Inter-domain Source Address Validation (SAVNET) Architecture
draft-ietf-savnet-inter-domain-architecture-02
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (savnet WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Dan Li , Li Chen , Nan Geng , Libin Liu , Lancheng Qin | ||
| Last updated | 2025-08-31 | ||
| Replaces | draft-wu-savnet-inter-domain-architecture | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
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| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-savnet-inter-domain-architecture-02
Internet Engineering Task Force D. Li
Internet-Draft Tsinghua University
Intended status: Standards Track L. Chen
Expires: 5 March 2026 Zhongguancun Laboratory
N. Geng
Huawei
L. Liu
L. Qin
Zhongguancun Laboratory
1 September 2025
Inter-domain Source Address Validation (SAVNET) Architecture
draft-ietf-savnet-inter-domain-architecture-02
Abstract
This document introduces an inter-domain SAVNET architecture for
performing AS-level SAV and provides a comprehensive framework for
guiding the design of inter-domain SAV mechanisms. The proposed
architecture empowers ASes to generate SAV rules by sharing SAV-
specific information between themselves, which can be used to
generate more accurate and trustworthy SAV rules in a timely manner
compared to the general information. During the incremental or
partial deployment of SAV-specific information, it can utilize
general information to generate SAV rules, if an AS's SAV-specific
information is unavailable. Rather than delving into protocol
extensions or implementations, this document primarily concentrates
on proposing SAV-specific and general information and guiding how to
utilize them to generate SAV rules. To this end, it also defines
some architectural components and their relations.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 March 2026.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Design Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Inter-domain SAVNET Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. SAV-related Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. General Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1.1. RPKI ROA objects and ASPA Objects . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1.2. Local Routing Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1.3. IRR Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2. SAV-specific Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. SAV Information Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. SAVNET Communication Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. SAV-specific Information Communication Mechanism . . . . 18
7.2. General Information Communication Mechanism . . . . . . . 21
7.3. Management Information Communication Mechanism . . . . . 21
8. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1. SAV at Customer Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1.1. Limited Propagation of Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1.2. Hidden Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.1.3. Reflection Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8.1.4. Direct Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8.2. SAV at Provider/Peer Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8.2.1. Reflection Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8.2.2. Direct Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
9. Meeting the Design Requirements of Inter-domain SAVNET . . . 30
9.1. Improving Validation Accuracy over Existing Mechanisms . 30
9.2. Working in Incremental/Partial Deployment . . . . . . . . 30
9.3. Reducing Operational Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9.4. Guaranteeing Convergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9.5. Providing Necessary Security Guarantee . . . . . . . . . 33
10. Manageability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
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11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
13. Scope and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
14. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1. Introduction
Attacks based on source IP address spoofing, such as reflective DDoS
and flooding attacks, continue to present significant challenges to
Internet security. Mitigating these attacks in inter-domain networks
requires effective source address validation (SAV). While BCP84
[RFC3704] [RFC8704] offers some SAV solutions, such as ACL-based
ingress filtering and uRPF-based mechanisms, existing inter-domain
SAV mechanisms have limitations in terms of validation accuracy and
operational overhead in different scenarios [inter-domain-ps].
There are various existing general information from different sources
including RPKI ROA objects and ASPA objects, RIB, FIB, and Internet
Routing Registry (IRR) data, which can be used for inter-domain SAV.
Generating SAV rules based on general information, however, cannot
well satisfy the requirements for new inter-domain SAV mechanisms
proposed in [inter-domain-ps]. As analyzed in Section 5, general
information from RPKI ROA objects and ASPA objects can be used to
infer the prefixes and their permissible incoming directions yet
cannot be updated in a timely manner to adapt to the prefix or route
changes, and the local routing information, which represents the
general information from RIB or FIB, cannot deal with the asymmetric
routing scenarios and may lead to improper blocks or improper
permits, while IRR data do not update in a timely manner either and
are not always accurate.
Consequently, to address these issues, the inter-domain SAVNET
architecture focuses on providing a comprehensive framework and
guidelines for the design and implementation of new inter-domain SAV
mechanisms. Inter-domain SAVNET architecture proposes SAV-specific
information and uses it to generate SAV rules. SAV-specific
information consists of prefixes and their corresponding legitimate
incoming direction to enter an AS. Inter-domain SAVNET architecture
can use it to generate more accurate SAV rules. In order to gather
the SAV-specific information, a SAV-specific information
communication mechanism would be developed for origination,
processing, propagation, and termination of the messages which carry
the SAV-specific information, and it can be implemented by a new
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protocol or extending an existing protocol. When the prefixes or
routes change, it can update the SAV-specific information
automatically in a timely manner. Also, the inter-domain SAVNET
architecture will communicate the SAV-specific information over a
secure connection between authenticated ASes.
Moreover, during the incremental/partial deployment period of the
SAV-specific information, the inter-domain SAVNET architecture can
leverage the general information to generate SAV rules, if the SAV-
specific information of an AS is unavailable. Multiple information
sources may exist concurrently, to determine the one used for
generating SAV rules, the inter-domain SAVNET architecture assigns
priorities to the SAV-specific information and different general
information and generates SAV rules using the SAV-related information
with the highest-priority. SAV-specific information has the highest
priority and the priorities of RPKI ROA objects and ASPA objects,
RIB, FIB, and IRR data decrease in turn.
+-----------+
| AS 1 (P1) #
+-----------+ \
\ Spoofed Packets
+-+#+-------+ with Source Addresses in P1 +-----------+
| AS 2 #-----------------------------# AS 4 |
+-+#+-------+ +-----------+
/
+-----------+ /
| AS 3 #
+-----------+
AS 4 sends spoofed packets with source addresses in P1 to AS 3
through AS 2.
If AS 1 and AS 2 deploy inter-domain SAV, the spoofed packets
can be blocked at AS 2.
Figure 1: An example for illustrating the incentive of deploying
inter-domain SAVNET architecture.
The inter-domain SAVNET architecture provides the incentive to deploy
inter-domain SAV for operators. Figure 1 illustrates this using an
example. P1 is the source prefix of AS 1, and AS 4 sends spoofing
packets with P1 as source addresses to AS 3 through AS 2. Assume AS
4 does not deploy intra-domain SAV, these spoofing packets cannot be
blocked by AS 4. Although AS 1 can deploy intra-domain SAV to block
incoming packets which spoof the addresses of AS 1, these spoofing
traffic from AS 4 to AS 3 do not go through AS 1, so they cannot be
blocked by AS 1. Inter-domain SAVNET architecture can help in this
scenario. If AS 1 and AS 2 deploy inter-domain SAVNET architecture,
AS 2 knows that the packets with P1 as source addresses should come
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from AS 1, and the spoofing packets can thus be blocked by AS 2 since
they come from the incorrect direction. Specifically, by proposing
SAV-specific information and using it to generate SAV rules, the
inter-domain SAVNET architecture gives more deployment incentive
compared to existing inter-domain SAV mechanisms, which will be
analyzed in Section 8.
In addition, this document primarily proposes a high-level
architecture for describing the communication flow of SAV-specific
information and general information, guiding how to utilize the SAV-
specific information and general information for generating SAV rules
and deploy an inter-domain SAV mechanism between ASes. This document
does not specify protocol extensions or implementations. Its purpose
is to provide a conceptual framework and guidance for the design and
development of inter-domain SAV mechanisms, allowing implementers to
adapt and implement the architecture based on their specific
requirements and network environments.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Terminology
SAV Rule:
The rule that indicates the validity of a specific source IP
address or source IP prefix.
SAV Table:
The table or data structure that implements the SAV rules and is
used for performing source address validation on the data plane.
SAV-specific Information:
The information that is specialized for SAV rule generation,
includes the source prefixes and their legitimate incoming
directions to enter an AS, and is gathered by the communication
between ASes with the SAV-specific information communication
mechanism.
SAV-specific Information Communication Mechanism:
The mechanism that is used to communicate SAV-specific information
between ASes and can be implemented by a new protocol or an
extension to an existing protocol.
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Local Routing Information:
The information that is stored in ASBR's local RIB or FIB and can
be used to generate SAV rules in addition to the routing purpose.
General Information:
The information that is not specialized for SAV but can be
utilized to generate SAV rules, and is initially utilized for
other purposes. Currently, the general information consists of
the information from RPKI ROA objects and ASPA objects, local
routing information, and the one from IRR data.
SAV-related Information:
The information that can be used to generate SAV rules and
includes SAV-specific information and general information.
SAVNET Agent:
The agent within a SAVNET-adopting AS that is responsible for
gathering SAV-related information and utilizing it to generate SAV
rules.
SAV Information Base:
SAV information base is a table or data structure for storing SAV-
related information collected from different SAV information
sources and is a component within SAVNET agent.
SAV Information Base Manager:
SAV information base manager maitains the SAV-related information
in the SAV information base and uses it to generate SAV rule
accordingly, and is a component within SAVNET agent.
Improper Block:
The validation results that the packets with legitimate source
addresses are blocked improperly due to inaccurate SAV rules.
