BGPSEC router key rollover as an alternative to beaconing
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-00

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Last updated 2012-08-07
Replaces draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover
Replaced by rfc8634, draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-rollover
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Network Working Group                                        R. Gagliano
Internet-Draft                                                  K. Patel
Intended status: Standards Track                                 B. Weis
Expires: February 8, 2013                                  Cisco Systems
                                                          August 7, 2012

       BGPSEC router key rollover as an alternative to beaconing
                   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-00

Abstract

   The current BGPSEC draft documents do not specifies a key rollover
   process for routers.  This document describes a possible key rollover
   process and explores its impact to mitigate replay attacks and
   eliminate the need for beaconing in BGPSEC.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 8, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Key rollover in BGPSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  A proposed process for BGPSEC key rollover . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  BGPSEC key rollover as a measure against replays attacks
       in BGPSEC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.1.  BGPSEC Re-play attack window requirement . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.2.  BGPSEC key rollover as a mechanism to protect against
           replay attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

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1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

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2.  Introduction

   In BGPSEC, a key rollover (or re-keying) is the process of changing
   the router's key pair, issuing the correspondent new End-Entity
   certificates and revoke the old certificate.  This process will need
   to happen at regular intervals normally due to local policies at each
   network.

   During a rollover process, a router needs to generate BGP UPDATE
   messages in order to signal the new key to be used to its neighbors.
   So, intuitively, a frequent key rollover process has similar effects
   as the beaconing process proposed by the BGPSEC base documents to
   protect a BGPSEC attribute against a re-play attack.  However, there
   are a number of operational details to be considered if the expire
   time field in the BGPSEC attribute is removed.

   This document details a possible key rollover process in BGPSEC and
   explores the operational environment where key rollovers could be
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