A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-24

Network Working Group                                        J. Snijders
Internet-Draft                                                       BSD
Intended status: Standards Track                               A. Azimov
Expires: 2 October 2026                                           Yandex
                                                                E. Uskov
                                                                 JetLend
                                                                 R. Bush
                                               Internet Initiative Japan
                                                              R. Housley
                                                          Vigil Security
                                                             B. Maddison
                                                              Workonline
                                                           31 March 2026

         A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
                   draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-24

Abstract

   This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) protected
   content type for Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA)
   objects for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).
   An ASPA is a digitally signed object through which the issuer (the
   holder of an Autonomous System identifier), can authorize one or more
   other Autonomous Systems (ASes) as its transit providers.  When
   validated, an ASPA's eContent can be used for detection and
   mitigation of route leaks.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 October 2026.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  customerASID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Use of One-Time Use End Entity Certificates . . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  ASPA Object Filenames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.3.  Upper Bound on the Number of Providers  . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Implementation status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Appendix A.  Example ASPA eContent Payload  . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

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1.  Introduction

   The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
   [RFC6480] is to improve security in the global Internet routing
   system.  As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed for
   Autonomous Systems (AS) operators, in their capacity as customer, to
   designate and authorize other ASes as their Provider(s).  A Provider
   AS (PAS) is a network providing connectivity between networks - it
   provides transit services to the customer, that is:

   a.  the provider may propagate Network Layer Reachability Information
       (NLRI) received from any direction (e.g., routes the provider
       learned from its own providers, lateral peers, and other
       customers), or default route advertisements, towards the
       customer;

   b.  the provider may propagate NLRI received from the customer
       towards any direction (e.g. towards the provider's providers,
       lateral peers, and other customers).

   The digitally signed Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA)
   object profile specified in this document provides the authorization
   mechanism mentioned above and can be used to facilitate detection and
   mitigation of route leaks.

   An ASPA object is a cryptographically verifiable attestation signed
   by the holder of an Autonomous System identifier (hereafter called
   the "Customer AS", or CAS).  An ASPA contains a list of one or more
   ASes, each entry meaning the listed AS is authorized to act as
   Provider network for the CAS.  When the CAS makes use of multiple
   providers, all Provider ASes are to be listed in the ASPA, including
   any non-transparent Internet Exchange Point (IXP) Route Server (RS)
   ASes.  Note that the common case for RS ASes at IXPs is to operate
   transparently (see Section 2.2.2.1 [RFC7947]), and transparent IXP
   Route Servers need not be listed as PAS in ASPAs.

   The BGP Roles that an Autonomous System (AS) may have in its peering
   relationships with eBGP neighbors are discussed in
   [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification].  The details of ASPA
   registration requirements for ASes in different scenarios are also
   specified in that document.  In addition, the procedures for
   verifying AS_PATHs in BGP UPDATE messages using Validated ASPA
   Payloads (VAPs) are described in that document.

   This CMS [RFC5652] protected content type definition conforms to the
   [RFC6488] template for RPKI signed objects.  In accordance with
   Section 4 of [RFC6488], this document defines:

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   1.  The object identifier (OID) that identifies the ASPA signed
       object.  This OID appears in the eContentType field of the
       encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed
       attribute within the signerInfo structure.

   2.  The ASN.1 syntax for the ASPA content, which is the payload
       signed by the CAS.  The ASPA content is encoded using the ASN.1
       [X.680] Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690].

   3.  The steps required to validate an ASPA beyond the validation
       steps specified in [RFC6488].

2.  ASPA Content Type

   The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-ct-ASPA, which has the
   numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49.  This OID MUST appear
   both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as
   well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo
   structure (see [RFC6488]).

3.  ASPA eContent

   The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as
   the Set of Provider ASes (SPAS) that are authorized by the CAS to be
   its Providers.

   A user registering ASPA(s) must be cognizant of Sections 2, 3, and 4
   of [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification] and the user (or their
   software tool) must comply with the ASPA registration recommendations
   in Section 4 of that document.

   It is highly recommended that for a given Customer AS, a single ASPA
   object be maintained which contains all providers, including any non-
   transparent RS ASes.  Such a practice helps prevent race conditions
   during ASPA updates.  Otherwise, said race conditions might affect
   route propagation.  The software that provides hosting for ASPA
   records SHOULD support enforcement of this recommendation.  In the
   case of the transition process between different CA registries, the
   ASPA records SHOULD be kept identical in all registries in terms of
   their authorization contents.