Improper Permit:
The validation results that the packets with spoofed source
addresses are permitted improperly due to inaccurate SAV rules.
Source AS:
The AS which deploys SAVNET agent and communicates its own SAV-
specific information to other ASes for generating SAV rules.
Validation AS:
The AS which deploys SAVNET agent and generates SAV rules
according to the received SAV-specific information from source
ASes.
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3. Design Goals
The inter-domain SAVNET architecture aims to improve SAV accuracy and
facilitate partial deployment with low operational overhead, while
guaranteeing convergence and providing security guarantees to the
communicated information, which corresponds to the requirements for
new inter-domain SAV mechanisms proposed in the inter-domain SAVNET
architecture draft [inter-domain-ps]. The overall goal can be broken
down into the following aspects:
* *G1*: The inter-domain SAVNET architecture should learn the real
paths of source prefixes to any destination prefixes or
permissible paths that can cover their real paths, and generate
accurate SAV rules automatically based on the learned information
to avoid improper blocks and reduce improper permits as much as
possible.
* *G2*: The inter-domain SAVNET architecture should provide
sufficient protection for the source prefixes of ASes that deploy
it, even if only a portion of the Internet does the deployment.
* *G3*: The inter-domain SAVNET architecture should adapt to dynamic
networks and asymmetric routing scenarios automatically.
* *G4*: The inter-domain SAVNET architecture should promptly detect
the network changes and launch the convergence process in a timely
manner, while reducing improper blocks and improper permits during
the convergence process.
* *G5*: The inter-domain SAVNET architecture should provide security
guarantees for the communicated SAV-specific information.
Other design goals, such as low operational overhead and easy
implementation, are also very important and should be considered in
specific protocols or protocol extensions.
4. Inter-domain SAVNET Architecture Overview
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+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+ +--------------------+
|RPKI Cache Server/IRR DB| | AS X's Provider AS |
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+ +------------+/\+/\+-+
ROA & ASPA | BGP / | |
Obj./IRR Data | Message / | |
| / | | BGP
+-----------+\/+----------------+\/+-+ | | Message
| AS X | BGP +--------------+
| +--------------------------------+ |<------|AS X's Lateral|
| | SAVNET Agent | |Message| Peer AS |
| +--------------------------------+ | +--------------+
+-----+/\+/\+----------------+/\+/\+-+
| | | |
BGP | | SAV-specific | |
Message | | Message | |
+------------------+ | |
|AS X's Customer AS| | |
+-------+/\+-------+ | |
\ | |
BGP \ SAV-specific | | BGP
Message \ Message | | Message
+------------------------------------+
| AS X's Customer AS |
| +--------------------------------+ |
| | SAVNET Agent | |
| +--------------------------------+ |
+------------------------------------+
AS X and one of its customer ASes have deployed SAVNET agent
and can exchange SAV-specific information with each other.
Figure 2: Inter-domain SAVNET architecture.
Figure 2 provides an overview of the inter-domain SAVNET
architecture, showcasing an AS topology and the flow of SAV-related
information among ASes. The topology captures the full spectrum of
AS relationships in the Internet, displaying all peer ASes of AS X
including customers, lateral peers, and providers and the existence
of multiple physical links between ASes. Arrows in the figure
indicate the direction of the corresponding SAV-related information
from its source to AS X, such as gathering RPKI ROA objects and ASPA
objects from RPKI cache server. The inter-domain SAVNET architecture
conveys the SAV-related information through various mediums such as
SAV-specific messages, BGP messages, RTR messages, and FTP messages.
Based on the SAV-related information, AS X generates SAV rules. It
is also worth noting that the inter-domain SAVNET architecture
discusses AS-level inter-domain SAV.
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Figure 2 uses AS X as the representative to illustrate that what SAV-
related information the SAVNET agent within AS X will collect and
where the information is from. AS X has deployed SAVNET agent and
can generate SAV rules to perform inter-domain SAV by consolidating
the SAV-related information. It can obtain SAV-specific information
from its customer AS which deploys SAVNET agent and local routing
information originating from the BGP update messages of its neighbor
ASes. Also, AS X can obtain RPKI ROA objects and ASPA objects from
RPKI cache server and IRR data from IRR database.
The inter-domain SAVNET architecture proposes SAV-specific
information, which is more accurate and trustworthy than existing
general information, and can update in a timely manner. SAV-specific
information consists of prefixes and their legitimate incoming
directions. The SAVNET agent communicates SAV-specific information
between ASes via SAV-specific messages, when prefixes or routes
change, it can launch SAV-specific messages timely to update SAV-
specific information. Additionally, when SAVNET agent receives SAV-
specific messages, it will validate whether the SAV-specific
connections for communicating SAV-specific messages are authentic
connections from authenticated ASes. Therefore, when SAV-specific
information of an AS is available, SAVNET agent will use it to
generate SAV rules.
Furthermore, if the SAV-specific information is needed to communicate
between ASes, a new SAV-specific information communication mechanism
would be developed to exchange the SAV-specific messages between ASes
which carry the SAV-specific information. It should define the data
structure or format for communicating the SAV-specific information
and the operations and timing for originating, processing,
propagating, and terminating the SAV-specific messages.
The SAVNET agent should launch SAV-specific messages to adapt to the
route changes in a timely manner. The SAV-specific information
communication mechanism should handle route changes carefully to
avoid improper blocks. The reasons for leading to improper blocks
may include late detection of route changes, delayed message
transmission, or packet losses. During the convergence process of
the SAV-specific information communication mechanism, the inter-
domain SAVNET architecture can use the information from RPKI ROA
objects and ASPA objects to generate SAV rules until the convergence
process is finished, since these information includes topological
information and is more stable, and can thus avoid improper blocks.
However, the detailed design of the SAV-specific information
communication mechanism for dealing with route changes is outside the
scope of this document.
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In the incremental/partial deployment stage of the inter-domain
SAVNET architecture, when the SAV-specific information of some ASes
is unavailable, SAVNET agent can leverage general information to
generate SAV rules. If all these general information is available,
it is recommended to use RPKI ROA objects and ASPA objects to
generate SAV rules. Since compared to the local routing information
and IRR data, they can provide authoritative prefixes and topological
information and have less improper blocks. The systematic
recommendations for the utilizations of SAV-related information and
the corresponding rationale will be illustrated in Section 6.
SAV-specific information communication mechanism will require
specifying a new inter-router (or inter-AS) communication protocol or
modifying an existing one. Therefore, while this is pursued, a new
SAV mechanism that utilizes RPKI objects (e.g., ROA, ASPA) and BGP
data (RIB/FIB) can be pursued. The latter solution may have the
potential for deployment in the near term since it utilizes existing
SAV-related information and can be deployed by network operators by
policy configuration on routers.
For ASes that support a network controller, such as a multi-AS or
single-AS controller, operators can deploy the SAVNET agent on the
controller to represent the ASes it manages and communicate SAV-
specific information with others. Additionally, ASes managed by the
same controller may obtain SAV-specific information directly from the
controller without needing to communicate with each other.
Regarding the security concerns, the inter-domain SAVNET architecture
shares the similar security threats with BGP and can leverage
existing BGP security mechanisms to enhance both session and content
security.
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+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| AS X |
| +-------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | SAVNET Agent | |
| | +---------------------+ +--------------------------+ | |
| | | General Information | | SAV-specific Information | | |
| | +---------------------+ +--------------------------+ | |
| | | | | |
| | \/ \/ | |
| | +---------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | | +-----------------------------------------------+ | | |
| | | | SAV Information Base | | | |
| | | +-----------------------------------------------+ | | |
| | | SAV Information Base Manager | | |
| | +---------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | |SAV Rules | |
| +-------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | |
| \/ |
| +-------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | SAV Table | |
| +-------------------------------------------------------+ |
+-----------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 3: SAVNET agent and SAV table within AS X in Figure 2.
Figure 3 displays the SAVNET agent and SAV table within AS X. The
SAVNET agent can obtain the SAV-specific information and general
information from various SAV information sources including SAV-
specific messages from other ASes, RPKI cache server, and RIB or FIB
as long as they are available. The SAV information base (SIB) within
the SAVNET agent can store the SAV-specific information and general
information and is maintained by the SIB manager. And SIB manager
generates SAV rules based on the SIB and fills out the SAV table on
the data plane. Moreover, the SIB can be managed by network
operators using various methods such as YANG [RFC6020], Command-Line
Interface (CLI), remote triggered black hole (RTBH) [RFC5635], and
Flowspec [RFC8955]. The detailed collection methods of the SAV-
related information depend on the deployment and implementation of
the inter-domain SAV mechanisms and are out of scope for this
document.
In the data plane, the packets coming from other ASes will be
validated by the SAV table and only the packets which are permitted
by the SAV table will be forwarded to the next hop. To achieve this,
the router looks up each packet's source address in its local SAV
table and gets one of three validity states: "Valid", "Invalid" or
"Unknown". "Valid" means that there is a source prefix in SAV table
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covering the source address of the packet and the valid incoming
interfaces covering the actual incoming interface of the packet.
