A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-12

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Authors Mark Reynolds  , Sean Turner  , Stephen Kent 
Last updated 2015-10-14
Replaces draft-turner-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles
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Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group                    M. Reynolds
Internet-Draft                                                      IPSw
Updates: 6487 (if approved)                                    S. Turner
Intended status: BCP                                                IECA
Expires: April 16, 2016                                          S. Kent
                                                                     BBN
                                                        October 14, 2015

               A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates,
        Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
                 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-12

Abstract

   This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
   the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths
   in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that
   protocol known as BGPsec.  BGP is a critical component for the proper
   operation of the Internet as a whole.  The BGPsec protocol is under
   development as a component to address the requirement to provide
   security for the BGP protocol.  The goal of BGPsec is to design a
   protocol for full AS path validation based on the use of strong
   cryptographic primitives.  The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
   by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure
   (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS
   Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous
   System (AS) or ASes.  The certificate asserts that the router(s)
   holding the private key are authorized to send out secure route
   advertisements on behalf of the specified AS(es).  This document also
   profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format
   of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate
   path validation procedures.  The document extends the RPKI;
   therefore, this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates
   Profile (RFC 6487).

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
 

Reynolds, et al.         Expires April 16, 2016                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         BGPsec Router PKI Profiles       October 14, 2015

   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Updates to [RFC6487] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1  BGPsec Router Certificate Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
         3.1.1.1.  Subject  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       3.1.2.  Subject Public Key Info  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       3.1.3.  BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields .  6
         3.1.3.1.  Basic Constraints  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
         3.1.3.2.  Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
         3.1.3.3.  Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
         3.1.3.4.  IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
         3.1.3.5.  AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile  . . . . . . . .  7
     3.3.  BGPsec Router Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.  Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
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