RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-13

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Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
Internet-Draft                                 Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: BCP                                   November 14, 2011
Expires: May 17, 2012

                 RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
                     draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-13

Abstract

   Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational
   considerations.  This document attempts to collect and present them.
   It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation is deployed
   and the dynamics are better understood.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 17, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

Bush                      Expires May 17, 2012                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft   RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation    November 2011

   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   4.  Within a Network  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   5.  Routing Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   6.  Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

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Internet-Draft   RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation    November 2011

1.  Introduction

   RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].  How
   the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern
   from many aspects.

   The global RPKI is in very initial stages of deployment, there is no
   single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the IANA
   and the RIRs, and there is a technical testbed.  It is thought that
   origin validation based on the RPKI will be deployed incrementally
   over the next year to five years.

   Origin validation needs to be done only by an AS's border routers and
   is designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are
   originated by any network participating in Internet BGP routing:
   large providers, upstreams and down-streams, and by small stub/
   enterprise/edge routers.

   Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers
   without significant hardware upgrade.  It should be used in border
   routers by operators from large backbones to small stub/entetprise/
   edge networks.

   RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent
   local routing policies, there is little risk that what is seen as
   today's normal Internet routing is threatened by imprudent deployment
   of the global RPKI, see Section 5.

2.  Suggested Reading

   It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,