According to the SAV principle, "Valid" packets will be forwarded.
"Invalid" means there is a source prefix in SAV table covering the
source address, but the incoming interface of the packet does not
match any valid incoming interface so that such packets will be
dropped. "Unknown" means there is no source prefix in SAV table
covering the source address. The packet with "unknown" addresses can
be dropped or permitted, which depends on the choice of operators.
The structure and detailed usage of SAV table can refer to
[sav-table].
5. SAV-related Information
SAV-related information represents the information that can be used
for SAV and consists of RPKI ROA objects and ASPA objects, local
routing information, IRR data, and SAV-specific information. In the
inter-domain SAVNET architecture, RPKI ROA objects and ASPA objects,
local routing information, and IRR data are categorized into general
information. In the future, if a new information source is created
and can be used for SAV, but is not originally and specially used for
SAV, its information can be categorized into general information. In
other words, general information can also be considered as dual-use
information.
5.1. General Information
General information refers to the information that is not directly
designed for SAV but can be utilized to generate SAV rules, and
includes RPKI ROA objects and ASPA objects, local routing
information, and IRR data.
5.1.1. RPKI ROA objects and ASPA Objects
The RPKI ROA objects and ASPA objects are originally designed for the
routing security purpose. RPKI ROA objects consists of {prefix,
maximum length, origin AS} information and are originally used to
mitigate the route origin hijacking, while RPKI ASPA objects consists
of {ASN, Provider AS Set} information and are originally used to
mitigate the route leaks. Both the objects are verified and
authoritative. They are also stable and will not be updated
frequently.
Based on ASPA objects, the AS-level network topology can be
constructed. And according to the ROA objects and the constructed
AS-level topology information, an AS can learn all the permissible
paths of the prefixes from its customer cone. Therefore, the
prefixes and all its permissible incoming directions can be obtained.
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SAV based on RPKI ROA and ASPA objects only may lead to improper
blocks, because not all ASes register their ROA and ASPA objects at
the current stage. In addition, all the permissible incoming
directions learned from ASPA objects do not only consist of the real
incoming directions of the prefixes, but also the extra non-used
incoming directions by the legitimate traffic. Only utilizing RPKI
ROA and ASPA objects for generating SAV rules with their full
deployment within the customer cone may lead to improper permits when
not all ASes perform SAV.
According to a recent study [rpki-time-of-flight], the process of
updating RPKI information typically requires several minutes to an
hour. This encompasses the addition or deletion of RPKI objects and
the subsequent retrieval of updated information by ASes.
5.1.2. Local Routing Information
The local routing information is originally used to guide the packet
forwarding on each router and can be stored in the local RIB or FIB.
It can be parsed from the BGP messages communicated between ASes.
Existing uRPF-based SAV mechanisms [RFC3704] [RFC8704] use the local
routing information to generate SAV rules. As analyzed in
[inter-domain-ps], in the asymmetric routing scenarios, these
mechanisms, generating SAV rules using local routing information
only, have accuracy problems and would lead to improper permits or
improper blocks.
5.1.3. IRR Data
The IRR data consist of ASes and their corresponding prefixes and can
be used for SAV [RFC8704]. However, SAV using IRR data only would
have limited functioning scope, in inter-domain networks, it may only
be able to prevent spoofing by a stub AS. In addition, the IRR data
are not always accurate [RFC8704].
5.2. SAV-specific Information
SAV-specific information is the information that is specifically
designed for SAV and consists of prefixes and their legitimate
incoming directions to enter ASes. It can be contained in the SAV-
specific messages which are communicated between ASes which deploy
the inter-domain SAVNET architecture. When parsing the SAV-specific
messages and obtaining the SAV-specific information, ASes can learn
the prefixes and their legitimate incoming direction to enter
themselves.
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Moreover, in the inter-domain SAVNET architecture, a SAV-specific
information communication mechanism is used to communicate SAV-
specific information between ASes and distribute the updated
information to the relative ASes automatically in a timely manner
once the prefixes or routes change. Compared against general
information, it may be expected that SAV-specific information is more
accurate and trustworthy, while it can update the SAV rules in a
timely manner to adapt to the prefix or route changes.
6. SAV Information Base
+----------------------------+---------------------------+-------------+
| SAV Information Sources | Trustworthiness | SAV Usage |
+----------------------------+---------------------------+-------------+
| SAV-specific Information |Specific security mechanism| |
+------------+---------------+---------------------------+ |
| |RPKI ROA & ASPA| X.509 certificates | |
| +---------------+---------------------------+Complementing|
| General | Local Routing | ROV, | each other. |
|Information | Information | Route leak detection | |
| +---------------+---------------------------+ |
| | IRR Data | Lower level of trust | |
+------------+---------------+---------------------------+-------------+
Figure 4: SAV information sources, their trustworthiness, and
their usage for SAV.
The SIB is managed by the SIB manager, which can consolidate SAV-
related information from different sources. Figure 4 presents the
summary of SAV information sources, their trustworthiness, and the
recommendation about how to use them for generating SAV rules.
Inter-domain SAVNET architecture can use SAV-related information from
different sources to generate SAV rules. It recommends using the
information from all the available sources which is verified as
trustworthy to generate SAV rules. Therefore, SAV information
sources complement each other for SAV. For example, when both SAV-
specific and general information are available, the inter-domain
SAVNET would use them all equally.
The recommendation for completing each information source for SAV
depends on their verified trustworthiness. Each AS deploying inter-
domain SAVNET can utilize a specific security mechanism as discussed
in Section 9.5 to validate the received SAV-specific information from
other ASes to guarantee its Trustworthiness. RPKI ROA and ASPA
objects use x.509 certificates [RFC5280] to protect the objects and
guarantee the trustworthiness. Beside, local routing information
relies on some techniques, such as ROV and route leak detection,
e.g., ASPA or OTC, for achieving the Trustworthiness of their
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information. Instead, IRR data has lower level of trust compared to
others and may be disregarded if RPKI is deployed well, and they are
usually updated in a slower manner than the real network changes and
not always correct.
It is noteworthy that using each type of SAV information source
complementally in Figure 4 is recommended rather than mandated. If a
new inter-domain SAV mechanism needs to generate SAV rules using an
informaiton source, it should ensure that the correct information is
obtained from the corresponding source and adopts appropriate SAV
actions in the data plane to avoid improper block and minimize
improper permit. A new inter-domain SAVNET mechanism, in line with
the inter-domain SAVNET architecture, has the flexibility to
determine the utilized SAV information sources and how to use them.
Especially, when using RPKI ROA objects and ASPA objects as the SAV
information source, the new inter-domain SAVNET mechanism should
avoid jeopardizing the use of RPKI in routing security.
+----------------+
| AS 3(P3) |
+-+/\-----+/\+/\++
/ \ \
P3[AS 3] / \ \ P3[AS 3]
/ \ \
/ (C2P) \ \
+----------------+ \ \
| AS 4(P4) | \ \
++/\+/\+/\+/\+/\++ \ \
P6[AS 1, AS 2] / / | | \ \ \
P2[AS 2] / / | | \ \ \
/ / | | \ \ \
/ / | | \ P5[AS 5] \ \ P5[AS 5]
/ / | | \ \ \
/ /(C2P) | | \ \ \
+----------------+ | | \ \ \
| AS 2(P2) | | | P1[AS 1] \ \ \
+--------+/\+----+ | | P6[AS 1] \ \ \
P6[AS 1] \ | | NO_EXPORT \ \ \
P1[AS 1] \ | | \ \ \
NO_EXPORT \ | | \ \ \
\ (C2P) | | (C2P/P2P) (C2P)\ (C2P) \ \
+----------------+ +----------------+
| AS 1(P1, P6) | | AS 5(P5) |
+----------------+ +----------------+
Both AS 1 and AS 4 deploy the inter-domain SAVNET architecture
and can exchange the SAV-specific information with each other,
while other ASes do not deploy it.
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Figure 5: An example of AS topology.
+-----+------+------------------+--------+------------------------+
|Index|Prefix|Incoming Direction|Relation| SAV Information Source |
+-----+------+------------------+--------+------------------------+
| 0 | P1 | AS 2 |Customer|SAV-specific Information|
+-----+------+------------------+--------+------------------------+
| 1 | P1 | AS 1 |Customer| General Information |
+-----+------+------------------+--------+------------------------+
| 2 | P2 | AS 2 |Customer| General Information |
+-----+------+------------------+--------+------------------------+
| 3 | P3 | AS 3 |Provider| General Information |
+-----+------+------------------+--------+------------------------+
| 4 | P5 | AS 3 |Provider| General Information |
+-----+------+------------------+--------+------------------------+
| 5 | P5 | AS 5 |Customer| General Information |
+-----+------+------------------+--------+------------------------+
| 6 | P6 | AS 2 |Customer| General Information |
| | | | |SAV-specific Information|
+-----+------+------------------+--------+------------------------+
| 7 | P6 | AS 1 |Customer| General Information |
+-----+------+------------------+--------+------------------------+
Figure 6: An example for the SAV information base of AS 4 in
Figure 6.
