Securing RPSL Objects with RPKI Signatures
draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-08
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Kisteleki , Brian Haberman | ||
| Last updated | 2016-03-03 (Latest revision 2015-10-09) | ||
| Replaces | draft-kisteleki-sidr-rpsl-sig | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | plain text htmlized pdfized bibtex | ||
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| Stream | WG state | WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up | |
| Document shepherd | Sandra L. Murphy | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | "Sandra L. Murphy" <sandy@tislabs.com> |
draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-08
SIDR R. Kisteleki
Internet-Draft RIPE NCC
Intended status: Standards Track B. Haberman
Expires: April 11, 2016 JHU APL
October 9, 2015
Securing RPSL Objects with RPKI Signatures
draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-08.txt
Abstract
This document describes a method to allow parties to electronically
sign RPSL-like objects and validate such electronic signatures. This
allows relying parties to detect accidental or malicious
modifications on such objects. It also allows parties who run
Internet Routing Registries or similar databases, but do not yet have
RPSS-like authentication of the maintainers of certain objects, to
verify that the additions or modifications of such database objects
are done by the legitimate holder(s) of the Internet resources
mentioned in those objects.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 11, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Signature Syntax and Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. General Attributes, Meta Information . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Signed Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Storage of the Signature Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. Number Resource Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.5. Validity Time of the Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Signature Creation and Validation Steps . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Canonicalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Signature Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Signature Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Signed Object Types, Set of Signed Attributes . . . . . . . . 10
5. Keys and Certificates used for Signature and Verification . . 12
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
Objects stored in resource databases, like the RIPE DB, are generally
protected by an authentication mechanism: anyone creating or
modifying an object in the database has to have proper authorization
to do so, and therefore has to go through an authentication procedure
(provide a password, certificate, e-mail signature, etc.) However,
for objects transferred between resource databases, the
authentication is not guaranteed. This means when downloading an
object stored in this database, one can reasonably safely claim that
the object is authentic, but for an imported object one cannot.
Also, once such an object is downloaded from the database, it becomes
a simple (but still structured) text file with no integrity
protection. More importantly, the authentication and integrity
guarantees associated with these objects do not always ensure that
the entity that generated them is authorized to make the assertions
implied by the data contained in the objects.
A potential use for resource certificates [RFC6487] is to use them to
secure such (both imported and downloaded) database objects, by
applying a form of digital signature over the object contents. A
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maintainer of such signed database objects MUST possess a relevant
resource certificate, which shows him/her as the legitimate holder of
an Internet number resource. This mechanism allows the users of such
database objects to verify that the contents are in fact produced by
the legitimate holder(s) of the Internet resources mentioned in those
objects. It also allows the signatures to cover whole RPSL objects,
or just selected attributes of them. In other words, a digital
signature created using the private key associated with a resource
certificate can offer object security in addition to the channel
security already present in most of such databases. Object security
in turn allows such objects to be hosted in different databases and
still be independently verifiable.
The capitalized key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL",
"SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
2. Signature Syntax and Semantics
When signing an RPSL object, the input for the signature process is
transformed into a sequence of strings of (ASCII) data. The approach
is similar to the one used in DKIM (Domain Key Identified Mail)
[RFC4871]. In the case of RPSL, the object-to-be-signed closely
resembles an SMTP header, so it seems reasonable to adapt DKIM's
relevant features.
2.1. General Attributes, Meta Information
The digital signature associated with an RPSL object is itself a new
attribute named "signature". It consists of mandatory and optional
fields. These fields are structured in a sequence of name and value
pairs, separated by a semicolon ";" and a white space. Collectively
these fields make up the value for the new "signature" attribute.
The "name" part of such a component is always a single ASCII
character that serves as an identifier; the value is an ASCII string
the contents of which depend on the field type. Mandatory fields
must appear exactly once, whereas optional fields MUST appear at most
once.
Mandatory fields of the "signature" attribute:
o Version number of the signature (field "v"). This field MUST be
set to "1".
