A Publication Protocol for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
draft-ietf-sidr-publication-12

Summary: Has enough positions to pass.

Joel Jaeggli Yes

Alvaro Retana Yes

Jari Arkko No Objection

Alia Atlas No Objection

Deborah Brungard No Objection

Ben Campbell No Objection

Comment (2017-01-18 for -10)
Most of my comments have already been made by others. But with the questions about upgrade paths, I see there is in fact a "version" element defined. How is that expected to be used? I don't see a version related error code.

Benoit Claise No Objection

Alissa Cooper (was Discuss) No Objection

Comment (2017-02-22 for -11)
Thanks for addressing my DISCUSS.

Spencer Dawkins No Objection

Stephen Farrell (was Discuss) No Objection

Comment (2017-02-22 for -11)
Thanks for addressing my discuss about alg agility.

Suresh Krishnan No Objection

Mirja K├╝hlewind No Objection

Comment (2017-01-16 for -10)
My only question is why this is a sidr wg doc? This seems like a general mechanism that cannot only be used in the routing infrastructure. Has this doc been at least reviewed by other wgs?

Terry Manderson (was Discuss) No Objection

Comment (2017-03-26)
Thank you for the discussion and resolution.

Alexey Melnikov (was Discuss) No Objection

Comment (2017-02-26 for -11)
Thank you for addressing my DISCUSS point. A couple of remaining issues:

I still think lack of details about versionning and what requires (or not) to bump the version number is a mistake.

RFC 2616 (HTTP) got obsoleted, please reference the latest version.

In 2.5: is the list of error reasons extensible? If yes, should you have an IANA registry for them?

In Section 5 you should reference this document (and not just section numbers), as IANA registrations cut & pasted to IANA website as separate files.

Kathleen Moriarty No Objection

Comment (2017-01-18 for -10)
Thanks for addressing the security directorate review.

As for Alissa's comment on transport, more language added to the Security Considerations section would be helpful to explain why the CMS signature is sufficient.  I am assuming that the only exposure would be to public information during transport that is protected from tampering, unless I missed something in reading the draft (I don't think you are transferring private keys and didn't see that in the text).

Security controls being managed according to the CA policy mentioned earlier in the document is appropriate, having run CAs before - there are strict requirements already depending on the level you plan to run the CA.