   The eContent of an ASPA is an instance of ASProviderAttestation,
   formally defined by the following ASN.1 [X.680] module:

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   RPKI-ASPA-2023
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
        pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-rpki-aspa-2023(TBD) }

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
   BEGIN

   IMPORTS
     CONTENT-TYPE
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- From RFC 6268
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
          pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;

   id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
       pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) aspa(49) }

   ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::=
     { TYPE ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA }

   ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
     version [0]   INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
     customerASID  CAS,
     providers     ProviderASSet }

   CAS ::= INTEGER (1..4294967295)

   ProviderASSet ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASID

   ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)

   END

   Note that this content appears as the eContent within the
   encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488].

3.1.  version

   The version number of the ASProviderAttestation that complies with
   this specification MUST be 1 and MUST be explicitly encoded.

3.2.  customerASID

   The customerASID field contains a positive integer that represents
   the AS number of the Customer Autonomous System that is the
   authorizing entity.

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3.3.  providers

   The providers field contains the listing of ASes that are authorized
   as providers.

   Each element contained in the providers field is an instance of ASID.
   Each ASID element contains the AS number of an AS that has been
   authorized by the customer AS as its provider or RS.

   In addition to the constraints described by the formal ASN.1
   definition, the contents of the providers field MUST satisfy the
   following constraints:

   *  The CustomerASID value MUST NOT appear in any ASID in the
      providers field.

   *  The elements of providers MUST be ordered in ascending numerical
      order.

   *  Each value of ASID MUST be unique (with respect to the other
      elements of providers).

   *  An ASID value of 0 can only be encoded in the providers field as a
      single item list, i.e., an element for AS 0 MUST NOT appear
      alongside any other elements.

4.  ASPA Validation

   Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing
   announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object
   itself.  To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the
   validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following
   additional ASPA-specific validation steps.

   *  The Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension [RFC3779]
      MUST be present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained
      within the ASPA), and the Customer ASID in the ASPA eContent MUST
      match the ASId specified by the EE certificate's Autonomous System
      Identifier Delegation Extension.

   *  The Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension MUST contain
      exactly one "id" element (Section 3.2.3.6 of [RFC3779]) and MUST
      NOT contain any "inherit" elements (Section 3.2.3.3 of [RFC3779])
      or "range" elements (Section 3.2.3.7 of [RFC3779]).

   *  The IP Address Delegation Extension [RFC3779] MUST be absent.

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5.  IANA Considerations

5.1.  SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier registry

   IANA is requested to allocate for id-mod-rpki-aspa-2023 in the "SMI
   Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)"
   registry as follows:

            +---------+-----------------------+---------------+
            | Decimal | Description           | Specification |
            +---------+-----------------------+---------------+
            | TBD2    | id-mod-rpki-aspa-2023 | [RFC-to-be]   |
            +---------+-----------------------+---------------+

                                  Table 1

5.2.  SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type registry

   IANA is requested to make permanent in the "SMI Security for S/MIME
   CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows:

                 +---------+-------------+---------------+
                 | Decimal | Description | Specification |
                 +---------+-------------+---------------+
                 | 49      | id-ct-ASPA  | [RFC-to-be]   |
                 +---------+-------------+---------------+

                                  Table 2

5.3.  RPKI Signed Object registry

   IANA is requested to make permanent in the "RPKI Signed Object"
   registry as follows:

     +-----------------+----------------------------+---------------+
     | Name            | OID                        | Specification |
     +-----------------+----------------------------+---------------+
     | Autonomous      | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49 | [RFC-to-be]   |
     | System Provider |                            |               |
     | Authorization   |                            |               |
     +-----------------+----------------------------+---------------+

                                 Table 3

5.4.  RPKI Repository Name Scheme registry

   IANA is requested to make permanent in the "RPKI Repository Name
   Scheme" registry [RFC6481] as follows:

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       +--------------------+------------------------+-------------+
       | Filename Extension | RPKI Object            | Reference   |
       +--------------------+------------------------+-------------+
       | .asa               | Autonomous System      | [RFC-to-be] |
       |                    | Provider Authorization |             |
       +--------------------+------------------------+-------------+

                                  Table 4

5.5.  Media Type registry

   The IANA is requested to register the media type application/rpki-
   aspa in the "Media Type" registry as follows:

