Guidance to Avoid Carrying RPKI Validation States in Transitive BGP Path Attributes
draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp-06

Network Working Group                                        J. Snijders
Internet-Draft                                                       BSD
Intended status: Best Current Practice                         T. Fiebig
Expires: 14 November 2026                                        MPI-INF
                                                           M. A. Stucchi
                                                             Glevia GmbH
                                                             13 May 2026

Guidance to Avoid Carrying RPKI Validation States in Transitive BGP Path
                               Attributes
             draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp-06

Abstract

   This document provides guidance to avoid carrying Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) derived validation states in transitive Border
   Gateway Protocol (BGP) Path Attributes.  Annotating routes with
   transitive attributes signaling validation states may cause needless
   flooding of BGP UPDATE messages through the global Internet routing
   system, for example when Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are
   issued, or are revoked, or when RPKI-To-Router sessions are
   terminated.

   Operators should ensure RPKI-derived validation states are not
   signaled in transitive BGP Path Attributes.  Specifically, Operators
   should not associate Prefix Origin Validation state with BGP routes
   using transitive BGP Communities.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 November 2026.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Risks of Signaling Validation State With Transitive
           Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Triggers for Large-Scale Validation Changes . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.1.  ROA Issuance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.2.  ROA Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.3.  Loss of Cached Validated Payload Information  . . . .   5
       3.1.4.  Outage Scenario Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Scaling issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Flooding and Cascading of BGP UPDATE Messages . . . . . .   8
       3.3.1.  Flooding of BGP UPDATE Messages . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.3.2.  Cascading of BGP UPDATE Messages  . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  Observed data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.5.  Lacking Benefit of Signaling Validation State . . . . . .   9
   4.  Advantages of Dissociating Validation States and BGP Path
           Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Guidance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

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1.  Introduction

   The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] allows for
   validation of received Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271]
   routes.  By means of a validation process, e.g., BGP Prefix Origin
   Validation ([RFC6811]), routers attain locally significant validation
   states.

   In the past, some operators and vendors suggested to use BGP
   Communities ([RFC1997] and [RFC8092]) to annotate received routes
   with validation states local to a router.  Some claim that the
   practice of signaling validation states could be useful, for example
   to Internal BGP (IBGP) speakers, in order to avoid each IBGP speaker
   having to perform their own route origin validation.  However, such a
   practice does not only conflict with core concepts of RPKI, but also
   threatens the stability of networks.

   Annotating a route with a transitive attribute (based on validation
   states) means that BGP UPDATE messages have to be sent to every
   neighbor when the aforementioned validation states changes.  This
   means that when, for example, Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
   [RFC9582] are issued, or are revoked, or RPKI-To-Router (RTR)
   [RFC8210] sessions are terminated, new BGP UPDATE messages will have
   to be send for all routes that were previously annotated with a BGP
   Community associated with a different validation state.  Furthermore,
   given that BGP Communities are a transitive attribute, such a BGP
   UPDATE might end up propagating through large portions of the
   Default-Free Zone (DFZ).

   Hence, this document provides guidance to avoid carrying RPKI-derived
   validation states in transitive Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Path
   Attributes (Section 5 of [RFC4271]).  Specifically, Operators SHOULD
   NOT associate BGP Prefix Origin Validation results [RFC6811] with BGP
   routes using transitive BGP Communities ([RFC1997], [RFC4360],
   [RFC8092]).  Furthermore, this document contains data on the measured
   current impact of BGP Communities used to signal validation states.

   Avoiding the use of BGP Communities to signal RPKI-derived validation
   states prevents BGP UPDATE messages from being flooded into the
   global Internet routing system.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

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2.  Scope

   This document discusses signaling locally significant RPKI validation
   states to EBGP neighbors through transitive BGP attributes.  This
   includes operator-specific BGP Communities to signal validation
   states, as well as any current or future standardized well-known BGP
   Communities denoting validation states.  As BGP message churn is
   associated with internal signaling changes, it is RECOMMENDED that
   operators also consider the guidance (Section 5) within their
   network, i.e., between their IBGP speakers.

   The guidance in this document applies to all current and future
   transitive BGP attributes that may be implicitly or explicitly used
   to signal validation states to neighbors.  Similarly, this guidance
   also applies to non-ROA validation mechanics based on RPKI, e.g.,
   Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA)
   [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile], BGPsec [RFC8205], and any other
   future validation mechanic built upon the RPKI.

3.  Risks of Signaling Validation State With Transitive Attributes

   This section outlines the risks of signaling RPKI-derived validation
   states using BGP Communities.  While the current description is
   specific to BGP communities, the observations hold similar for all
   transitive attributes that may be added to BGP routes.

3.1.  Triggers for Large-Scale Validation Changes

   This section describes examples on how a large amount of RPKI ROA
   changes may occur in a short time, leading to generation of a large
   amounts of BGP UPDATE messages.

