BGP Prefix Origin Validation
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-09

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Last updated 2012-10-05 (latest revision 2012-09-08)
Replaces draft-pmohapat-sidr-pfx-validate
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
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Document shepherd Chris Morrow
IESG IESG state IESG Evaluation
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Responsible AD Stewart Bryant
IESG note Chris Morrow (morrowc@ops-netman.net) is the document shepherd.
Send notices to sidr-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate@tools.ietf.org
Network Working Group                                       P. Mohapatra
Internet-Draft                                             Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track                              J. Scudder
Expires: March 03, 2013                                 Juniper Networks
                                                                 D. Ward
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                                 R. Bush
                                               Internet Initiative Japan
                                                              R. Austein
                                                    Dragon Research Labs
                                                          September 2012

                      BGP Prefix Origin Validation
                    draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-09

Abstract

   To help reduce well-known threats against BGP including prefix mis-
   announcing and monkey-in-the-middle attacks, one of the security
   requirements is the ability to validate the origination AS of BGP
   routes.  More specifically, one needs to validate that the AS number
   claiming to originate an address prefix (as derived from the AS_PATH
   attribute of the BGP route) is in fact authorized by the prefix
   holder to do so.  This document describes a simple validation
   mechanism to partially satisfy this requirement.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 03, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Mohapatra, et al.        Expires March 03, 2013                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        BGP Prefix Origin Validation        September 2012

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
     1.1.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Prefix-to-AS Mapping Database  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Pseudo-Code  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.  Policy Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Interaction with Local Cache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Deployment Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     9.2.  Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9

1.  Introduction

   A BGP route associates an address prefix with a set of autonomous
   systems (AS) that identify the interdomain path the prefix has
   traversed in the form of BGP announcements.  This set is represented
   as the AS_PATH attribute in BGP [RFC4271] and starts with the AS that
   originated the prefix.  To help reduce well-known threats against BGP
   including prefix mis-announcing and monkey-in-the-middle attacks, one
   of the security requirements is the ability to validate the
   origination AS of BGP routes.  More specifically, one needs to
   validate that the AS number claiming to originate an address prefix
   (as derived from the AS_PATH attribute of the BGP route) is in fact
   authorized by the prefix holder to do so.  This document describes a
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