We use the examples shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 to introduce SIB
and illustrate how to generate SAV rules based on the SIB. Figure 6
depicts an example of the SIB established in AS 4 displayed in
Figure 5. Each row of the SIB contains an index, prefix, incoming
direction of the prefix, reltation between ASes, and the
corresponding sources of the information. The incoming direction
consists of customer, provider, and peer. For example, in Figure 6,
the row with index 0 indicates the incoming direction of P1 is AS 2
and the information source is SAV-specific information. Note that
the same SAV-related information may have multiple sources and the
SIB records them all, such as the row indexed 6. Moreover, SIB
should be carefully implemented in the specific protocol or protocol
extensions to avoid becoming a heavy burden of the router, and the
similar optimization approaches used for the RIB may be applied.
Recall that inter-domain SAVNET architecture generates SAV rules
based on the SAV information sources in the SIB and each type of
source complements each other. In addition, in the case of an AS's
interfaces facing provider or lateral peer ASes where loose SAV rules
are applicable, the inter-domain SAVNET architecture recommends to
use blocklist at such directions to only block the prefixes that are
sure not to come at these directions, while in the case of an AS's
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interfaces facing customer ASes that necessitate stricter SAV rules,
the inter-domain SAVNET architecture recommends to use allowlist to
only permit the prefixes that are allowed to come at these
directions.
Based on the above rules, taking the SIB in Figure 6 as an example to
illustrate how the inter-domain SAVNET generates rules, AS 4 can
conduct SAV as follows: SAV at the interfaces facing AS 3 blocks P1,
P2, and P6 according to the rows indexed 0, 1, 2, 6, and 7 in the
SIB, SAV at the interfaces facing AS 2 permits P1, P2, and P6
according to the rows indexed 0, 2, and 6 in the SIB, SAV at the
interfaces facing AS 1 permit P1 and P6 according to the row indexed
1 and 7 in the SIB, and SAV at the interfaces facing AS 5 permits P5
according to the row indexed 5 in the SIB.
7. SAVNET Communication Mechanism
+------+
| | SAV-specific Information +-----------------------------+
| |<=========================| SAVNET Agent in other ASes |
| | +-----------------------------+
| | +---------------------------------+
| | | +-----------------------------+ |
| | | | RPKI ROA Obj. and ASPA Obj. | |
| | | +-----------------------------+ |
| | | +-----------------------------+ |
| | | | RIB | |
|SAVNET| General Information | +-----------------------------+ |
|Agent |<-----------------------| +-----------------------------+ |
| | | | FIB | |
| | | +-----------------------------+ |
| | | +-----------------------------+ |
| | | | IRR Database | |
| | | +-----------------------------+ |
| | +---------------------------------+
| | Management Information +-----------------------------+
| |<-------------------------| Network Operators |
| | +-----------------------------+
+------+
Figure 7: Gathering SAV-related information from different SAV
information sources.
SAV-specific information relies on the communication between SAVNET
agents, and general information can be from RPKI ROA objects and ASPA
objects, RIB, FIB, and IRR data. Therefore, as illustrated in
Figure 7, the SAVNET agent needs to receive the SAV-related
information from these SAV information sources. SAVNET agent also
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needs to accept the configurations from network operators for the
management operations. Gathering these types of information relies
on the SAVNET communication mechanism, which includes SAV-specific
information communication mechanism, general information
communication mechanism, and management information communication
mechanism.
7.1. SAV-specific Information Communication Mechanism
+------------------------+
| AS 3(P3, P3') |
| +----------------+ |
| | SAVNET Agent | |
| +----------------+ |
+-+/\+---------------+/\++
/ | |
SAV-specific / | |
Messages[ / SAV-specific | |
(P1, AS 2)] / Messages[ | |
/ (P3, AS 3), | |
/ (P3', AS 3)] | |
+------------+ | |
| AS 2(P2) | | |
+------+/\+--+ | | SAV-specific
SAV-specific \ | | Messages[
Messages[ \ | | (P1, AS 1)]
(P1, AS 2)] \ | |
\ | |
+-------------------+\/+--+
| AS 1(P1) |
| +--------------+ |
| | SAVNET Agent | |
| +--------------+ |
+-------------------------+
(1) The path of the legitimate traffic with source addresses in P1
and destination addresses in P3 is [AS 1, AS 2, AS 3].
(2) The path of the legitimate traffic with source addresses in P1
and destination addresses in P3' is [AS 1, AS 3].
(3) The path of the legitimate traffic with source addresses in P3
or P3' and destination addresses in P1 is [AS 3, AS 1].
Figure 8: An example for exchanging SAV-specific information with
SAV-specific information communication mechanism between AS 1 and
AS 3.
Figure 8 uses an example to show the exchange of SAV-specific
information between AS 1 and AS 3 through SAV-specific messages. The
SAV-specific information is expressed as <Prefix, Incoming Direction>
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pairs, such as (P1, AS 1), (P1, AS 2), (P3, AS 3), and (P3', AS 3) in
Figure 8. AS 1 needs to determine the incoming direction to AS 3 for
its prefix P1 to obtain SAV-specific information, such as (P1, AS 1)
and (P1, AS 2). It then assembles this information into SAV-specific
messages to send to AS 3, which can subsequently generate SAV rules
based on the received information. This process may require AS 1 to
collaborate with intermediate ASes between AS 1 and AS 3 to obtain
the SAV-specific information. Similarly, AS 3 needs to determine the
incoming direction to AS 1 for its prefixes P3 and P3' and send the
SAV-specific information, such as (P3, AS 3) and (P3', AS 3), to AS 1
through SAV-specific messages, allowing AS 1 to generate the
corresponding SAV rules. AS 3 may also need to collaborate with
intermediate ASes between AS 3 and AS 1 to gather the required
information for obtaining the SAV-specific information.
The SAV-specific information can be exchanged between ASes via SAV-
specific messages. SAV-specific messages are used to propagate or
originate the SAV-specific information between ASes by the SAVNET
agent. For an AS which initiates its own SAV-specific messages, its
SAVNET agent needs to obtain the incoming direction of its own
prefixes to enter other ASes and assemble them into the SAV-specific
messages to the corresponding ASes. When ASes receive the SAV-
specific messages, they parse the messages to obtain source prefixes
and their corresponding incoming directions.
Additionally, if SAV-specific information is communicated between
ASes, a new SAV-specific information communication mechanism would
need to be developed to communicate it and can be implemented by a
new protocol or extending an existing protocol. The SAV-specific
information communication mechanism needs to define the data
structure or format to communicate the SAV-specific messages and the
operations and timing for originating, processing, propagating, and
terminating the messages. If an extension to an existing protocol is
used to exchange SAV-specific information, the corresponding existing
protocol should not be affected. The SAVNET agent is the entity to
support the SAV-specific communication mechanism. By parsing the
SAV-specific messages, it obtains the prefixes and their incoming AS
direction for maintaining the SIB. It is important to note that the
SAVNET agent within an AS has the capability to establish connections
with multiple SAVNET agents within different ASes, relying on either
manual configurations by operators or an automatic mechanism. In
addition, SAVNET agents should validate the authenticity of the
connection for communicating the SAV-specific information to verify
whether the SAV-specific information is provided over a secure
connection with an authenticated AS.
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The need for a SAV-specific communication mechanism arises from the
facts that the SAV-specific information needs to be obtained and
communicated between ASes. Different from the general information
such as routing information from the RIB, there are no existing
mechanism which can support the perception and communication of SAV-
specific information between ASes. Hence, a SAV-specific
communication mechanism is needed to provide a medium and set of
rules to establish communication between different ASes for the
exchange of SAV-specific information.
Furthermore, in order to obtain all the source prefixes of an AS, the
inter-domain SAVNET architecture may communicate with the intra-
domain SAVNET architecture [intra-domain-arch] to obtain all the
prefixes belonging to an AS. If the legitimate incoming directions
of SAV-specific information are learned from BGP AS_PATH information,
it needs to note that BGP AS_PATH may hide some interfaces that exist
between ASes in the scenarios involving topological fork and merge.
Some scenarios, such as the ones where policy-based routing or static
route exist in the inter-domain networks, may rely on the wider
deployment of SAVNET agent or more interactive communication between
ASes to make the inter-domain SAVNET work better. In these
scenarios, operators may override the default BGP decision by using
policy-based routing or static route. For example, in Figure 8, AS 2
may use another AS which does not in the AS path [AS 1, AS 2, AS 3]
to transmit the legitimate traffic with source addresses in P1 to AS
3. For such cases, inter-domain SAVNET may require AS 2 to deploy
SAVNET agent to obtain the SAV-specific information for the
legitimate traffic with source addresses in P1, or AS 1 and AS 3 may
need more interactive communication to obtain the SAV-specific
information.