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o Reference to the certificate corresponding to the private key used
to sign this object (field "c"). This is a URL of type "rsync" or
"http(s)" that points to a specific resource certificate in an
RPKI repository [RFC6481]. The value of this field MUST be an
"rsync://..." or an "http[s]://..." URL. Any non URL-safe
characters (including semicolon ";" and plus "+") must be URL
encoded.
o Signature method (field "m"): what hash and signature algorithms
were used to create the signature. The allowed algorithms which
can be used for the signature are specified in [RFC6485].
o Time of signing (field "t"). The format of the value of this
field MUST be in the Internet Date/Time format [RFC3339]. All
times MUST be converted to Universal Coordinated Time (UTC)
o The signed attributes (field "a"). This is a list of attribute
names, separated by an ASCII "+" character (if more than one
attribute is enumerated). The list must include any attribute at
most once.
o The signature itself (field "b"). This MUST be the last field in
the list. The signature is the output of the signature algorithm
using the appropriate private key and the calculated hash value of
the object as inputs. The value of this field is the digital
signature in base64 encoding [RFC4648].
Optional fields of the "signature" attribute:
o Signature expiration time (field "x"). The format of the value of
this field MUST be in the Internet Date/Time format [RFC3339].
All times MUST be represented in UTC.
2.2. Signed Attributes
One can look at an RPSL object as an (ordered) set of attributes,
each having a "key: value" syntax. Understanding this structure can
help in developing more flexible methods for applying digital
signatures.
Some of these attributes are automatically added by the database,
some are database-dependent, yet others do not carry operationally
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important information. This specification allows the maintainer of
such an object to decide which attributes are important (signed) and
which are not (not signed), from among all the attributes of the
object; in other words, we define a way of including important
attributes while excluding irrelevant ones. Allowing the maintainer
of an object to select the attributes that are covered by the digital
signature achieves the goals established in Section 1.
The type of the object determines the minimum set of attributes that
MUST be signed. The signer MAY choose to sign additional attributes,
in order to provide integrity protection for those attributes too.
When verifying the signature of an object, the verifier has to check
whether the signature itself is valid, and whether all the specified
attributes are referenced in the signature. If not, the verifier
MUST reject the signature and threat the object as a regular, non-
signed RPSL object.
2.3. Storage of the Signature Data
The result of applying the signature mechanism once is exactly one
new attribute for the object. As an illustration, the structure of a
signed RPSL object is as follows:
attribute1: value1
attribute2: value2
attribute3: value3
...
signature: v=1; c=rsync://.....; m=sha256WithRSAEncryption;
t=2014-12-31T23:59:60Z;
a=attribute1+attribute2+attribute3+...;
b=<base64 data>
2.4. Number Resource Coverage
Even if the signature(s) over the object are valid according to the
signature validation rules, they may not be relevant to the object;
they also need to cover the relevant Internet number resources
mentioned in the object.
Therefore the Internet number resources present in [RFC3779]
extensions of the certificate referred to in the "c" field of the
signature (or in the union of such extensions in the "c" fields of
the certificates, in case multiple signatures are present) MUST cover
the resources in the primary key of the object (e.g., value of the
"aut-num:" attribute of an aut-num object, value of the "inetnum:"
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attribute of an inetnum object, values of "route:" and "origin:"
attributes of a route object, etc.).
2.5. Validity Time of the Signature
The validity time interval of a signature is the intersection of the
validity time of the certificate used to verify the signature, the
"not before" time specified by the "t" field of the signature, and
the optional "not after" time specified by the "x" field of the
signature.
When checking multiple signatures, these checks are applied to each
signature, individually.
3. Signature Creation and Validation Steps
3.1. Canonicalization
The notion of canonicalization is essential to digital signature
generation and validation whenever data representations may change
between a signer and one or more signature verifiers.
