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BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Formats
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-16

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 8208.
Author Sean Turner
Last updated 2016-12-15 (Latest revision 2016-11-13)
Replaces draft-turner-sidr-bgpsec-algs
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
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Reviews
Additional resources Mailing list discussion
Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Sandra L. Murphy
Shepherd write-up Show Last changed 2016-06-24
IESG IESG state Became RFC 8208 (Proposed Standard)
Consensus boilerplate Yes
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD Alvaro Retana
Send notices to "Sandra L. Murphy" <sandy@tislabs.com>, aretana@cisco.com
IANA IANA review state IANA OK - Actions Needed
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-16
Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group                      S. Turner
Internet-Draft                                                     sn3rd
Updates: 7935 (if approved)                            November 14, 2016
Intended status: Standards Track                                        
Expires: May 18, 2017                                                   

          BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Formats
                     draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-16
                                    
Abstract

   This document specifies the algorithms, algorithm parameters,
   asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key size and signature format used
   in BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security).  This document updates
   the Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource
   Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 7935).

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

 

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Asymmetric Key Pair Formats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     3.1.  Public Key Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.2.  Private Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Signature Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.  Additional Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7

1.  Introduction

   This document specifies:
      o the digital signature algorithm and parameters;
      o the hash algorithm and parameters;
      o the public and private key formats; and,
      o the signature format
   used by Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification
   Authorities (CA), and BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security)
   speakers (i.e., routers).  CAs use these algorithms when processing
   requests for BGPsec Router Certificates [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-
   profiles].  Examples when BGPsec routers use these algorithms include
   requesting BGPsec certificates [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles], signing
   BGPsec Update messages [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], and verifying
   BGPsec Update messages [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol].

   This document updates [RFC7935] to add support for a) a different
   algorithm for BGPsec certificate requests, which are issued only by
   BGPsec speakers; b) a different Subject Public Key Info format for
   BGPsec certificates, which is needed for the specified BGPsec
   signature algorithm; and, c) a different signature format for BGPsec
   signatures, which is needed for the specified BGPsec signature
   algorithm.  The BGPsec certificate are differentiated from other RPKI
   certificates by the use of the BGPsec Extended Key Usage defined in
   [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles].

 

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1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

2.  Algorithms

   The algorithms used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec
   Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in Section 2 of
   [RFC7935].  This section addresses BGPsec algorithms, for example
   these algorithms are used by BGPsec routers to request BGPsec
   certificates, by RPKI CAs to verify BGPsec certification requests, by
   BGPsec routers to generate BGPsec Update messages, and by BGPsec
   routers to verify BGPsec Update message:

     o The signature algorithm used MUST be the Elliptic Curve Digital
       Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with curve P-256 [RFC6090][DSS].

     o The hash algorithm used MUST be SHA-256 [SHS].

   Hash algorithms are not identified by themselves in certificates or
   BGPsec Update messages. They are represented by an OID that combines
   the hash algorithm with the digital signature algorithm as follows:

     o The ecdsa-with-SHA256 OID [RFC5480] MUST appear in the PKCS #10
       signatureAlgorithm field [RFC2986] or in Certificate Request
       Message Format (CRMF) POPOSigningKey algorithm field [RFC4211],
       which location depends on the certificate request format
       generated.

     o In BGPsec Update messages, the ECDSA with SHA-256 Algorithm Suite
       Identifier value 0x1 (see Section 7) is included in the
       Signature-Block List's Algorithm Suite Identifier field.

3.  Asymmetric Key Pair Formats

   The key formats used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec
   Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in Section 3 of
   [RFC7935].  This section addresses key formats found in the BGPsec
   router certificate requests and in BGPsec Router Certificates.

   The ECDSA private keys used to compute signatures for certificate
   requests and BGPsec Update messages MUST come from the P-256 curve
   [RFC5480].  The public key pair MUST use the uncompressed form.

 

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3.1.  Public Key Format

   The Subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo
   [RFC5280].  It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey. 
   The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow:

     o algorithm (an AlgorithmIdentifier type):  The id-ecPublicKey OID
       MUST be used in the algorithm field, as specified in Section
       2.1.1 of [RFC5480].  The value for the associated parameters MUST
       be secp256r1, as specified in Section 2.1.1.1 of [RFC5480].

     o subjectPublicKey:  ECPoint MUST be used to encode the
       certificate's subjectPublicKey field, as specified in Section 2.2
       of [RFC5480].