The preferred AS paths of an AS may change over time due to route
changes caused by operator configurations or network failures. In
addition, the SAVNET agent should be aware of the route changes and
launch SAV-specific messages to adapt to the route changes in a
timely manner. The SAV-specific information communication mechanism
should handle route changes carefully to avoid improper blocks. The
reasons for leading to improper blocks may include late detection of
route changes, delayed message transmission, or packet losses. If
the SAVNET agent cannot be aware of the route changes caused by
failures, it may not be aware of the failures. A wider deployment of
SAVNET agent can make network failure sensing more sensitive.
However, the detailed design of SAV-specific information
communication mechanism for dealing with route changes is outside the
scope of this document.
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7.2. General Information Communication Mechanism
The general information communication mechanism is used for
communicating routing information between ASes, obtaining RPKI ROA
objects and ASPA objects from RPKI cache servers, and obtaining the
information about ASes and their prefixes from IRR databases. The
general communication mechanism can be implemented by using existing
protocols for collecting the relative information, such as BGP, RTR
[RFC8210], and FTP [RFC959].
7.3. Management Information Communication Mechanism
The primary purpose of the management information communication
mechanism is to deliver manual configurations of network operators.
Examples of the management configurations include, but are not
limited to:
* SAVNET configurations using YANG, CLI, RTBH, or Flowspec: Inter-
domain SAVNET implementations on vendor devices need to accept the
configurations from operators, such as the SAV rules directly
configured by operators, and may support various tools to do this,
such as YANG, CLI, RTBH, or Flowspec.
* SAVNET performance analysis: Inter-domain SAVNET implementations
need to support various operation methods to report the statistics
of SAVNET, such as alarm and exception reporting, performance
monitoring and reporting for the control plane and data plane,
which are discussed in detail in Section 10.
* SAVNET deployment provisioning: Inter-domain SAVNET
implementations may support the configurations which relate to its
deployment process, such as maximum hardware resources used, "on-
off" of SAVNET, and access authority.
Note that the management information can be delivered at any time and
requires reliable delivery for the management information
communication mechanism implementation. Additionally, to support
performance analysis, the management information communication
mechanism can carry telemetry information, such as metrics pertaining
to forwarding performance, the count of spoofing packets and
discarded packets, and the information regarding the prefixes
associated with the spoofing traffic, as observed until the most
recent time.
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8. Use Cases
This section utilizes the sample use cases to showcase that the
inter-domain SAVNET architecture can improve the validation accuracy
in the scenarios of limited propagation of prefixes, hidden prefixes,
reflection attacks, and direct attacks, compared to existing SAV
mechanisms, which are also utilized for the gap analysis of existing
inter-domain SAV mechanisms in [inter-domain-ps]. In the following,
these use cases are discussed for SAV at customer interfaces and SAV
at provider/peer interfaces, respectively.
8.1. SAV at Customer Interfaces
In order to prevent the source address spoofing, operators can enable
ACL-based ingress filtering, source-based RTBH filtering, and/or
uRPF-based mechanisms at customer interfaces, namely Strict uRPF, FP-
uRPF, VRF uRPF, or EFP-uRPF [manrs] [nist]. However, as analyzed in
[inter-domain-ps], uRPF-based mechanisms may lead to false positives
in two inter-domain scenarios: limited propagation of prefixes and
hidden prefixes, or may lead to false negatives in the scenarios of
source address spoofing attacks within a customer cone, while ACL-
based ingress filtering and source-based RTBH filtering need to
update SAV rules in a timely manner and lead to high operational
overhead. The following showcases that the inter-domain SAVNET
architecture can avoid false positives and false negatives in these
scenarios.
8.1.1. Limited Propagation of Prefixes
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+----------------+
| AS 3(P3) |
+-+/\-----+/\+/\++
/ \ \
P3[AS 3] / \ \ P3[AS 3]
/ \ \
/ (C2P) \ \
+----------------+ \ \
| AS 4(P4) | \ \
++/\+/\+/\+/\+/\++ \ \
/ / | | \ \ \
P2[AS 2] / / | | \ \ \
/ / | | \ \ \
/ / | | \ P5[AS 5] \ \ P5[AS 5]
/ / | | \ \ \
/ /(C2P) | | \ \ \
+----------------+ | | \ \ \
| AS 2(P2) | | | P1[AS 1] \ \ \
+--------+/\+----+ | | P6[AS 1] \ \ \
\ | | NO_EXPORT \ \ \
P1[AS 1] \ | | \ \ \
NO_EXPORT \ | | \ \ \
\ (C2P) | | (C2P/P2P) (C2P)\ (C2P) \ \
+----------------+ +----------------+
| AS 1(P1, P6) | | AS 5(P5) |
+----------------+ +----------------+
Figure 9: Limited propagation of prefixes caused by NO_EXPORT.
Figure 9 presents a scenario where the limited propagation of
prefixes occurs due to the NO_EXPORT community attribute. In this
scenario, AS 1 is a customer of AS 2, AS 2 is a customer of AS 4, AS
4 is a customer of AS 3, and AS 5 is a customer of both AS 3 and AS
4. The relationship between AS 1 and AS 4 can be either customer-to-
provider (C2P) or peer-to-peer (P2P). AS 1 advertises prefixes P1 to
AS 2 and adds the NO_EXPORT community attribute to the BGP
advertisement sent to AS 2, preventing AS 2 from further propagating
the route for prefix P1 to AS 4. Similarly, AS 1 adds the NO_EXPORT
community attribute to the BGP advertisement sent to AS 4, resulting
in AS 4 not propagating the route for prefix P6 to AS 3.
Consequently, AS 4 only learns the route for prefix P1 from AS 1 in
this scenario. Suppose AS 1 and AS 4 have deployed inter-domain SAV
while other ASes have not, and AS 4 has deployed EFP-uRPF at its
customer interfaces.
In this scenario, existing uRPF-based SAV mechanisms would block the
traffic with P1 as source addresses improperly, and thus suffer from
the problem of false positives [inter-domain-ps]. If the inter-
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domain SAVNET architecture is deployed, AS 1 can communicate the SAV-
specific information to AS 4 and AS 4 will be aware that the traffic
with P1 as source addresses can arrive at the interfaces facing AS 1
and AS 2. As a result, the false positive problem can be avoided.
8.1.2. Hidden Prefixes
+----------------+
Anycast Server+-+ AS 3(P3) |
+-+/\-----+/\+/\++
/ \ \
P3[AS 3] / \ \ P3[AS 3]
/ \ \
/ (C2P) \ \
+----------------+ \ \
| AS 4(P4) | \ \
++/\+/\+/\+/\+/\++ \ \
P6[AS 1, AS 2] / / | | \ \ \
P2[AS 2] / / | | \ \ \
/ / | | \ \ \
/ / | | \ P5[AS 5] \ \ P5[AS 5]
/ / | | \ \ \
/ /(C2P) | | \ \ \
+----------------+ | | \ \ \
User+-+ AS 2(P2) | | | P1[AS 1] \ \ \
+--------+/\+----+ | | P6[AS 1] \ \ \
P6[AS 1] \ | | NO_EXPORT \ \ \
P1[AS 1] \ | | \ \ \
NO_EXPORT \ | | \ \ \
\ (C2P) | | (C2P) (C2P) \ (C2P) \ \
+----------------+ +----------------+
Edge Server+-+ AS 1(P1, P6) | | AS 5(P5) |
+----------------+ +----------------+
P3 is the anycast prefix and is only advertised by AS 3 through BGP.
Figure 10: A Direct Server Return (DSR) scenario.
Figure 10 illustrates a direct server return (DSR) scenario where the
anycast IP prefix P3 is only advertised by AS 3 through BGP. In this
example, AS 3 is the provider of AS 4 and AS 5, AS 4 is the provider
of AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5, and AS 2 is the provider of AS 1. AS 1 and
AS 4 have deployed inter-domain SAV, while other ASes have not. When
users in AS 2 send requests to the anycast destination IP, the
forwarding path is AS 2->AS 4->AS 3. The anycast servers in AS 3
receive the requests and tunnel them to the edge servers in AS 1.
Finally, the edge servers send the content to the users with source
addresses in prefix P3. The reverse forwarding path is AS 1->AS
4->AS 2.
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In this scenario, existing uRPF-based mechanisms will improperly
block the legitimate response packets from AS 1 at the customer
interface of AS 4 facing AS 1 [inter-domain-ps]. In contrast, if the
inter-domain SAVNET architecture is deployed, AS 1 can communicate
the SAV-specific information to AS 4 and AS 4 will be aware that the
traffic with P3 as source addresses can arrive at the interfaces
facing AS 1 and AS 3. As a result, the legitimate response packets
with P3 as source addresses from AS 1 can be allowed and the false
positive problem can be avoided.