Canonicalization defines how one transforms a representation of data
into a series of bits for signature generation and verification. The
task of canonicalization is to make irrelevant differences in
representations of the same object, which would otherwise cause
signature verification to fail. Examples of this could be:
o data transformations applied by the databases that host these
objects (such as notational changes for IPv4/IPv6 prefixes,
automatic addition/modification of "changed" attributes, etc.)
o the difference of line terminators across different systems.
This means that the destination database might change parts of the
submitted data after it was signed, which would cause signature
verification to fail. This document specifies strict
canonicalization rules to overcome this problem.
The following steps MUST be applied in order to achieve canonicalized
representation of an object, before the actual signature
(verification) process can begin:
1. Comments (anything beginning with a "#") MUST be omitted.
2. Any trailing white space MUST be omitted.
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3. A multi-line attribute MUST be converted into its single-line
equivalent. This is accomplished by:
* Converting all line endings to a single blank space.
* Concatenating all lines into a single line.
* Replacing the trailing blank space with a single new line
("\n").
4. Numerical fields MUST be converted to canonical representations.
These include:
* Date and time fields MUST be converted to UTC and MUST be
represented in the Internet Date/Time format [RFC3339].
* AS numbers MUST be converted to ASPLAIN syntax [RFC5396].
* IPv6 addresses MUST be canonicalized as defined in [RFC5952].
* IPv4 addresses MUST be represented as the ipv4-address type
defined by RPSL [RFC2622]
* All IP prefixes (IPv4 and IPv6) MUST be represented in CIDR
notation [RFC4632].
5. All ranges, lists, or sets of numerical fields are represented
using the appropriate RPSL attribute and each numerical element
contained within those attributes MUST conform to the
canonicalization rules in this document.
6. The name of each attribute MUST be converted into lower case, and
MUST be kept as part of the attribute line.
7. Tab characters ("\t") MUST be converted to spaces.
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8. Multiple whitespaces MUST be collapsed into a single space (" ")
character.
9. All line endings MUST be converted to a singe new line ("\n")
character (thus avoiding CR vs. CRLF differences).
3.2. Signature Creation
Given an RPSL object, in order to create the digital signature, the
following steps MUST be performed:
1. For each signature, a new public/private key pair and certificate
SHOULD be used. Therefore the signer SHOULD create a single-use
key pair and end-entity resource certificate (see [RFC6487]).
The private key is used for signing this object this time.
2. Create a list of attribute names referring to the attributes that
will be signed (contents of the "a" field). The minimum set of
these attributes is determined by the object type; the signer MAY
select additional attributes.
3. Arrange the selected attributes according to the selection
sequence specified in the "a" field as above, omitting all
attributes that will not be signed.
4. Construct the new "signature" attribute, with all its fields,
leaving the value of the "b" field empty.
5. Apply canonicalization rules to the result (including the
"signature" attribute).
6. Create the signature over the results of the canonicalization
process (according to the signature and hash algorithms specified
in the "m" field of the signature attribute).
7. Insert the base64 encoded value of the signature as the value of
the "b" field.
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8. Append the resulting "signature" attribute to the original
object.
3.3. Signature Validation
In order to validate a signature over such an object, the following
steps MUST be performed:
1. Verify the syntax of the "signature" attribute (i.e., whether it
contains the mandatory and optional components and the syntax of
these fields matches the specification as described in section
2.1.)
2. Fetch the certificate referred to in the "c" field of the
"signature" attribute, and check its validity using the steps
described in [RFC6487].
3. Extract the list of attributes that were signed using the signer
from the "a" field of the "signature" attribute.
4. Verify that the list of signed attributes includes the minimum
set of attributes for that object type.
5. Arrange the selected attributes according to the selection
sequence provided in the value of the "a" field, omitting all
non-signed attributes.
6. Replace the value of the signature field "b" of the "signature"
attribute with an empty string.
7. Apply the canonicalization procedure to the selected attributes
(including the "signature" attribute).
