Adverse Actions by a Certification Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actions-04

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Last updated 2017-07-03 (latest revision 2017-01-12)
Replaces draft-kent-sidr-adverse-actions
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SIDR                                                             S. Kent
Internet-Draft                                          BBN Technologies
Intended status: Informational                                     D. Ma
Expires: July 16, 2017                                              ZDNS
                                                        January 12, 2017

Adverse Actions by a Certification Authority (CA) or Repository Manager
            in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
                   draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actions-04

Abstract

   This document analyzes actions by or against a CA or independent
   repository manager in the RPKI that can adversely affect the Internet
   Number Resources (INRs) associated with that CA or its subordinate
   CAs.  The analysis is done from the perspective of an affected INR
   holder.  The analysis is based on examination of the data items in
   the RPKI repository, as controlled by a CA (or independent repository
   manager) and fetched by Relying Parties (RPs).  The analysis does not
   purport to be comprehensive; it does represent an orderly way to
   analyze a number of ways that errors by or attacks against a CA or
   repository manager can affect the RPKI and routing decisions based on
   RPKI data.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 16, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Kent & Ma                 Expires July 16, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           RPKI Adverse CA Actions            January 2017

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Analysis of RPKI Repository Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Manifest  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.3.  Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     2.4.  ROA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     2.5.  Ghostbusters Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     2.6.  Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   3.  Analysis of Actions Relative to Scenarios . . . . . . . . . .  18
     3.1.  Scenario A  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     3.2.  Scenario B  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     3.3.  Scenario C  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     3.4.  Scenario D  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24

1.  Introduction

   In the context of this document, any change to the Resource Public
   Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] that diminishes the set of
   Internet Number Resources (INRs) associated with an INR holder, and
   that is contrary to the holder's wishes, is termed "adverse".  This
   analysis is done from the perspective of an affected INR holder.  An
   action that results in an adverse charge (as defined above), may be
   the result of an attack on a CA [RFC7132], an error by a CA, or an
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