achieved by spoofing the binding anchor or
because the binding anchor is shared among the legitimate owner of
the address and the attacker. An example of the latter is the case
where the binding anchor is a port of a switched network and a legacy
switch (i.e. no SEND SAVI capable switch) is connected to that port.
All the source addresses of the nodes connected to the legacy switch
will share the same binding anchor (i.e. the switch port). This
means that nodes connected to the legacy switch can spoof each
other's IP address and this will not be detected by the SEND SAVI
device. This can be prevented by not sharing binding anchors among
nodes.
SEND SAVI is defined to operate only with validated SEND messages.
The interaction in a mixed scenario comprising SEND and non-SEND
devices should be addressed in other document. However, nodes MUST
NOT assume that all SEND messages received from a SEND SAVI device
are validated, since these devices only validate the messages
strictly required for SEND SAVI operation. Among the number of
messages which are not validated, we can name NUD_NSOL messages
generated by other nodes and its responses, or RSOL messages.
SEND SAVI improves protection compared to conventional SAVI, as a
result of the increased ability of SEND nodes to prove address
ownership.
A critical security consideration regarding to SEND SAVI deals with
the need of proper configuration of the roles of the ports in a SEND
SAVI deployment scenario. Regarding to security, the main
requirement is that ports defining the protected perimeter SHOULD be
configured as Validating ports. Not doing so will generate security
breaches through which an attacker could send packets using any
source address, regardless of the bindings established in other SEND
SAVI devices.
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5.1. Protection Against Replay Attacks
One possible concern about SEND SAVI is its behavior when an attacker
tries to forge the identity of a legitimate node by replaying
messages. Note that information that can be valid for SEND a short
period after being generated (such as the binding between an IPv6
address and a layer-2 MAC address), is not valid for SEND SAVI if the
binding anchor used is the port and the message arrives from the port
to which a node replaying a message to use an address illegitimately
is connected. For example, with the values recommended by [RFC3971]
for TIMESTAMP_FUZZ and TIMESTAMP_DRIFT, a node receiving a DAD_NSOL
message, would not discard replays of this message being received
within a period of aproximately 2 seconds (more precisely, 2/0.99
seconds). An attacker could replay this message to abort the
configuration of an address for a legitimate node, and to gain the
right to use the address for LIFETIME_LT seconds. We now discuss the
risks of such replay attacks and the protection provided by SEND
SAVI.
To perform a security analysis of such a replay attack for SEND SAVI,
we have to consider two different cases:
o When the information replayed is tied to the anchor binding,
especially if the anchor binding being used is the port through
which packets are received. In this case, all the messages which
can be create a SEND SAVI binding may be sensible to the replay of
valid SEND messages. SEND SAVI creates and maintains bindings as
a result of the reception of DAD_NSOL messages and of the exchange
of NUD_NSOL/NUD_NADV messages.
o When the information replayed is not tied to the anchor binding
(eg. to ports) in SEND SAVI operation. Such situations are the
reception of CPA messages containing certificates, or the
processing of an RADV message coming from a Trusted port, which
can be used in SEND SAVI to populate the SEND SAVI Prefix list.
In this case, the security risks are equivalent to those of SEND
operation.
A special case is the processing of a RADV message coming from a
Validating port. Although part of the information obtained (the
router condition of the node connecting to the port) is
(indirectly) associated to the anchor binding, in this case the
replay of the RADV message does not provide an advantage to an
attacker. SEND SAVI requires a binding to exist (between the IPv6
address and the binding anchor) prior to consider the RADV
message, so protecting the binding also protects the ability of an
attacker to become a router.
We now discuss how replay attacks for DAD_NSOL messages and of the
exchange of NUD_NSOL/NUD_NADV messages. For this discussion we
assume that the anchor binding in use is the port through which
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packets are received.
o To prevent DAD_NSOL replay attacks, DAD_NSOL messages are not
forwarded to ports through which an existing binding existed.
Therefore, to capture a message that could be used to launch a
replay attack, an attacker has to be located either in the port
through which the legitimate node is connected (in which case the
attack is useless), or in a port in which a legitimate node was
before, but it is not now, and for which a binding still exists.
For this latter case, an attacker can prevent the configuration of
a binding for a legitimate node in other port to which the node
could have moved. This risk is inherent to allow layer-2 node
mobility in an scenario in which many nodes can attach to the same
port (either at the same time or in instants very close one to the
other). Another consideration is that this situation reflect the
fact that it is impossible to determine the legitimacy of a node
without the more secure NUD_NSOL/NUD_NADV exchange, which cannot
be used when the nodes claim to be configuring the address.
o When a NUD_NSOL/NUD_NADV exchange is used to create or maintain a
state, the messages are only forwarded to the port in which the
node claiming to be legitimate is located. In this case, an
attacker connected to the same port as the legitimate node can
capture either the NUD_NSOL or the NUD_NADV message in order to
replay it, but this is useless. The replay of NUD_NSOL is
useless, since this message is not used to trigger the creation of
a binding unless the SEND SAVI device had previously issued the
corresponding NUD_NSOL. The replay of a NUD_NADV message through
the same port is useless, since SEND SAVI does not protect against
spoofers attached to the same port. Finally, the replay of a
NUD_NADV message through a different port does result neither in
the creation of a binding in other SEND SAVI device, nor in the
binding created in the SEND SAVI device originating the NUD_NSOL
message, since SEND SAVI devices only consider NUD_NADV message
received from the same port through which the NUD_NSOL message was
sent.
