RPKI Certificate Tree Validation by a Relying Party Tool
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-tree-validation-02

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Last updated 2016-07-20
Replaces draft-tbruijnzeels-sidr-validation-local-cache
Replaced by rfc8488, draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-tree-validation
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SIDR                                                        O. Muravskiy
Internet-Draft                                            T. Bruijnzeels
Intended status: Informational                                  RIPE NCC
Expires: January 21, 2017                                  July 20, 2016

        RPKI Certificate Tree Validation by a Relying Party Tool
                draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-tree-validation-02

Abstract

   This document describes the approach to validate the content of the
   RPKI certificate tree, as used by the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator.  This
   approach is independent of a particular object retrieval mechanism.
   This allows it to be used with repositories available over the rsync
   protocol, the RPKI Repository Delta Protocol, and repositories that
   use a mix of both.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 21, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Muravskiy & Bruijnzeels Expires January 21, 2017                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            RPKI Tree Validation                 July 2016

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  General Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Hash comparisons  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Discovery of RPKI objects issued by a CA  . . . . . . . .   3
     2.3.  Manifest entries versus repository content  . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Top-down Validation of a Single Trust Anchor Certificate Tree   4
     3.1.  Fetching the Trust Anchor Certificate Using the Trust
           Anchor Locator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  CA Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.1.  Finding the most recent valid manifest and CRL  . . .   6
       3.2.2.  Manifest entries validation . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Object Store Cleanup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Remote Objects Fetcher  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Fetcher Operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.1.  Fetch repository objects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.1.2.  Fetch single repository object  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Local Object Store  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Store Operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.1.1.  Store Repository Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.1.2.  Get objects by hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.1.3.  Get certificate objects by URI  . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.1.4.  Get manifest objects by AKI . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.1.5.  Delete objects for a URI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.1.6.  Delete outdated objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.1.7.  Update object's validation time . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   In order to use information published in RPKI repositories, Relying
   Parties (RP) need to retrieve and validate the content of
   certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects.  To validate a
   particular object, one must ensure that all certificates in the
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