Threat Model for BGP Path Security
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-07

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Last updated 2013-11-21 (latest revision 2013-10-08)
Replaces draft-kent-bgpsec-threats
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Secure Inter-Domain Routing                                      S. Kent
Internet-Draft                                                       BBN
Intended status: Informational                                    A. Chi
Expires: April 11, 2014                                           UNC-CH
                                                        October 08, 2013

                   Threat Model for BGP Path Security
                   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-07

Abstract

   This document describes a threat model for the context in which
   (E)BGP path security mechanisms will be developed.  The threat model
   includes an analysis of the RPKI, and focuses on the ability of an AS
   to verify the authenticity of the AS path info received in a BGP
   update.  We use the term PATHSEC to refer to any BGP path security
   technology that makes use of the RPKI.  PATHSEC will secure BGP
   [RFC4271], consistent with the inter-AS security focus of the RPKI
   [RFC6480].

   The document characterizes classes of potential adversaries that are
   considered to be threats, and examines classes of attacks that might
   be launched against PATHSEC.  It does not revisit attacks against
   unprotected BGP, as that topic has already been addressed in
   [RFC4271].  It concludes with brief discussion of residual
   vulnerabilities.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 11, 2014.

Copyright Notice

Kent & Chi               Expires April 11, 2014                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft     Threat Model for BGP Path Security       October 2013

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Threat Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Attack Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Active wiretapping of sessions between routers  . . . . .   8
     4.2.  Attacks on a BGP router . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Attacks on network operator management computers (non-CA
           computers)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.4.  Attacks on a repository publication point . . . . . . . .  11
     4.5.  Attacks on an RPKI CA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Residual Vulnerabilities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   9.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   This document describes the security context in which PATHSEC is
   intended to operate.  (The term "PATHSEC" is employed in this
   document to refer to any design used to achieve the path security
   goal described in the SIDR WG charter.  The charter focuses on
   mechanisms that will enable an AS to determine if the AS_PATH
   represented in a route represents the path via which the Network
   Layer Reachability Information traveled.  Other SIDR documents use
   the term "BGPSEC" to refer to a specific design.)  It discusses
   classes of potential adversaries that are considered to be threats,
   and classes of attacks that might be launched against PATHSEC.
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