Threat Model for BGP Path Security
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-05

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Last updated 2013-09-04 (latest revision 2013-03-26)
Replaces draft-kent-bgpsec-threats
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Secure Inter-Domain Routing                                      S. Kent
Internet-Draft                                                    A. Chi
Intended status: Informational                                       BBN
Expires: September 27, 2013                               March 26, 2013

                   Threat Model for BGP Path Security
                   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-05

Abstract

   This document describes a threat model for the context in which BGP
   path security mechanisms will be developed.  It assumes the context
   established by the SIDR WG charter, as of April 19, 2011.  The
   charter established two goals for the SIDR work:

   o  Enabling an AS to verify the authorization of an origin AS to
      originate a specified set of prefixes

   o  Enabling an AS to verify that the AS-PATH [sic] represented in a
      route matches the path traveled by the NLRI for the route

   The charter further mandates that SIDR build upon the Resource Public
   Key Infrastructure (RPKI), the first product of the WG.  Consistent
   with the charter, this threat model includes an analysis of the RPKI,
   and focuses on the ability of an AS to verify the authenticity of the
   AS path info received in a BGP update.  This document does not assume
   a specific path security solution approach.  However, the model does
   assume that any solution approach will make use of the RPKI, at least
   for route origin validation.  We use the term PATHSEC to refer to any
   BGP path security technology that makes use of the RPKI.  PATHSEC
   will secure EBGP (see [RFC4271]), consistent with the inter-AS
   security focus of the RPKI [RFC6480].  References to "BGP" in this
   document are to be interpreted as references to EBGP.

   The document characterizes classes of potential adversaries that are
   considered to be threats, and examines classes of attacks that might
   be launched against PATHSEC.  It does not revisit attacks against
   unprotected BGP, as that topic has already been addressed in
   [RFC4271].  It concludes with brief discussion of residual
   vulnerabilities.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Kent & Chi             Expires September 27, 2013               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft     Threat Model for BGP Path Security         March 2013

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Threat Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Attack Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Active wiretapping of sessions between routers  . . . . .   8
     4.2.  Attacks on a BGP router . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.3.  Attacks on network operator management computers (non-CA
           computers)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.4.  Attacks on a repository publication point . . . . . . . .  12
     4.5.  Attacks on an RPKI CA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   5.  Residual Vulnerabilities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   9.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
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