8. Check the validity of the signature using the signature algorithm
specified in the "m" field of the signature attribute, the public
key contained in the certificate mentioned in the "c" field of
the signature, the signature value specified in the "b" field of
the signature attribute, and the output of the canonicalization
process.
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4. Signed Object Types, Set of Signed Attributes
This section describes a list of object types that MAY signed using
this approach. For each object type, the set of attributes that MUST
be signed for these object types (the minimum set noted in
Section Section 3.3 is enumerated.
This list generally excludes attributes that are used to maintain
referential integrity in the databases that carry these objects,
since these usually make sense only within the context of such a
database, whereas the scope of the signatures is only one specific
object. Since the attributes in the referred object (such as mnt-by,
admin-c, tech-c, ...) can change without any modifications to the
signed object, signing such attributes could lead to false sense of
security in terms of the contents of the signed data; therefore
including such attributes should only be done in order to provide
full integrity protection of the object itself.
The newly constructed "signature" attribute is always included in the
list.
as-block:
* as-block
* org
* signature
aut-num:
* aut-num
* as-name
* member-of
* import
* mp-import
* export
* mp-export
* default
* mp-default
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* signature
inet[6]num:
* inet[6]num
* netname
* country
* org
* status
* signature
route[6]:
* route[6]
* origin
* holes
* org
* member-of
* signature
For each signature, the RFC3779 extension appearing in the
certificate used to verify the signature MUST include a resource
entry that is equivalent to, or covers ("less specific" than) the
following resources mentioned in the object the signature is attached
to:
o For the as-block object type: the resource in the "as-block"
attribute.
o For the aut-num object type: the resource in the "aut-num"
attribute.
o For the inet[6]num object type: the resource in the "inet[6]num"
attribute.
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o For the route[6] object type: the resource in the "route[6]" or
"origin" (or both) attributes.
5. Keys and Certificates used for Signature and Verification
The certificate that is referred to in the signature (in the "c"
field):
o MUST be an end-entity (ie. non-CA) certificate
o MUST conform to the X.509 PKIX Resource Certificate profile
[RFC6487]
o MUST have an [RFC3779] extension that covers the Internet number
resource included in a signed attribute.
o SHOULD NOT be used to verify more than one signed object (ie.
should be a "single-use" EE certificate, as defined in [RFC6487]).
6. Security Considerations
RPSL objects stored in the IRR databases are public, and as such
there is no need for confidentiality. Each signed RPSL object can
have its integrity and authenticity verified using the supplied
digital signature and the referenced certificate.
Since the RPSL signature approach leverages X.509 extensions, the
security considerations in [RFC3779] apply here as well.
The maintainer of an object has the ability to include attributes in
the signature that are not included in the resource certificate used
to create the signature. Potentially, a maintainer may include
attributes that reference resources the maintainer is not authorized
to use.
7. IANA Considerations
[Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
considerations stated in this version of the document.]
8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from
Jos Boumans, Steve Kent, Sean Turner, and Geoff Huston in preparation
of this document.
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9. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2622] Alaettinoglu, C., Villamizar, C., Gerich, E., Kessens, D.,
Meyer, D., Bates, T., Karrenberg, D., and M. Terpstra,
"Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL)", RFC 2622,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2622, June 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2622>.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC4871] Allman, E., Callas, J., Delany, M., Libbey, M., Fenton,
J., and M. Thomas, "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
Signatures", RFC 4871, DOI 10.17487/RFC4871, May 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4871>.
[RFC5396] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Textual Representation of
Autonomous System (AS) Numbers", RFC 5396,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5396, December 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5396>.
[RFC5952] Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
Address Text Representation", RFC 5952,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5952, August 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5952>.
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[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
RFC 6485, DOI 10.17487/RFC6485, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6485>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
Authors' Addresses
Robert Kisteleki
Email: robert@ripe.net
URI: http://www.ripe.net
Brian Haberman
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab
Email: brian@innovationslab.net
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