BGPsec Operational Considerations
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-06

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Last updated 2015-07-02
Replaces draft-ymbk-bgpsec-ops
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Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
Internet-Draft                                 Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Best Current Practice                      July 3, 2015
Expires: January 4, 2016

                   BGPsec Operational Considerations
                     draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-06

Abstract

   Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many
   operational considerations.  This document attempts to collect and
   present the most critical and universal.  It is expected to evolve as
   BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
   be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
   appear in all upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed
   case as English words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

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Internet-Draft      BGPsec Operational Considerations          July 2015

   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  AS/Router Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Within a Network  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   6.  Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  Routing Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   8.  Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   BGPsec, [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], is a new protocol with many
   operational considerations.  It is expected to be deployed
   incrementally over a number of years.  As core BGPsec-capable routers
   may require large memory and/or modern CPUs, it is thought that
   origin validation based on the RPKI, [RFC6811], will occur over the
   next twp to three years and that BGPsec will start to deploy well
   after that.

   BGPsec relies on widespread propagation of the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480].  How the RPKI is distributed and
   maintained globally and within an operator's infrastructure may be
   different for BGPsec than for origin validation.

   BGPsec need be spoken only by an AS's eBGP speaking, AKA border,
   routers, and is designed so that it can be used to protect
   announcements which are originated by small edge routers.  This has
   special operational considerations.

   Different prefixes may have different timing and replay protection
   considerations.

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