8.1.3. Reflection Attacks
+----------------+
| AS 3(P3) |
+-+/\-----+/\+/\++
/ \ \
/ \ \
/ \ \
/ (C2P) \ \
+----------------+ \ \
| AS 4(P4) | \ \
++/\+/\+/\+/\+/\++ \ \
P6[AS 1, AS 2] / / | | \ \ \
P2[AS 2] / / | | \ \ \
/ / | | \ \ \
/ / | | \P5[AS 5]\ \ P5[AS 5]
/ / | | \ \ \
/ /(C2P) | | \ \ \
+----------------+ | | \ \ \
Attacker(P1')-+ AS 2(P2) | | | P1[AS 1] \ \ \
+--------+/\+----+ | | P6[AS 1] \ \ \
P6[AS 1] \ | | NO_EXPORT \ \ \
P1[AS 1] \ | | \ \ \
NO_EXPORT \ | | \ \ \
\ (C2P) | | (C2P) (C2P) \ (C2P) \ \
+----------------+ +----------------+
Victim+-+ AS 1(P1, P6) | Server+-+ AS 5(P5) |
+----------------+ +----------------+
P1' is the spoofed source prefix P1 by the attacker which is inside of
AS 2 or connected to AS 2 through other ASes.
Figure 11: A scenario of reflection attacks by source address
spoofing within a customer cone.
Figure 11 depicts the scenario of reflection attacks by source
address spoofing within a customer cone. The reflection attack by
source address spoofing takes place within AS 4's customer cone,
where the attacker spoofs the victim's IP address (P1) and sends
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requests to servers' IP address (P5) that are designed to respond to
such requests. As a result, the server sends overwhelming responses
back to the victim, thereby exhausting its network resources. The
arrows in Figure 11 illustrate the commercial relationships between
ASes. AS 3 serves as the provider for AS 4 and AS 5, while AS 4 acts
as the provider for AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5. Additionally, AS 2 is the
provider for AS 1. Suppose AS 1 and AS 4 have deployed inter-domain
SAV, while the other ASes have not.
In this scenario, EFP-uRPF with algorithm A/B will improperly permit
the spoofing attacks originating from AS 2 [inter-domain-ps]. If the
inter-domain SAVNET architecture is deployed, AS 1 can communicate
the SAV-specific information to AS 4 and AS 4 will be aware that the
traffic with P1 as source addresses can only arrive at the interface
facing AS 1. Therefore, at the interface of AS 4 facing AS 2, the
spoofing traffic can be blocked.
8.1.4. Direct Attacks
+----------------+
| AS 3(P3) |
+-+/\-----+/\+/\++
| \ \
| \ \
| \ \
| (C2P) \ \
+----------------+ \ \
| AS 4(P4) | \ \
++/\+/\+/\+/\+/\++ \ \
P6[AS 1, AS 2] / / | | \ \ \
P2[AS 2] / / | | \ \ \
/ / | | \ \ \
/ / | | \P5[AS 5] \ \ P5[AS 5]
/ / | | \ \ \
/ /(C2P) | | \ \ \
+----------------+ | | \ \ \
Attacker(P5')-+ AS 2(P2) | | | P1[AS 1] \ \ \
+--------+/\+----+ | | P6[AS 1] \ \ \
P6[AS 1] \ | | NO_EXPORT \ \ \
P1[AS 1] \ | | \ \ \
NO_EXPORT \ | | \ \ \
\ (C2P) | | (C2P) (C2P) \ (C2P) \ \
+----------------+ +----------------+
Victim+-+ AS 1(P1, P6) | | AS 5(P5) |
+----------------+ +----------------+
P1' is the spoofed source prefix P1 by the attacker which is inside of
AS 2 or connected to AS 2 through other ASes.
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Figure 12: A scenario of the direct attacks by source address
spoofing within a customer cone.
Figure 12 portrays a scenario of direct attacks by source address
spoofing within a customer cone and is used to analyze the gaps of
uRPF-based mechanisms below. The direct attack by source address
spoofing takes place within AS 4's customer cone, where the attacker
spoofs a source address (P5) and directly targets the victim's IP
address (P1), overwhelming its network resources. The arrows in
Figure 12 illustrate the commercial relationships between ASes. AS 3
serves as the provider for AS 4 and AS 5, while AS 4 acts as the
provider for AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5. Additionally, AS 2 is the
provider for AS 1. Suppose AS 4 and AS 5 have deployed inter-domain
SAV, while the other ASes have not.
In this scenario, EFP-uRPF with algorithm A/B will improperly permit
the spoofing attacks [inter-domain-ps]. If the inter-domain SAVNET
architecture is deployed, AS 5 can communicate the SAV-specific
information to AS 4 and AS 4 will be aware that the traffic with P5
as source addresses can arrive at the interface facing AS 3 and AS 5.
Therefore, at the interface of AS 4 facing AS 2, the spoofing traffic
can be blocked.
8.2. SAV at Provider/Peer Interfaces
In order to prevent packets with spoofed source addresses from the
provider/peer AS, ACL-based ingress filtering, Loose uRPF, and/or
source-based RTBH filtering can be deployed [nist]. [inter-domain-ps]
exposes the limitations of ACL-based ingress filtering, source-based
RTBH filtering, and Loose uRPF for SAV at provider/peer interfaces in
scenarios of source address spoofing attacks from provider/peer AS.
The source address spoofing attacks from provider/peer AS include
reflection attacks from provider/peer AS and direct attacks from
provider/peer AS. The following showcases that the inter-domain
SAVNET architecture can avoid false negatives in these scenarios.
8.2.1. Reflection Attacks
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+----------------+
Attacker(P1')+-+ AS 3(P3) |
+-+/\-----+/\+/\++
/ \ \
/ \ \
/ \ \
/ (C2P/P2P) \ \
+----------------+ \ \
| AS 4(P4) | \ \
++/\+/\+/\+/\+/\++ \ \
P6[AS 1, AS 2] / / | | \ \ \
P2[AS 2] / / | | \ \ \
/ / | | \ \ \
/ / | | \ P5[AS 5] \ \ P5[AS 5]
/ / | | \ \ \
/ /(C2P) | | \ \ \
+----------------+ | | \ \ \
Server+-+ AS 2(P2) | | | P1[AS 1] \ \ \
+--------+/\+----+ | | P6[AS 1] \ \ \
P6[AS 1] \ | | NO_EXPORT \ \ \
P1[AS 1] \ | | \ \ \
NO_EXPORT \ | | \ \ \
\ (C2P) | | (C2P) (C2P) \ (C2P) \ \
+----------------+ +----------------+
Victim+-+ AS 1(P1, P6) | | AS 5(P5) |
+----------------+ +----------------+
P1' is the spoofed source prefix P1 by the attacker which is inside of
AS 3 or connected to AS 3 through other ASes.
Figure 13: A scenario of reflection attacks by source address
spoofing from provider/peer AS.
Figure 13 depicts the scenario of reflection attacks by source
address spoofing from provider/peer AS. In this case, the attacker
spoofs the victim's IP address (P1) and sends requests to servers' IP
address (P2) that respond to such requests. The servers then send
overwhelming responses back to the victim, exhausting its network
resources. The arrows in Figure 13 represent the commercial
relationships between ASes. AS 3 acts as the provider or lateral
peer of AS 4 and the provider for AS 5, while AS 4 serves as the
provider for AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5. Additionally, AS 2 is the
provider for AS 1. Suppose AS 1 and AS 4 have deployed inter-domain
SAV, while the other ASes have not.
Both ACL-based ingress filtering and source-based RTBH filtering will
induce additional operational overhead, and Loose uRPF may improperly
permit spoofed packets [inter-domain-ps]. If the inter-domain SAVNET
architecture is deployed, AS 1 can communicate the SAV-specific
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information to AS 4 and AS 4 will be aware that the traffic with P1
as source addresses can arrive at the interface facing AS 1 and AS 2.
Therefore, at the interface of AS 4 facing AS 3, the spoofing traffic
can be blocked.
8.2.2. Direct Attacks
+----------------+
Attacker(P2')+-+ AS 3(P3) |
+-+/\-----+/\+/\++
/ \ \
/ \ \
/ \ \
/ (C2P/P2P) \ \
+----------------+ \ \
| AS 4(P4) | \ \
++/\+/\+/\+/\+/\++ \ \
P6[AS 1, AS 2] / / | | \ \ \
P2[AS 2] / / | | \ \ \
/ / | | \ \ \
/ / | | \ P5[AS 5] \ \ P5[AS 5]
/ / | | \ \ \
/ /(C2P) | | \ \ \
+----------------+ | | \ \ \
| AS 2(P2) | | | P1[AS 1] \ \ \
+--------+/\+----+ | | P6[AS 1] \ \ \
P6[AS 1] \ | | NO_EXPORT \ \ \
P1[AS 1] \ | | \ \ \
NO_EXPORT \ | | \ \ \
\ (C2P) | | (C2P) (C2P) \ (C2P) \ \
+----------------+ +----------------+
Victim+-+ AS 1(P1, P6) | | AS 5(P5) |
+----------------+ +----------------+
P2' is the spoofed source prefix P2 by the attacker which is inside of
AS 3 or connected to AS 3 through other ASes.
Figure 14: A scenario of direct attacks by source address
spoofing from provider/peer AS.
Figure 14 showcases a scenario of direct attack by source address
spoofing from provider/peer AS. In this case, the attacker spoofs
another source address (P2) and directly targets the victim's IP
address (P1), overwhelming its network resources. The arrows in
Figure 14 represent the commercial relationships between ASes. AS 3
acts as the provider or lateral peer of AS 4 and the provider for AS
5, while AS 4 serves as the provider for AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5.