      Type name: application
      Subtype name: rpki-aspa
      Required parameters: N/A
      Optional parameters: N/A
      Encoding considerations: binary
      Security considerations: Carries an RPKI ASPA [RFC-to-be].
          This media type contains no active content. See
          Section 4 of [RFC-to-be] for further information.
      Interoperability considerations: None
      Published specification: [RFC-to-be]
      Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators
      Additional information:
        Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined
            in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of
            AS identifers as defined in [RFC-to-be].
        Magic number(s): None
        File extension(s): .asa
        Macintosh file type code(s):
      Person & email address to contact for further information:
        Job Snijders <job@bsd.nl>
      Intended usage: COMMON
      Restrictions on usage: None
      Change controller: IETF

6.  Implementation Considerations

6.1.  Use of One-Time Use End Entity Certificates

   CA are RECOMMENDED to generate a new key pair for each new ASPA and
   only sign one ASPA with each EE certificate.  This type of EE
   certificate is termed a "one-time-use" EE certificate (see Section 3
   of [RFC6487]).

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6.2.  ASPA Object Filenames

   CAs are RECOMMENDED to follow the guidelines for naming ASPA objects
   based on Section 2.2 of [RFC6481], i.e., convert the 160-bit hash of
   the EE's public key value into a 27-character string using Base 64
   Encoding with the URL and Filename Safe Alphabet (see Section 5 of
   [RFC4648]).  See Section 7.7 of
   [I-D.ietf-sidrops-publication-server-bcp] for more information and
   considerations.

6.3.  Upper Bound on the Number of Providers

   While the ASN.1 profile specified in Section 3 imposes no limit on
   the number of Provider ASes that can be listed for a given Customer
   ASID, consideration will need to be given to limitations existing in
   validators and elsewhere in the RPKI supply chain.  For example, the
   number of Provider ASes that can be listed in a single RPKI-To-Router
   protocol ASPA PDU (following the Length field constraints in
   Section 5.1 of [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis]) is 16,380 providers.  In
   addition to protocol limitations in the supply chain, locally defined
   restrictions could exist for the maximum file size of signed objects
   a Relying Party implementation is willing to accept.

   Relying Party implementations are RECOMMENDED to impose an upper
   bound on the number of Provider ASes for a given Customer ASID.  An
   upper bound value between 4,000 and 10,000 Provider ASes is
   suggested.  If this threshold is exceeded, Relying Party
   implementations SHOULD treat all ASPA objects related to the Customer
   ASID invalid; e.g. not emit a partial list of Provider ASes.
   Additionally, an error SHOULD be logged in the local system,
   indicating the Customer ASID for which the threshold was exceeded.

   Implementers and operators SHOULD periodically review whether imposed
   upper bounds still are reasonable in context of the global Internet
   routing system.

7.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations of [RFC6481], [RFC6485], and [RFC6488]
   also apply to ASPAs.

8.  Implementation status

   This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
   Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942.

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   The description of implementations in this section is intended to
   assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
   RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
   here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort
   has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
   supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not
   be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
   features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
   exist.

   According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
   to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
   running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
   and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
   It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
   they see fit".

   *  A validator implementation [rpki-client] written in C was provided
      by Job Snijders.

   *  A validator implementation [routinator] written in Rust was
      provided by Martin Hoffman from NLnet Labs.

   *  A validator implementation [rpki-prover] written in Haskell was
      provided by Mikhail Puzanov.

   *  A signer implementation [rpki-aspa-demo] written in Perl was
      provided by Tom Harrison from APNIC.

   *  A signer implementation [rpki-commons] in Java was reported on by
      Ties de Kock from RIPE NCC.

   *  A signer implementation [krill] in Rust was reported on by Tim
      Bruijnzeels.

9.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Keyur Patel for helping kick-start
   the ASPA profile project, Ties de Kock & Tim Bruijnzeels for
   suggesting that the ProviderASSet be in a canonical form, and Claudio
   Jeker, Martin Hoffman & Lancheng Qin for review and several
   suggestions for improvements.

Contributors

   The following people made significant contributions to this document:

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           Kotikalapudi Sriram
           USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
           Email: ksriram@nist.gov

References

Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis]
              Bush, R., Austein, R., and T. Harrison, "The Resource
              Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol,
              Version 2", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              sidrops-8210bis-25, 2 March 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
              8210bis-25>.

   [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification]
              Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., Snijders,
              J., and K. Sriram, "BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on
              Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-
              verification-24, 19 October 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
              aspa-verification-24>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.

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   [RFC6485]  Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
              Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
              RFC 6485, DOI 10.17487/RFC6485, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6485>.

