A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-21

[Ballot comment]
I'm posting a No-Objection, but I think Dale is correct in raising the remaining issues. Commenting those below:

> 3.1.1.  Subject
>
>  However, each
>  certificate issued by an individual CA MUST contain a Subject name
>  that is unique to that CA context.
>
> E-mail from Sean Turner on 22 Dec 2016 says:
>
>    I think this is just a case of a missing "CA" in front of the
word
>    "context" so tweaking it to: ".... that is unique to that CA
>    context".  The certs only need to be unique on a per CA basis the
>    subject name does not need to be unique across the whole of the
>    RPKI.  The combination of issuer+subject+serial # plus all the
>    parent certs provides the uniqueness.
>
> However, there doesn't seem to be a standard meaning of the phrase
> "CA
> context".  I can't find any occurrences in any RFC or in any I-D
> other
> than draft-ietf-trans-threat-analysis-NN.

Is a good question.

> It seems to me that the best solution is to put a cleaned-up version
> of Sean's statement "The combination of issuer+subject+serial # plus
> all parent certs provides the uniqueness." into the draft, as that is
> admirably clear.  (Unless, of course, there is a standard PKI phrase
> for that requirement, in which case that could be used.)  For
> instance:
>
>  However, the combination of subject name, serial number, issuer,
>  and certification path must be globally unique.

That would be clearer for me, assuming that is what was actually meant, of course :-)

> 3.3.  BGPsec Router Certificate Validation
>
>  The validation procedure used for BGPsec Router Certificates is
>  identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of
>  [RFC6487] (and any RFC that updates this procedure), as modified
>  below.  For example, in step 3: "The certificate contains all
>  field
>  that must be present" - refers to the fields that are required by
>  this specification.
>
> This picks up the changes from Sean Turner's e-mail of 22 Dec 2016
> except it omits changing "that updates this procedure" to "that
> updates that procedure", which seems to me to necessary to make the
> wording correct.

I think that’s right.

>  step 3: "The certificate contains all field that must be present"
>
> This doesn't match the text in RFC 6487, despite claiming to be
> quoted:
> s/all field/all fields/ and s/must/MUST/.

Right.

> 7.  IANA Considerations
>
>  No IANA allocations are request of IANA, ...
>
> I think this should be "No IANA allocations are requested of IANA",
> or
> probably better "No allocations are requested of IANA".
>
> E-mail from Sean Turner on 22 Dec 2016 says "Alvaro had a similar
> comment on the IANA considerations and he suggested the first
> option.", but no change has been made.

OK

[Ballot comment]

Thanks for addressing my discuss points.

OLD COMMENTS below, I didn't edit 'em...

- section 2: I think this is a bit badly written: "The use
of BGPsec Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs
that process Manifests and ROAs because the public key
found in the BGPsec Router Certificate is used only to
verify the signature on the BGPsec certificate request
(only CAs process these) and the signature on a BGPsec
Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPsec
routers process these)." Do you mean that there's no way
that an entity can confuse a Manifest, ROA, CSR or BGPsec
update so there's no issue with which public keys are used
to verify the signatures on those data structures?

- section 3: As noted in my comments on the BGPsec
protocol, it'd be better to call out the SKI here if you
don't add the direct ref to 6487 to the BGPsec protocol
draft.

[Ballot comment]
A few strictly editorial comments:

- IDNits complains about some undefined references.

- Abstract: Why is the phrase "(to routers within an Autonomous System)" in parentheses?

-2: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol explicitly excludes non-capitalized versions of 2119 words. This draft does not. It seems different 2119 approaches among the various bgpsec draft could be confusing to the reader.

[Ballot discuss]


I have a few probably quick things I'd like to discuss for
this one:

(1) 3.1.1: Why MUST a CA ensure that the CA name and
Subject name combination is unique? I don't see what'd
break in BGPsec if that rule is omitted, but maybe I'm
missing something.

(2) 3.1.1: Similarly, I'm not clear why only common name
and serial number are allowed in Subject.  Why is that
needed for interop? (I can see that you want to say that
code MUST support those but not why you want to prevent
other things.)

(3) Where's certificate status checking covered? What's
expected for BGPsec router certs? If BGPsec speakers are
intended to inherit the CRL checking from 6487 then being
explicit about that would probably be worthwhile.  And I'd
wonder if router cert revocation will be more common than
for other resource certs, in which case an OCSP-like
system could be needed - did the WG consider that?

