A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-17

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Last updated 2016-06-24 (latest revision 2016-06-01)
Replaces draft-turner-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
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Document shepherd Chris Morrow
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Send notices to "Chris Morrow" <morrowc@ops-netman.net>, aretana@cisco.com
Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group                    M. Reynolds
Internet-Draft                                                      IPSw
Updates: 6487 (if approved)                                    S. Turner
Intended status: Standard Track                                     IECA
Expires: December 3, 2016                                        S. Kent
                                                                     BBN
                                                            June 1, 2016

               A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates,
        Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
                 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-17

Abstract

   This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used
   to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border
   Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol
   known as BGPsec.  BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the
   Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together. BGPsec
   is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the
   requirement to provide security for BGP.  The goal of BGPsec is to
   provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong
   cryptographic primitives.  The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
   by this profile are issued (to routers within an Autonomous System). 
   Each of these certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificate. 
   These CA certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS
   Identifier Delegation extension.  An EE certificate of this type
   asserts that the router(s) holding the corresponding private key are
   authorized to emit secure route advertisements on behalf of the
   AS(es) specified in the certificate.  This document also profiles the
   format of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party (RP)
   certificate path validation procedures for these EE certificates.
   This document extends the RPKI; therefore, this documents updates the
   RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC 6487).

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
 

Reynolds, et al.        Expires December 3, 2016                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         BGPsec Router PKI Profiles           June 1, 2016

   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Updates to [RFC6487] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1  BGPsec Router Certificate Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
         3.1.1.1.  Subject  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       3.1.2.  Subject Public Key Info  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       3.1.3.  BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields .  6
         3.1.3.1.  Basic Constraints  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
         3.1.3.2.  Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
         3.1.3.3.  Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
         3.1.3.4.  IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
         3.1.3.5.  AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile  . . . . . . . .  7
     3.3.  BGPsec Router Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.4.  Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI  . .  8
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