   [RFC6488]  Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
              Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [X.680]    ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation",
              ITU-T Recommendation X.680, 2021.

   [X.690]    ITU-T, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2021.

Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidrops-publication-server-bcp]
              Bruijnzeels, T., de Kock, T., Hill, F., Harrison, T., and
              J. Snijders, "Best Practises for Operating Resource Public
              Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Publication Services", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-publication-
              server-bcp-07, 21 March 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
              publication-server-bcp-07>.

   [krill]    Bruijnzeels, T., "krill", 2023,
              <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/
              RrHCYTmevxDHgebdLC_adRlKH-o/>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

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   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

   [RFC7947]  Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
              "Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", RFC 7947,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7947, September 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7947>.

   [routinator]
              Hoffman, M., "routinator", 2023,
              <https://github.com/NLnetLabs/rpki-rs/pull/264>.

   [rpki-aspa-demo]
              Harrison, T., "rpki-aspa-demo", 2023,
              <https://github.com/APNIC-net/rpki-aspa-demo>.

   [rpki-client]
              Jeker, C., Snijders, J., Dzonsons, K., and T. Buehler,
              "OpenBSD rpki-client", 2023,
              <https://www.rpki-client.org/>.

   [rpki-commons]
              de Kock, T., "rpki-commons", 2023,
              <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/
              nNAmZMrr7t9NMzm12jRXU03ABN4/>.

   [rpki-prover]
              Puzanov, M., "rpki-prover", 2023,
              <https://github.com/lolepezy/rpki-prover/compare/
              master...aspa-profile-16>.

Appendix A.  Example ASPA eContent Payload

   Below an example of a DER encoded ASPA eContent is provided with
   annotation following the '#' character.

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$ echo 301DA003020101020300FE633011020300FC00020301000F020500FA56EA00 \
  | xxd -r -ps | openssl asn1parse -inform DER -dump -i
  0:d=0  hl=2 l=  29 cons: SEQUENCE
  2:d=1  hl=2 l=   3 cons:  cont [ 0 ]
  4:d=2  hl=2 l=   1 prim:   INTEGER   :01
  7:d=1  hl=2 l=   3 prim:  INTEGER    :FE63     # Customer ASID 65123
 12:d=1  hl=2 l=  17 cons:  SEQUENCE
 14:d=2  hl=2 l=   3 prim:   INTEGER   :FC00     # ProviderAS 64512
 19:d=2  hl=2 l=   3 prim:   INTEGER   :01000F   # ProviderAS 65551
 24:d=2  hl=2 l=   5 prim:   INTEGER   :FA56EA00 # ProviderAS 4200000000

   Below is a complete Base64 [RFC4648] encoded RPKI ASPA Signed Object.

   MIIGLAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGHTCCBhkCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwMAYLKoZI
   hvcNAQkQATGgIQQfMB2gAwIBAQIDAP5jMBECAwD8AAIDAQAPAgUA+lbqAKCCBCMw
   ggQfMIIDB6ADAgECAgEEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMA8xDTALBgNVBAMTBHJvb3Qw
   HhcNMjUwMTA2MTAyNjQ4WhcNMjYwMTA2MTAyNjQ4WjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRyb290
   MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAmgjRVMrjafIK81cxs8GB
   ehcjlP97o3CdlhceX8ogtUE19C1v3VZQttdzaBG1ViI2+TJiyueHm2M6nq7tl7A9
   HfkPWGdvwjTUeF4ynpxNlqqoG5pGPMLuuk6HdVaKbuEeX3ZAYD2daG8qm3zkmmF3
   F7e+xPvr6nCTIQX7nr0WQyX74FmLGwlr6TV+6MGdCnp24A5aCXJo3m1vGlQUKdd/
   bMszpbfzaX1rxBKA0GSdWx/QEOxFb1BPObjF+P/GpDXOq3i0DoZiDB+omgdUAWDZ
   dmskG0l+2EyQaCS/pVCES50Y5zAagTcFabCLKnPvr3qh9tvjD/KlolYc35gNIfoX
   7wIDAQABo4IBhDCCAYAwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQrh8dvXu72
   IET1KLgskpso1VcyrDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQ2mtAZLGdOeDIizTKFZreUErGPJjAY
   BgNVHSABAf8EDjAMMAoGCCsGAQUFBw4CMF8GCCsGAQUFBwEBBFMwUTBPBggrBgEF
   BQcwAoZDcnN5bmM6Ly9sb2NhbGhvc3QvcmVwby8zNjlBRDAxOTJDNjc0RTc4MzIy
   MkNEMzI4NTY2Qjc5NDEyQjE4RjI2LmNlcjBXBgNVHR8EUDBOMEygSqBIhkZyc3lu
   YzovL2xvY2FsaG9zdC9yZXBvL3RhLzM2OUFEMDE5MkM2NzRFNzgzMjIyQ0QzMjg1
   NjZCNzk0MTJCMThGMjYuY3JsMD4GCCsGAQUFBwELBDIwMDAuBggrBgEFBQcwC4Yi
   cnN5bmM6Ly9sb2NhbGhvc3QvdGEvYW4tb2JqZWN0LmFzYTAaBggrBgEFBQcBCAEB
   /wQLMAmgBzAFAgMA/mMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBACqgWrD692DUuN1jrriv
   SGqI7JqAtbqOSvnwxNGMlPZ6oTkarf4aDMJNcwqMaOUOzZPQ9VXA48h5R8TgvAub
   s/HJ263DLtPiScwkWqLZZs6Ius2zFothzDwWOoe/rHKiecCF0YpJqFhaa6dw6vsO
   zK77Ze+Gfa1SeeuI1DTwGDjiNBtXCaRxAPmvpYGxSKQmRYCIo6vKPSZlzCPqzEZa
   MVCmxdlaDQjVPUuWLbFV/bbZmS4wM1nbikt5WLZEVHMcAyqWOb7a3KO2GIIw0Ak9
   O6JgUoex/8y0s6smSWcRe2y9d6kAhT0COW1KvFoNM5lFKSe1rYqTtMFY33XfCI7e
   IgsxggGqMIIBpgIBA4AUK4fHb17u9iBE9Si4LJKbKNVXMqwwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIB
   oGswGgYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQ0GCyqGSIb3DQEJEAExMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0y
   NTAxMDYxMDI2NDhaMC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCCLMweRYDN5u5auRQYv6+Dx+b9X
   m1t5R3gkH9c3aX40gzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQATWDI3fYgku2fJPzFXAbnz
   IKabFMRvhp9LAhvl8oPkCp0zQu4SyJsdvoWxkpHKnXGwwdgub/d4GF0weoJgauDr
   ugUsB2e40aQwFoTyPcVuS/BirhlW5j0NwYovmuJ9GiBe67/sCRBaPC5sBKRBpOIv
   IpMpAe2QhaoeDUDc0KYCM42f1kFD+PD8PnlvXRisL3A3OFhB+0LY1Z3xivRAEdtf
   qzobZT0Hq6CIlAjNeocG0gMfJj/lFyElLkJdfGHzCWLnVNX2I+9GbDDdYV13cUTG
   yk5CFeQWetsX7D7XRNSdKwrrW6qWK/KxGF38SsuGeTyDQiNcOhwqvSfFc388ge/G

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   The above should decode as following:

Object SHA256 hash:          S6B+jKOCFXPlRn7ws6Kd5tgpsSx609tJZpw60CVaf9Y=
EE Subject key identifier:   2B87C76F5EEEF62044F528B82C929B28D55732AC
EE Certificate issuer:       /CN=root
EE Certificate serial:       04
EE Authority key identifier: 369AD0192C674E783222CD328566B79412B18F26
EE Authority info access:    rsync://localhost/repo/369AD0192C674E783222CD328566B79412B18F26.cer
EE Subject info access:      rsync://localhost/ta/an-object.asa
CMS Signing time:            Mon 06 Jan 2025 10:26:48 +0000
EE notBefore:                Mon 06 Jan 2025 10:26:48 +0000
EE notAfter:                 Tue 06 Jan 2026 10:26:48 +0000

ASPA eContent:
  Customer AS:               65123
  Provider Set:              1: AS: 64512
                             2: AS: 65551
                             3: AS: 4200000000

Authors' Addresses

   Job Snijders
   BSD Software Development
   Amsterdam
   Netherlands
   Email: job@bsd.nl
   URI:   https://www.bsd.nl

   Alexander Azimov
   Yandex
   Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com

   Eugene Uskov
   JetLend
   Email: eu@jetlend.ru

   Randy Bush
   Internet Initiative Japan
   Email: randy@psg.com

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   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC
   918 Spring Knoll Drive
   Herndon, VA 20170
   United States of America
   Email: housley@vigilsec.com

   Ben Maddison
   Workonline
   Cape Town
   South Africa
   Email: benm@workonline.africa

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