Additionally, AS 2 is the provider for AS 1. Suppose AS 1 and AS 4
have deployed inter-domain SAV, while the other ASes have not.
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Also, in this scenario, both ACL-based ingress filtering and source-
based RTBH filtering will induce additional operational overhead, and
Loose uRPF may improperly permit spoofed packets [inter-domain-ps].
If the inter-domain SAVNET architecture is deployed, AS 2 can
communicate the SAV-specific information to AS 4 and AS 4 will be
aware that the traffic with P2 as source addresses can only arrive at
the interface facing AS 2. Therefore, at the interface of AS 4
facing AS 3, the spoofing traffic can be blocked.
9. Meeting the Design Requirements of Inter-domain SAVNET
The inter-domain SAVNET architecture proposes the guidelines for the
design of new inter-domain SAV mechanisms to meet the requirments
defined in [inter-domain-ps]. The followings illustrate the design
guidelines to meet the requirements one by one.
9.1. Improving Validation Accuracy over Existing Mechanisms
As analyzed in Section 8, existing uRPF-based SAV mechanisms may have
improper block or improper permit problems in the scenarios of
limited propagation of prefixes, hidden prefixes, reflection attacks,
and direct attacks for SAV at customer interfaces, and the scenarios
of reflection attacks and direct attacks for SAV at provider/peer
interfaces.
Inter-domain SAVNET proposes SAV-specific information, which consists
of the source prefixes of ASes and their corresponding legitimate
incoming direction to enter other ASes. ASes which deploy SAVNET
agent can communicate SAV-specific information with each other and
generate accurate SAV rules for the prefixes from the SAV-specific
information. The use cases shown in Section 8 has demonstrated
inter-domain SAVNET can improve validation accuracy compared to
existing SAV mechanisms. Along with more ASes deploy SAVNET agent
and communicate SAV-specific information with each other, accurate
SAV rules can be generated for these ASes and their prefixes can
obtain better protection.
9.2. Working in Incremental/Partial Deployment
A new inter-domain SAVNET mechanism should consider incremental/
partial deployment as it is not feasible to deploy SAVNET agent
simultaneously in all ASes, due to various constraints, such as
device capabilities, versions, or vendors.
Inter-domain SAVNET can support incremental/partial deployment, as it
is not mandatory for all ASes to deploy SAVNET agents for
communicating SAV-specific information. ASes which deploy SAVNET
agents can establish a logical neighboring relationship with other
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ASes. The connections for communicating SAV-specific information can
be achieved by manual configurations set by operators or an automatic
neighbor discovery mechanism. An automatic neighbor discovery
mechanism can utilize existing protocols or tools to collect the
SAVNET neighboring information. This flexibility enables the inter-
domain SAVNET to accommodate varying degrees of deployment, promoting
interoperability and collaboration among participating ASes. During
the partial/incremental deployment of SAVNET agent, the SAV-specific
information for the ASes which do not deploy SAVNET agent cannot be
obtained. To protect the prefixes of these ASes, inter-domain SAVNET
can use the general information in the SIB to generate SAV rules.
When using the general information, inter-domain SAVNET needs to
guarantee the SAV accuracy for the corresponding application
scenarios. The use cases in Section 8 demonstrates that inter-domain
SAVNET supports incremental/partial deployment.
As more ASes adopt the inter-domain SAVNET, the "deployed area"
expands, thereby increasing the collective defense capability against
source address spoofing. Furthermore, if multiple "deployed areas"
can be logically interconnected across "non-deployed areas", these
interconnected "deployed areas" can form a logical alliance,
providing enhanced protection against address spoofing. Especially,
along with more ASes deploy SAVNET agent and support the
communication of SAV-specific information, the generated SAV rules
will become more accurate, as well as enhancing the protection
capability against source address spoofing.
In addition, releasing the SAV functions of the inter-domain SAVNET
incrementally is RECOMMENDED as one potential way to reduce the
deployment risks and can be considered in its deployment by network
operators:
* First, the inter-domain SAVNET can only do the measurement in the
data plane and do not take any other actions. Based on the
measurement data, the operators can evaluate the effect of the
inter-domain SAVNET on the legitimate traffic, including
validation accuracy and forwarding performance, as well as the
operational overhead.
* Second, the inter-domain SAVNET can open the function to limit the
rate of the traffic that is justified as spoofing traffic. The
operators can further evaluate the effect of the inter-domain
SAVNET on the legitimate traffic and spoofing traffic, such as
limiting the rate of all the spoofing traffic without hurting the
legitimate traffic.
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* Third, when the validation accuracy, forwarding performance, and
operational overhead have been verified on a large scale by the
live network, the inter-domain SAVNET can open the function to
directly block the spoofing traffic that is justified by the SAV
table in the data plane.
9.3. Reducing Operational Overhead
The inter-domain routes or the prefixes of ASes usually change
dynamically, which requires the SAV rules to be updated
acutomatically. ACL-based ingress filtering and source-based RTBH
filtering requires manual configuration to update SAV rules to adapt
to the routing or prefix changes, which leads to high operational
overhead.
Inter-domain SAVNET proposes the SAV-specific information
communication mechanism and utilizes it to communicate SAV-specific
information automatically between ASes which deploy SAVNET agent.
Upon receiving the SAV-specific information, SAVNET agent will use it
to generate SAV rules. The use cases displayed in Section 8.2 show
that inter-domain SAVNET reduces operational overhead compared to
ACL-based ingress filtering and source-based RTBH filtering.
9.4. Guaranteeing Convergence
Convergence issues SHOULD be carefully considered due to the dynamic
nature of the Internet. Internet routes undergo continuous changes,
and SAV rules MUST proactively adapt to these changes, such as prefix
and route changes, in order to avoid improper block and reduce
improper permit. To effectively track these changes, the SAVNET
agent should proactively communicate the changes of SAV-specific
information between ASes and generate SAV rules in a timely manner.
The SAVNET agent should launch SAV-specific messages to adapt to the
route or prefix changes in a timely manner. During the routing
convergence process, the traffic paths of the source prefixes can
undergo rapid changes within a short period. The changes of the SAV-
specific information may not be communicated in time between ASes to
update SAV rules, improper block or improper permit may happen. Such
inaccurate validation is caused by the delays in communicating SAV-
specific information between ASes, which occur due to the factors
like packet losses, unpredictable network latencies, or message
processing latencies. The detailed design of the SAV-specific
information communication mechanism should consider these issues to
reduce the inaccurate validation.
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Besides, for the inter-domain SAVNET, the potential ways to deal with
the inaccurate validation issues during the convergence of the SAV-
specific information communication mechanism is to consider using the
information from RPKI ROA objects and ASPA objects to generate SAV
rules until the convergence process of the SAV-specific communication
mechanism is finished, since these information is more stable and can
help avoid improper block, and thus avoiding the impact to the
legitimate traffic.
9.5. Providing Necessary Security Guarantee
For inter-domain SAVNET, the SAVNET agent plays a crucial role in
generating and disseminating SAV-specific messages across different
ASes. To safeguard against the potential risks posed by a malicious
AS generating incorrect or forged SAV-specific messages, it is
important for the SAVNET agents to employ security authentication
measures for each received SAV-specific message. The majour security
threats faced by inter-domain SAVNET can be categorized into two
aspects: session security and content security. Session security
pertains to verifying the identities of both parties involved in a
session and ensuring the integrity of the session content. Content
security, on the other hand, focuses on verifying the authenticity
and reliability of the session content, thereby enabling the
identification of forged SAV-specific messages.
The threats to session security include:
* Session identity impersonation: This occurs when a malicious
router deceitfully poses as a legitimate peer router to establish
a session with the targeted router. By impersonating another
router, the malicious entity can gain unauthorized access and
potentially manipulate or disrupt the communication between the
legitimate routers.
* Session integrity destruction: In this scenario, a malicious
intermediate router situated between two peering routers
intentionally tampers with or destroys the content of the relayed
SAV-specific message. By interfering with the integrity of the
session content, the attacker can disrupt the reliable
transmission of information, potentially leading to
miscommunication or inaccurate SAV-related data being propagated.
The threats to content security include:
* Message alteration: A malicious router has the ability to
manipulate or forge any portion of a SAV-specific message. For
example, the attacker may employ techniques such as using a
spoofed Autonomous System Number (ASN) or modifying the AS path
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information within the message. By tampering with the content,
the attacker can potentially introduce inaccuracies or deceive the
receiving ASes, compromising the integrity and reliability of the
SAV-related information.
* Message injection: A malicious router injects a seemingly
"legitimate" SAV-specific message into the communication stream
and directs it to the corresponding next-hop AS. This type of
attack can be likened to a replay attack, where the attacker
attempts to retransmit previously captured or fabricated messages
to manipulate the behavior or decisions of the receiving ASes.
The injected message may contain malicious instructions or false
information, leading to incorrect SAV rule generation or improper
validation.