3.2.  Private Key Format

   Local Policy determines private key format.

4.  Signature Format 

   The structure for the certificate's and CRL's signature field MUST be
   as specified in Section 4 of [RFC7935], which is the same format used
   by other RPKI certificates.  The structure for the certification
   request's and BGPsec Update message's signature field MUST be as
   specified in Section 2.2.3 of [RFC3279].

5.  Additional Requirements

   It is anticipated that BGPsec will require the adoption of updated
   key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over
   time, in order to maintain an acceptable level of cryptographic
   security. This profile should be updated to specify such future
   requirements, when appropriate.

   The recommended procedures to implement such a transition of key
   sizes and algorithms is specified in [RFC6916].

6.  Security Considerations 

   The Security Considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC5480], [RFC6090],
   [RFC7935], and [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] apply to certificates. 
   The security considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC6090], [RFC7935],
   [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] apply to certification requests.  The
   security considerations of [RFC3279], [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], and
   [RFC6090] apply to BGPsec Update messages.  No new security
   considerations are introduced as a result of this specification.

 

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7.  IANA Considerations

   The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is requested to define
   the "BGPsec Algorithm Suite Registry" in the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) group.  The one-octet BGPsec Algorithm Suite
   Registry identifiers assigned by IANA identifies the digest algorithm
   and a signature algorithm used in the BGPsec Signature-Block List's
   Algorithm Suite Identifier field.

   IANA is kindly requested to also register a single algorithm suite
   identifier, for the digest algorithm SHA-256 [SHS] and the signature
   algorithm ECDSA on the P-256 curve [RFC6090][DSS].

                    BGPsec Algorithm Suites Registry

       Algorithm    Digest       Signature    Specification
       Suite        Algorithm    Algorithm    Pointer
       Identifier 

     +------------+------------+-------------+---------------------+
     | 0x0        | Reserved   | Reserved    | This draft          |
     +------------+------------+-------------+---------------------+
     | 0x1        | SHA-256    | ECDSA P-256 | [SHS][DSS][RFC6090] |
     +------------+------------+-------------+---------------------+
     | 0x2-0xE    | Unassigned | Unassigned  | This draft          |
     +------------+------------+-------------+---------------------+
     | 0xF        | Reserved   | Reserved    | This draft          |
     +------------+------------+-------------+---------------------+

   Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process
   defined in [RFC5226].  Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm
   suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and
   signature algorithm name.

8.  Acknowledgements

   The author wishes to thank Geoff Huston and George Michaelson for
   producing [RFC7935], which this document is entirely based on.  I'd
   also like to thank Roque Gagliano, David Mandelberg, Tom Petch, Sam
   Weiller, and Stephen Kent for their reviews and comments.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI
             10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-
 

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             editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
             Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, DOI
             10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, <http://www.rfc-
             editor.org/info/rfc2986>.

   [RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
             Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
             Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
             (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April 2002,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.

   [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
             Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, DOI
             10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, <http://www.rfc-
             editor.org/info/rfc4211>.

   [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
             IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, DOI
             10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, <http://www.rfc-
             editor.org/info/rfc5226>.

   [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
             Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
             Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
             (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
             "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
             Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.

   [RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
             Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, DOI
             10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011, <http://www.rfc-
             editor.org/info/rfc6090>.

   [RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
             Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
             (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April
             2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.

   [RFC7935] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for
             Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key
             Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935, August
             2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7935>.
 

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   [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinski, M., "BGPsec Protocol
             Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in-
             progress.

   [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] Reynolds, M. and S. Turner, "A Profile
             for BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation
             Lists, and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-
             pki-profiles, work-in-progress.

   [DSS]     National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S.
             Department of Commerce, "Digital Signature Standard", FIPS
             Publication 186-4, July 2013.

   [SHS]     National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S.
             Department of Commerce, "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS
             Publication 180-4, August 2015.

9.2.  Informative References

   None.

Authors' Addresses

   Sean Turner
   sn3rd

   EMail: sean@sn3rd.com

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