Threat Model for BGP Path Security
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-08

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Last updated 2013-11-22
Replaces draft-kent-bgpsec-threats
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Secure Inter-Domain Routing                                      S. Kent
Internet-Draft                                                       BBN
Intended status: Informational                                    A. Chi
Expires: May 26, 2014                                             UNC-CH
                                                       November 22, 2013

                   Threat Model for BGP Path Security
                   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-08

Abstract

   This document describes a threat model for the context in which
   Exterior Border Gateway Protocol (EBGP) path security mechanisms will
   be developed.  The threat model includes an analysis of the Resource
   Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), and focuses on the ability of an
   autonomous system (AS) to verify the authenticity of the AS path info
   received in a BGP update.  We use the term PATHSEC to refer to any
   BGP path security technology that makes use of the RPKI.  PATHSEC
   will secure BGP, consistent with the inter-AS security focus of the
   RPKI.

   The document characterizes classes of potential adversaries that are
   considered to be threats, and examines classes of attacks that might
   be launched against PATHSEC.  It does not revisit attacks against
   unprotected BGP, as that topic has already been addressed in the
   BGP-4 standard.  It concludes with brief discussion of residual
   vulnerabilities.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 26, 2014.

Copyright Notice

Kent & Chi                Expires May 26, 2014                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft     Threat Model for BGP Path Security      November 2013

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Threat Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Attack Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Active wiretapping of sessions between routers  . . . . .   8
     4.2.  Attacks on a BGP router . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Attacks on network operator management computers (non-CA
           computers)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.4.  Attacks on a repository publication point . . . . . . . .  11
     4.5.  Attacks on an RPKI CA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Residual Vulnerabilities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   9.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   This document describes the security context in which PATHSEC is
   intended to operate.  The term "PATHSEC" (for path security) refers
   to any design used to preserve the integrity and authenticity of the
   AS_PATH attribute carried in a BGP update message [RFC4271].  The
   goal of PATHSEC is to enable a BGP speaker to verify that the
   Autonomous Systems (ASes) enumerated in this path attribute represent
   the sequence of ASes that the Network Layer Reachability Information
   (NLRI) traversed.  The term PATHSEC is thus consistent with the goal
   described in the SIDR WG charter.  (Other SIDR documents use the term
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