* Path deviation: A malicious router intentionally diverts a SAV-
specific message to an incorrect next-hop AS, contrary to the
expected path defined by the AS path. By deviating from the
intended routing path, the attacker can disrupt the proper
dissemination of SAV-related information and introduce
inconsistencies or conflicts in the validation process. This can
undermine the effectiveness and accuracy of source address
validation within the inter-domain SAVNET architecture.
Overall, inter-domain SAVNET shares similar security threats with BGP
and can leverage existing BGP security mechanisms to enhance both
session and content security. Session security can be enhanced by
employing session authentication mechanisms used in BGP. Similarly,
content security can benefit from the deployment of existing BGP
security mechanisms like RPKI, BGPsec, and ASPA. While these
mechanisms can address content security threats, their widespread
deployment is crucial. Until then, it is necessary to develop an
independent security mechanism specifically designed for inter-domain
SAVNET. One potential approach is for each source AS to calculate a
digital signature for each AS path and include these digital
signatures within the SAV-specific messages. Upon receiving a SAV-
specific message, the SAVNET agent can verify the digital signature
to ascertain the message's authenticity. Furthermore, it is worth
noting that the SAV-specific information communication mechanism may
need to operate over a network link that is currently under a source
address spoofing attack. As a result, it may experience severe
packet loss and high latency due to the ongoing attack, and the
implementation of the SAV-specific communication mechanism should
ensure uninterrupted communication. Detailed security designs and
considerations will be addressed in a separate draft, ensuring the
robust security of inter-domain SAVNET.
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10. Manageability Considerations
It is crucial to consider the operations and management aspects of
SAV information sources, the SAV-specific communication mechanism,
SIB, SIM, and SAV table in the inter-domain SAVNET architecture. The
following guidelines should be followed for their effective
management:
First, management interoperability should be supported across devices
from different vendors or different releases of the same product,
based on a unified data model such as YANG [RFC6020]. This is
essential because the Internet comprises devices from various vendors
and different product releases that coexist simultaneously.
Second, scalable operation and management methods such as NETCONF
[RFC6241] and syslog protocol [RFC5424] should be supported. This is
important as an AS may have hundreds or thousands of border routers
that require efficient operation and management.
Third, management operations, including default initial
configuration, alarm and exception reporting, logging, performance
monitoring and reporting for the control plane and data plane, as
well as debugging, should be designed and implemented in the
protocols or protocol extensions. These operations can be performed
either locally or remotely, based on the operational requirements.
By adhering to these rules, the management of SAV information sources
and related components can be effectively carried out, ensuring
interoperability, scalability, and efficient operations and
management of the inter-domain SAVNET architecture.
11. Privacy Considerations
TBD
12. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA requirements.
13. Scope and Assumptions
In this architecture, the choice of protocols used for communication
between the SIM and different SAV information sources is not limited.
The inter-domain SAVNET architecture presents considerations on how
to consolidate SAV-related information from various sources to
generate SAV rules and perform SAV using the SAV table in the
dataplane. The detailed design and implementation for SAV rule
generation and SAV execution depend on the specific inter-domain SAV
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mechanisms employed.
This document does not cover administrative or business agreements
that may be established between the involved inter-domain SAVNET
parties. These considerations are beyond the scope of this document.
However, it is assumed that authentication and authorization
mechanisms can be implemented to ensure that only authorized ASes can
communicate SAV-related information.
This document makes the following assumptions:
* All ASes where the inter-domain SAVNET is deployed are assumed to
provide the necessary connectivity between SAVNET agent and any
intermediate network elements. However, the architecture does not
impose any specific limitations on the form or nature of this
connectivity.
* Congestion and resource exhaustion can occur at various points in
the inter-domain networks. Hence, in general, network conditions
should be assumed to be hostile. The inter-domain SAVNET
architecture must be capable of functioning reliably under all
circumstances, including scenarios where the paths for delivering
SAV-related information are severely impaired. It is crucial to
design the inter-domain SAVNET system with a high level of
resilience, particularly under extremely hostile network
conditions. The architecture should ensure uninterrupted
communication between inter-domain SAVNET agents, even when data-
plane traffic saturates the link.
* The inter-domain SAVNET architecture does not impose rigid
requirements for the SAV information sources that can be used to
generate SAV rules. Similarly, it does not dictate strict rules
on how to utilize the SAV-related information from diverse sources
or perform SAV in the dataplane. Network operators have the
flexibility to choose their approaches to generate SAV rules and
perform SAV based on their specific requirements and preferences.
Operators can either follow the recommendations outlined in the
inter-domain SAVNET architecture or manually specify the rules for
governing the use of SAV-related information, the generation of
SAV rules, and the execution of SAV in the dataplane.
* The inter-domain SAVNET architecture does not impose restrictions
on the selection of the local AS with which AS to communicate SAV-
specific Information. The ASes have the flexibility to establish
connections for SAV-specific communication based on the manual
configurations set by operators or other automatic mechanisms.
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* The inter-domain SAVNET architecture provides the flexibility to
accommodate Quality-of-Service (QoS) policy agreements between
SAVNET-enabled ASes or local QoS prioritization measures, but it
does not make assumptions about their presence. These agreements
or prioritization efforts are aimed at ensuring the reliable
delivery of SAV-specific Information between SAVNET agents. It is
important to note that QoS is considered as an operational
consideration rather than a functional component of the inter-
domain SAVNET architecture.
* The SAVNET communication mechanisms are loosely coupled and are
used for communicating or gathering SAV-related information, and
how the inter-domain SAVNET synchronizes the management and
operation configurations is out of scope of this document.
14. Contributors
Mingqing Huang
Zhongguancun Laboratory
Beijing
China
Email: huangmq@mail.zgclab.edu.cn
Igor Lubashev
Akamai Technologies
145 Broadway
Cambridge, MA, 02142
United States of America
Email: ilubashe@akamai.com
Many thanks to Mingqing Huang and Igor Lubashev for the significantly
helpful discussions and revision suggestions.
15. References
15.1. Normative References
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, DOI 10.17487/RFC3704, March
2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3704>.
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[RFC8704] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., and J. Haas, "Enhanced
Feasible-Path Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding", BCP 84,
RFC 8704, DOI 10.17487/RFC8704, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8704>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6020>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6241>.
[RFC5424] Gerhards, R., "The Syslog Protocol", RFC 5424,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5424, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5424>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
15.2. Informative References
[inter-domain-ps]
"Source Address Validation in Inter-domain Networks Gap
Analysis, Problem Statement, and Requirements", 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-savnet-inter-
domain-problem-statement/>.
[intra-domain-arch]
"Intra-domain Source Address Validation (SAVNET)
Architecture", 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/
draft-ietf-savnet-intra-domain-architecture/>.
[RFC5635] Kumari, W. and D. McPherson, "Remote Triggered Black Hole
Filtering with Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF)",
RFC 5635, DOI 10.17487/RFC5635, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5635>.
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[RFC8955] Loibl, C., Hares, S., Raszuk, R., McPherson, D., and M.
Bacher, "Dissemination of Flow Specification Rules",
RFC 8955, DOI 10.17487/RFC8955, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8955>.
[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8210>.
[RFC959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol",
STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc959>.
[manrs] MANRS, "MANRS Implementation Guide", 2023,
<https://www.manrs.org/netops/guide/antispoofing/>.
[nist] NIST, "Resilient Interdomain Traffic Exchange: BGP
Security and DDos Mitigation", 2019,
<https://www.nist.gov/publications/resilient-interdomain-
traffic-exchange-bgp-security-and-ddos-mitigation>.
[rpki-time-of-flight]
ISOC, "RPKI Time-of-Flight: Tracking Delays in the
Management, Control, and Data Planes", n.d.,
<https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-28486-1_18>.
[sav-table]
"General Source Address Validation Capabilities", 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-savnet-
general-sav-capabilities/>.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Alvaro Retana, Kotikalapudi Sriram, Rüdiger Volk,
Xueyan Song, Ben Maddison, Jared Mauch, Joel Halpern, Aijun Wang,
Jeffrey Haas, Xiangqing Chang, Changwang Lin, Mingxing Liu, Zhen Tan,
Yuanyuan Zhang, Yangyang Wang, Antoin Verschuren, Olaf Struck, Siyuan
Teng, Gert Doering etc. for their valuable comments on this document.
Authors' Addresses
Dan Li
Tsinghua University
Beijing
China
Email: tolidan@tsinghua.edu.cn
Li, et al. Expires 5 March 2026 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft Inter-domain SAVNET Architecture September 2025
Li Chen
Zhongguancun Laboratory
Beijing
China
Email: lichen@zgclab.edu.cn
Nan Geng
Huawei
Beijing
China
Email: gengnan@huawei.com
Libin Liu
Zhongguancun Laboratory
Beijing
China
Email: liulb@zgclab.edu.cn
Lancheng Qin
Zhongguancun Laboratory
Beijing
China
Email: qinlc@mail.zgclab.edu.cn
Li, et al. Expires 5 March 2026 [Page 40]