A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-18
| The information below is for an old version of the document | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG) | |
| Authors | Mark Reynolds , Sean Turner , Stephen Kent | ||
| Last updated | 2016-12-19 (latest revision 2016-07-21) | ||
| Replaces | draft-turner-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Chris Morrow | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2016-06-24) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date |
Needs 7 more YES or NO OBJECTION positions to pass. |
||
| Responsible AD | Alvaro Retana | ||
| Send notices to | "Chris Morrow" <morrowc@ops-netman.net>, aretana@cisco.com | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - Actions Needed | |
Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group M. Reynolds
Internet-Draft IPSw
Updates: 6487 (if approved) S. Turner
Intended status: Standard Track sn3rd
Expires: January 22, 2017 S. Kent
BBN
July 21, 2016
A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates,
Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-18
Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used
to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol
known as BGPsec. BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the
Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together. BGPsec
is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the
requirement to provide security for BGP. The goal of BGPsec is to
provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong
cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
by this profile are issued (to routers within an Autonomous System).
Each of these certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificate.
These CA certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS
Identifier Delegation extension. An EE certificate of this type
asserts that the router(s) holding the corresponding private key are
authorized to emit secure route advertisements on behalf of the
AS(es) specified in the certificate. This document also profiles the
format of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party (RP)
certificate path validation procedures for these EE certificates.
This document extends the RPKI; therefore, this documents updates the
RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC 6487).
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
Reynolds, et al. Expires January 22, 2017 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft BGPsec Router PKI Profiles July 21, 2016
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Updates to [RFC6487] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1 BGPsec Router Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1.1. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . 6
3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3.2. Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3.4. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3.5. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI . . 8
4. Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Show full document text