5.2. Protection Against Denial of Service Attacks
The attacks against the SAVI device basically consist on making the
SEND SAVI device to consume its resource until it runs out of them,
or to slow CPU operation. For instance, a possible attack would be
to create state for different addresses in order to waste memory. At
some point the SEND SAVI device runs out of memory and it needs to
decide how to react in this situation. The result is that some form
of garbage collection is needed to prune the entries. It is
RECOMMENDED that when the SEND SAVI device runs out of the memory
allocated for the SEND SAVI Data Base, it creates new entries by
deleting the entries which Creation Time is higher. This implies
that older entries are preserved and newer entries overwrite each
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other. In an attack scenario where the attacker sends a batch of
data packets with different source address, each new source address
is likely to rewrite another source address created by the attack
itself. It should be noted that entries are also garbage collected
using the LIFETIME, which is updated by NUD_NSOL/NUD_NADV exchange.
The result is that in order for an attacker to actually fill the SAVI
DB with false source addresses, it needs to continuously answer to
NUD_NSOL for all the different source addresses, in order for the
entries to grow old and compete with the legitimate entries. The
result is that the cost of the attack for the attacker is highly
increased.
In addition, it is also RECOMMENDED that a SEND SAVI device reserves
a minimum amount of memory for each available port (in the case where
the port is used as part of the L2 anchor). The recommended minimum
is the memory needed to store 4 bindings associated to the port. The
motivation for this recommendation is as follows: an attacker
attached to a given port of a SEND SAVI device may attempt to launch
a DoS attack towards the SEND SAVI device by creating many bindings
for different addresses. It can do so, by sending DAD NSOL for
different addresses. The result is that the attack will consume all
the memory available in the SEND SAVI device. The above
recommendation aims to reserve a minimum amount of memory per port,
so that nodes located in different ports can make use of the reserved
memory for their port even if a DoS attack is occurring in a
different port.
As the SEND SAVI device may store data packets while the address is
being verified, the memory for data packet storage may also be a
target of DoS attacks. The effects of such attacks may be limited to
the lack of capacity to store new data packets. The effect of such
attack will be then that data packets will be dropped during the
verification period. A SEND SAVI device MUST limit the amount of
memory used to store data packets, allowing the other functions to
have available memory even in the case of an attacks as the above
described.
It is worth to note that the potential of Denial of Service attacks
against the SEND SAVI network is increased due to the use of costly
cryptographic operations in order to validate the address of the
nodes. An attacker could generate packets using new source addresses
in order to make the closest SEND SAVI device spend CPU time to
validate DAD_NSOL messages or to generate a secure NUD_NSOL. This
attack can be used to drain CPU resources of SEND SAVI devices with a
very low cost for the attacker. In order to solve this problem,
rate-limiting the processing of packets which may trigger SEND SAVI
events SHOULD be enforced in a per-port basis.
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5.3. Security Logging
In order to improve the integration of SEND SAVI into an overall
security environment, and enable response to additional indirect
security issues which SAVI can help ameliorate, it is helpful if SEND
SAVI systems log the creation, modification, and deletion of binding
entries.
6. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
7. Acknowledgments
Thanks to Ana Kukec for her review and comments on this document.
The text has also benefited from feedback provided by Tony Cheneau
and Jean-Michel Combes.
Marcelo Bagnulo is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project
supported by the European Commission under its Seventh Framework
Program.
Alberto Garcia-Martinez is partly funded by T2C2
(TIN2008-06739-C04-01), a Spanish R&D project.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
RFC 3972, March 2005.
[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
September 2007.
[RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.
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8.2. Informative References
[RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.
[I-D.ietf-savi-framework]
Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt,
"Source Address Validation Improvement Framework",
draft-ietf-savi-framework-05 (work in progress),
July 2011.
Authors' Addresses
Marcelo Bagnulo
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Av. Universidad 30
Leganes, Madrid 28911
SPAIN
Phone: 34 91 6248814
Email: marcelo@it.uc3m.es
URI: http://www.it.uc3m.es
Alberto Garcia-Martinez
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Av. Universidad 30
Leganes, Madrid 28911
SPAIN
Phone: 34 91 6248782
Email: alberto@it.uc3m.es
URI: http://www.it.uc3m.es
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