RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-13
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2011-11-13
(latest revision 2011-10-31)
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draft-ymbk-rpki-origin-ops
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Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: BCP November 14, 2011
Expires: May 17, 2012
RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-13
Abstract
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational
considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them.
It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation is deployed
and the dynamics are better understood.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 17, 2012.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
Bush Expires May 17, 2012 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation November 2011
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Bush Expires May 17, 2012 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation November 2011
1. Introduction
RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. How
the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern
from many aspects.
The global RPKI is in very initial stages of deployment, there is no
single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the IANA
and the RIRs, and there is a technical testbed. It is thought that
origin validation based on the RPKI will be deployed incrementally
over the next year to five years.
Origin validation needs to be done only by an AS's border routers and
is designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are
originated by any network participating in Internet BGP routing:
large providers, upstreams and down-streams, and by small stub/
enterprise/edge routers.
Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers
without significant hardware upgrade. It should be used in border
routers by operators from large backbones to small stub/entetprise/
edge networks.
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