RPKI Certificate Tree Validation by a Relying Party Tool
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-tree-validation-00

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Last updated 2016-03-21
Replaces draft-tbruijnzeels-sidr-validation-local-cache
Replaced by rfc8488, draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-tree-validation
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SIDR                                                        O. Muravskiy
Internet-Draft                                            T. Bruijnzeels
Intended status: Informational                                  RIPE NCC
Expires: September 22, 2016                               March 21, 2016

        RPKI Certificate Tree Validation by a Relying Party Tool
                draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-tree-validation-00

Abstract

   This document currently describes the approach to validate the
   content of the RPKI certificate tree, as used by the RIPE NCC RPKI
   Validator.  This approach is independent of a particular object
   retrieval mechanism.  This allows it to be used with repositories
   available over the rsync protocol, the RPKI Repository Delta
   Protocol, and repositories that use a mix of both.

   This algorithm does not rely on content of repository directories,
   but uses the Authority Key Identifier (AKI) field of a manifest and a
   certificate revocation list (CRL) objects to discover manifest and
   CRL objects issued by a particular Certificate Authority (CA).  It
   further uses the hashes of manifest entries to discover other objects
   issued by the CA.

   If the working group finds that algorithm outlined here is useful for
   other implementations, we may either update future revisions of this
   document to be less specific to the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator
   implementation, or we may use this document as a starting point of a
   generic validation document and keep this as a detailed description
   of the actual RIPE NCC RPKI Validator implementation.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2016.

Muravskiy & BruijnzeelsExpires September 22, 2016               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            RPKI Tree Validation                March 2016

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Top-down Validation of a Single Trust Anchor Certificate Tree   3
     2.1.  Fetching the Trust Anchor Certificate Using the Trust
           Anchor Locator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.2.1.  Finding most recent valid manifest and CRL  . . . . .   5
       2.2.2.  Manifest entries validation . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Object Store Cleanup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Remote Objects Fetcher  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Fetcher Operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.1.1.  Fetch repository objects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.1.2.  Fetch single repository object  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Local Object Store  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Store Operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.1.  Store Repository Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.2.  Update object's last fetch time . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.3.  Get objects by hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.4.  Get certificate objects by URI  . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.5.  Get manifest objects by AKI . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.6.  Delete objects for URI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.7.  Delete outdated objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.8.  Update object's validation time . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
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