Verification of AS_PATH Using the Resource Certificate Public Key Infrastructure and Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-00
Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft Yandex
Intended status: Standards Track E. Bogomazov
Expires: November 18, 2019 Qrator Labs
R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
K. Patel
Arrcus, Inc.
J. Snijders
NTT
May 17, 2019
Verification of AS_PATH Using the Resource Certificate Public Key
Infrastructure and Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-00
Abstract
This document defines the semantics of an Autonomous System Provider
Authorization object in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure to
verify the AS_PATH attribute of routes advertised in the Border
Gateway Protocol.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 18, 2019.
Azimov, et al. Expires November 18, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft AS_PATH Verification May 2019
Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Anomaly Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Autonomous System Provider Authorization . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Customer-Provider Verification Procedure . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. AS_PATH Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Disavowal of Provider Authorizaion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Siblings (Complex Relations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) was designed with no mechanisms to
validate BGP attributes. Two consequences are BGP Hijacks and BGP
Route Leaks [RFC7908]. BGP extensions are able to partially solve
these problems. For example, ROA-based Origin Validation [RFC6483]
can be used to detect and filter accidental mis-originations, and
[I-D.ymbk-idr-bgp-eotr-policy] can be used to detect accidental route
leaks. While these upgrades to BGP are quite useful, they still rely
on transitive BGP attributes, i.e. AS_PATH, that can be manipulated
by attackers.
BGPSec [RFC8205] was designed to solve the problem of AS_PATH
validation. Unfortunately, strict cryptographic validation brought
unaffordable computational overhead for BGP routers. BGPSec also
proved to be vulnerable to downgrade attacks that can nullify all the
work of AS_PATH signing. As a result, to abuse the AS_PATH or any
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