[Ballot comment]

- section 2: I think this is a bit badly written: "The use
of BGPsec Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs
that process Manifests and ROAs because the public key
found in the BGPsec Router Certificate is used only to
verify the signature on the BGPsec certificate request
(only CAs process these) and the signature on a BGPsec
Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPsec
routers process these)." Do you mean that there's no way
that an entity can confuse a Manifest, ROA, CSR or BGPsec
update so there's no issue with which public keys are used
to verify the signatures on those data structures?

- section 3: As noted in my comments on the BGPsec
protocol, it'd be better to call out the SKI here if you
don't add the direct ref to 6487 to the BGPsec protocol
draft.

(Via drafts-lastcall-comment@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

The IANA Services Operator has completed its review of draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-18.txt. If any part of this review is inaccurate, please let us know.

The IANA Services Operator understands that, upon approval of this document, there are two actions which we must complete.

First, in the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier subregsitry of the Structure of Management Information (SMI) Numbers (MIB Module Registrations) registry located at:

https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/

the existing registration for:

Decimal: 84
Description: id-mod-bgpsec-eku

will have its reference updated to [ RFC-to-be ].

Second, in the SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose subregsitry of the Structure of Management Information (SMI) Numbers (MIB Module Registrations) registry located at:

https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/

the existing registration for:

Decimal: 30
Description: id-kp-bgpsec-router

will have its reference updated to [ RFC-to-be ].

The IANA Services Operator understands that these two actions are the only ones required to be completed upon approval of this document.

Note:  The actions requested in this document will not be completed until the document has been approved for publication as an RFC. This message is only to confirm what actions will be performed.

Thank you,

Sabrina Tanamal
IANA Services Specialist
PTI

The following Last Call announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG
To: "IETF-Announce"
CC: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles@ietf.org, morrowc@ops-netman.net, sidr-chairs@ietf.org, "Chris Morrow" , sidr@ietf.org, aretana@cisco.com
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: Last Call:  (A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests) to Proposed Standard


The IESG has received a request from the Secure Inter-Domain Routing WG
(sidr) to consider the following document:
- 'A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation
  Lists, and Certification Requests'
  as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2016-12-19. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used
  to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border
  Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol
  known as BGPsec.  BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the
  Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together. BGPsec
  is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the
  requirement to provide security for BGP.  The goal of BGPsec is to
  provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong
  cryptographic primitives.  The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
  by this profile are issued (to routers within an Autonomous System).
  Each of these certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key
  Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificate.
  These CA certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS
  Identifier Delegation extension.  An EE certificate of this type
  asserts that the router(s) holding the corresponding private key are
  authorized to emit secure route advertisements on behalf of the
  AS(es) specified in the certificate.  This document also profiles the
  format of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party (RP)
  certificate path validation procedures for these EE certificates.
  This document extends the RPKI; therefore, this documents updates the
  RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC 6487).




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

=== AD Review of draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-18 ===

I have some comments (please see below) I would like you to address, but I wouldn’t characterize any of them as major, so I’m starting the IETF Last Call and placing this document in the next available IESG Telechat.

Thanks!

Alvaro.


Comments:

C1. From the Introduction: “A router holding the private key is authorized to send route advertisements (to its peers) that contain one or more of the specified AS number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute.”  First of all, if BGPSec is used, then the AS_PATH attribute is not.  Second, what does “one or more of the specified AS number as the last item” mean?  There is only one “last item”…but I’m guessing you might be referring to pre-pending.

C2. “Border Gateway Protocol Security protocol (BGPsec)”  I haven’t seen BGPsec expanded anywhere else like that.  In fact, ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol just used BGPsec (no expansion).

C3. s/ID.sidr-rfc6485bis/rfc7935

C4. In Section 3.1.3.2. (Extended Key Usage): “As specified in [RFC6487] this extension MUST be marked as non-critical.”  Because the behavior was specified in RFC6487, then the “MUST” shouldn’t be Normative here; s/MUST/must

C5. Section 3.3. (BGPsec Router Certificate Validation) says that the “validation procedure…is identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of [RFC6487] (and any RFC that updates this procedure), but using the constraints applied come from this specification.”  It Is strange to me that the phrase inside the parenthesis is included here since there isn’t an update to the procedure – is there a specific reason why you need to call future (unknown) updates out at this point?  BTW, s/using the constraints applied come from this specification/using the constraints from this specification

C6. References.
- RFC6818 can be made Informative.
- RFC6486 and ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol should be Normative.

