A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-07
Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group M. Reynolds
Internet-Draft IPSw
Updates: 6487 (if approved) S. Turner
Intended Status: Standards Track IECA
Expires: September 27, 2014 S. Kent
BBN
March 27, 2014
A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates,
Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-07
Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths
in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that
protocol known as BGPSEC. BGP is a critical component for the proper
operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPSEC protocol is under
development as a component to address the requirement to provide
security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPSEC is to design a
protocol for full AS path validation based on the use of strong
cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS
Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous
System (AS) or ASes. The certificate asserts that the router(s)
holding the private key are authorized to send out secure route
advertisements on behalf of the specified AS(es). This document also
profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format
of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate
path validation procedures. The document extends the RPKI;
therefore, this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates
Profile (RFC 6487).
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
Reynolds & Turner Expires March 21, 2014 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft BGPSEC Router PKI Profiles September 17, 2013
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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1. Introduction
This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE)
certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of
Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol Security
(BGPSEC) protocol. Such certificates are termed "BGPSEC Router
Certificates". The holder of the private key associated with a
BGPSEC Router Certificate is authorized to send secure route
advertisements (BGPSEC UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS(es) named in the
certificate. That is, a router holding the private key may send to
its BGP peers, route advertisements that contain one or more of the
specified AS number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute. A key
property that BGPSEC will provide is that every AS along the AS PATH
can verify that the other ASes along the path have authorized the
advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH).
This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of
[RFC5280], and it updates [RFC6487]. It establishes requirements
imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a BGPSEC Router
Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for certificate fields and
extensions for the certificate to be valid in this context. This
document also profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and
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