3.1.1.  ROA Issuance

   Large-Scale ROA issuance events should be a comparatively rare event
   for individual networks.  However, several cases exist where issuance
   by individual operators or (malicious) coordinated issuance of ROAs
   by multiple operators may lead to a high route churn, triggering a
   continuous flow of BGP UPDATE messages caused by operators using
   transitive BGP attributes to signal validation states.

   Specifically:

   *  When an operator issues new ROAs for their netblocks, possibly by
      issuing one ROA with a non-minimal maxLength (Section 4.3.2.2 of
      [RFC9582]) covering a large number of prefixes.  This may also
      occur when incorrectly migrating to minimally covering ROAs
      ([RFC9319]), i.e., when the previous ROA is first revoked (see

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      Section 3.1.2) and the new ROAs are only issued after this
      revocation has been propagated, e.g., due to an operational error
      or a bug in the issuance pipeline used by the operator.

   *  When multiple Certification Authorities (CAs) coordinate to issue
      new ROAs at the same time.

   *  When a CA has been unavailable or unable to publish for some time,
      but then publishes all updates at once, or - as unlikely as it is
      - if a key-rollover encounters issues.

3.1.2.  ROA Revocation

   Large-Scale ROA revocation should be a comparatively rare event for
   individual networks.  However, several cases exist where revocations
   by individual operators or (malicious) coordinated revocation of ROAs
   by multiple operators may lead to a high route churn triggering a
   continuous flow of BGP Update messages caused by operators using
   transitive BGP attributes to signal validation states.

   Specifically:

   *  When one large operator revokes all ROAs for their netblocks at
      once, for example, when migrating to minimally covering ROAs
      [RFC9319], or when revoking one ROA with a long maxLength covering
      a large number of prefixes.

   *  When multiple CAs coordinate to revoke ROAs at the same time.

   *  When a CA becomes unavailable or unable to publish for some time,
      e.g., due to the CA expiring ([CA-Outage1], [CA-Outage2],
      [CA-Outage3], [CA-Outage4]).

3.1.3.  Loss of Cached Validated Payload Information

   Similar to the issuance and revocation of ROAs, the validation
   pipeline of a Relying Party (RP) may encounter issues.  Issues may
   occur on the cache side (Section 3.1.3.1) or on the router side
   (Section 3.1.3.2) with network connectivity issues having specific
   impact on either of the two.

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   While, in general, implementations should not have bugs, operators
   should not make mistakes, and the network should be reliable, this is
   usually not the case in practice.  Instead, the worst-case of sudden
   and unexpected, yet unintentional, loss of cached validated payloads
   is an event that, however unlikely in a specific system, may and will
   happen.  Hence, systems should be resilient in case of unexpected
   issues, and should not exacerbate issues by inadvertently
   contributing to BGP UPDATE floods.

   Below, examples are provided of events for both categories that may
   lead to the validation state of routes in one or multiple routers of
   an operator changing from Valid to NotFound (Section 2 of [RFC6811]).
   These lists are provided for illustrative purposes and not
   exhaustive.

3.1.3.1.  Potential Issues with a Cache

   The following events may impact a cache's ability to provide
   validated payload information to routers:

   *  The RPKI-To-Router (RTR) service may have to temporarily be taken
      offline by the RP operator for maintenance.  While operators
      should, in general, take care to provision sufficient redundancy,
      critical vulnerabilities may necessitate the immediate
      simultaneous shutdown of all RTR instances.

   *  A cache may crash due to bugs when ingesting unexpected data from
      the RPKI, or run into performance issues due to insufficient
      available memory or limited I/O performance on the host.  In the
      worst case, especially memory issues, can lead to a flapping
      cache, e.g., when the system runs out of memory after a few
      minutes of transmitting validated payloads to routers.

   *  Validation state may seemingly lapse due to issues with time
      synchronization if, e.g., the clock of the cache diverts
      significantly, starting to consider CA's certificates invalid.

   *  The cache may lose its network connectivity in general, or to
      specific CAs.  While, in general, the cache should be able to
      serve from cache, an operator may have to shutdown the cache in
      such a case, to prevent dropping prefixes as invalid due to stale
      data.

3.1.3.2.  Potential Ingestion Issues with a Router

   Examples of encountered issues are:

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   *  An RTR client, especially when implemented as a dedicated daemon,
      may fail to start, or terminate when receiving unexpected data.
      Especially when this leads to a flapping client, e.g., due to a
      bug in the handling of incremental updates leading to a crash,
      while the initial retrieval is successful, this will lead to
      flapping between routes being Valid and NotFound.

   *  A misconfiguration may impact a router's ability to communicate
      with the RTR service.  For example, an RTR client may lose its
      credentials or may not receive updated credentials in time when
      these are changed, or the address of the RTR service changes and
      is not updated on the router in time.