C7. s/to an Internet Service Providers (ISP)/ to an Internet Service Provider (ISP)

C8. s/The CA also generate./  (orphan phrase)

C9. s/The [RFC6480]/[RFC6480]

C10. s/3.1.1.1./3.1.1.

C11. “…the efforts of Steve Kent…were instrumental in preparing this work”  Steve is an author.

As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document
Shepherd Write-Up.

Changes are expected over time. This version is dated 24 February 2012.

(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard,
Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)?  Why
is this the proper type of RFC?  Is this type of RFC indicated in the
title page header?

ProposedStandard

(2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement
Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent
examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved
documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

"This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used
  to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border
  Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol
  known as BGPsec.  BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the
  Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together. BGPsec
  is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the
  requirement to provide security for BGP.  The goal of BGPsec is to
  provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong
  cryptographic primitives.  The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
  by this profile are issued (to routers within an Autonomous System).
  Each of these certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key
  Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificate.
  These CA certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS
  Identifier Delegation extension.  An EE certificate of this type
  asserts that the router(s) holding the corresponding private key are
  authorized to emit secure route advertisements on behalf of the
  AS(es) specified in the certificate.  This document also profiles the
  format of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party (RP)
  certificate path validation procedures for these EE certificates.
  This document extends the RPKI; therefore, this documents updates the
  RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC 6487)."

  Relevant content can frequently be found in the abstract
  and/or introduction of the document. If not, this may be
  an indication that there are deficiencies in the abstract
  or introduction.

Working Group Summary

The PKI Profiles document received lots of discussion from the WG over it's 17 revisions,

  Was there anything in WG process that is worth noting? For
  example, was there controversy about particular points or
  were there decisions where the consensus was particularly
  rough?

no

Document Quality

  Are there existing implementations of the protocol? Have a
  significant number of vendors indicated their plan to
  implement the specification? Are there any reviewers that
  merit special mention as having done a thorough review,
  e.g., one that resulted in important changes or a
  conclusion that the document had no substantive issues? If
  there was a MIB Doctor, Media Type or other expert review,
  what was its course (briefly)? In the case of a Media Type
  review, on what date was the request posted?

This is not a protocol, so no implementations exist.

Personnel

  Who is the Document Shepherd? Who is the Responsible Area
  Director?

Shepherd: Chris Morrow - morrowc@ops-netman.net
AD: Alvaro Retana - aretana@cisco.com

(3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by
the Document Shepherd.  If this version of the document is not ready
for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to
the IESG.

The document was read several times over it's lifecycle in the WG, but the shepherd. I believe it's ready to move forward.

(4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or
breadth of the reviews that have been performed?

no

(5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from
broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS,
DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that
took place.

There are IANA considerations, discussion of use of 2 PKIX related SMI values, the request is for IANA to simply update the refences in the registries when this document is finalized.

(6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd
has with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the
IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable
with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really
is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and
has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here.

no concerns.

(7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR
disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78
and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why.

yes

(8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document?
If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR
disclosures.

none necessary

(9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others
being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? 

as solid as SIDR gets.

(10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate
email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a
separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

no threats.

(11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this
document. (See https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-Drafts
Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be
thorough.

no nits

(12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review
criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

no formal review required.

(13) Have all references within this document been identified as
either normative or informative?

yes

(14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for
advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative
references exist, what is the plan for their completion?

no

(15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)?
If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in
the Last Call procedure.

no

(16) Will publication of this document change the status of any
existing RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed
in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are not
listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the
part of the document where the relationship of this document to the
other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document,
explain why the WG considers it unnecessary.

It will update RFC6487, which is expected.

(17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations
section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the
document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes
are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries.
Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly
identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a
detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that
allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a
reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 5226).

The IANA Considerations section seems to be in order, with minimal work for IANA upon publication.

(18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future
allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find
useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries.

No new registries.

(19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document
Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal
language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc.

no formal language used.