RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-20

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Last updated 2013-09-04 (latest revision 2013-02-20)
Replaces draft-ymbk-rpki-origin-ops
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Best Current Practice
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Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Chris Morrow
Shepherd write-up Show (last changed 2013-08-20)
IESG IESG state AD Evaluation::Revised I-D Needed
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Responsible AD Stewart Bryant
Send notices to sidr-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops@tools.ietf.org
Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
Internet-Draft                                 Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Best Current Practice                 February 21, 2013
Expires: August 25, 2013

                 RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
                     draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-20

Abstract

   Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational
   considerations.  This document attempts to collect and present those
   which are most critical.  It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based
   origin validation continues to be deployed and the dynamics are
   better understood.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
   be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
   appear in all upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed
   case as English words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Within a Network  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Routing Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480].  How the RPKI is
   distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern from many
   aspects.

   While the global RPKI is in the early stages of deployment, there is
   no single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the
   RIRs, and there are technical testbeds.  It is thought that origin
   validation based on the RPKI will continue to be deployed
   incrementally over the next few years.  It is assumed that eventually
   there must be a single root trust anchor for the public address
   space.

   Origin validation needs to be done only by an AS's border routers and
   is designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are
   originated by any network participating in Internet BGP routing:
   large providers, upstreams and down-streams, and by small stub/
   enterprise/edge routers.

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