BGPSEC router key rollover as an alternative to beaconing
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-02

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Last updated 2013-10-17 (latest revision 2013-04-15)
Replaces draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover
Replaced by rfc8634, draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-rollover
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Expired & archived
pdf htmlized bibtex
Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd No shepherd assigned
IESG IESG state Expired
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-02.txt

Abstract

BGPSEC will need to address the impact from regular and emergency rollover processes for the BGPSEC End-Entity (EE) certificates that will be performed by Certificate Authorities (CAs) participating at the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document provides general recommendations for that process and specifies how this process is used to control BGPSEC's window of exposure to replay attacks.

Authors

Roque Gagliano (rogaglia@cisco.com)
Keyur Patel (keyupate@cisco.com)
Brian Weis (bew@cisco.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)