   *  An RTR client may lose network connectivity to the RTR service.
      While, in general, caches should prevent this from having
      immediate impact, an RTR client's behavior in case of a flapping
      network connection with frequent interruptions may lead to
      unexpected behavior and cache invalidation.  Similarly, after
      cache expiry, routes will change from Valid to NotFound.

   *  As an extension of the previous point, multiple operators might be
      using one central RTR service hosted by an external party, or
      depend on a similar cache, which becomes unavailable, e.g., due to
      maintenance or an outage.  If local instances are not able to
      handle loss of this external service without changing validation
      states, i.e., do not serve from cache or the outage extends beyond
      the expiry of cached information, routes will change local
      validation states from Valid to NotFound.  Naturally, the negative
      impact in such a case is significantly larger in comparison to
      each operator running their own cache.

3.1.4.  Outage Scenario Summary

   The above non-exhaustive listing suggests that issues in general
   operations, CA operations, and RPKI cache implementations simply are
   unavoidable.  Hence, Operators have to plan and design accordingly.

3.2.  Scaling issues

   For each change in the validation state of a route, an Autonomous
   System (AS) in which the local routing policy sets a BGP Community
   based on the BGP Prefix Origin Validation result, routers would need
   to send BGP UPDATE messages for more than half of the global Internet
   routing table if the validation state changes to NotFound.  The same,
   reversed case, would be true for every new ROA created by the address
   space holders, whereas a new BGP UPDATE would be generated, as the
   validation state would change to Valid.

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   Furthermore, adding additional attributes to routes increases their
   size and memory consumption in the Routing Information Base of BGP
   routers.  Given the continuous growth of the global routing table, in
   general, operators should be conservative regarding the additional
   information they add to routes.

3.3.  Flooding and Cascading of BGP UPDATE Messages

   The aforementioned scaling issues are not confined to singular UPDATE
   events.  Instead, changes in validation state may lead to floods and/
   or cascades of BGP UPDATE messages throughout the Internet.

3.3.1.  Flooding of BGP UPDATE Messages

   Flooding events are caused by an individual operator losing
   validation states.  If that operator annotates validation states
   using BGP communities, the AS will send updates for all routes that
   changed from Valid to NotFound to its customers, as well as updates
   for routes received from customers to its providers.

   Following an RPKI service affecting outage (Section 3.1), given that,
   at the time of writing, more than half the global Internet routing
   table [CIDR_Report] nowadays is covered by RPKI ROAs [NIST], such
   convergence events represent a significant burden.  See
   [How-to-break] for an elaboration on this phenomenon.

3.3.2.  Cascading of BGP UPDATE Messages

   For events that are not specific to one operator, e.g., a malicious
   withdrawal of a ROA, loss of a major CA, or an unexpected downtime of
   a major centralized RTR service, events can also cascade for ASes
   annotating validation states using BGP communities.  Given that
   routers' view of the RPKI with RTR are only loosely consistent, BGP
   UPDATE messages may cascade, i.e., one event affecting validation
   states may actually trigger multiple subsequent BGP UPDATE floods.

   Assume, for example, that AS65536 is a customer of AS65537 (both
   annotating validation states with BGP Communities and using a 300
   second RTR cycle), and a centralized RTR service fails.  In the
   example, AS65536 has their routers updated from that cache a second
   before the service went down, while AS65537 was due for a refresh a
   second thereafter.

   This means that a second after the RTR service went down, AS65537
   will trigger a BGP UPDATE flood down its cone.  AS65536 will ingest
   and propagate these BGP UPDATE messages down its own cone as well.

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   When, roughly 300 seconds later, AS65536 fails to disseminate
   validated payload information as well, the community set by AS65536
   will again change for ROA covered routes, and it will again trigger a
   BGP UPDATE flood and propagate further on.

   Even if either or both of AS65536 and AS65537 use a cache after RTR
   expiry, the underlying issue would not change, assuming the RTR
   service downtime spans beyond the cache TTL.  Assuming a 30 minute
   cache TTL, both ASes using a cache would only move the cascading
   event 30 minutes later.  If only one of the two uses a cache, the two
   flood events get moved further apart.  However, the overall issue of
   two independent floods due to one event remains.

3.4.  Observed data

   In February 2024, a data-gathering initiative [Side-Effect] reported
   that between 8% and 10% of BGP UPDATE messages seen on the Routing
   Information Service (RIS), contained publicly-known communities from
   large ISPs signaling either NotFound or Valid BGP Origin Validation
   results.  The study also demonstrated that the creation or removal of
   a ROA object triggered a chain of updates in a period of circa 1 hour
   following the change.

   Such a high percentage of unnecessary BGP UPDATE messages constitutes
   a considerable level of noise, impacting the capacity of the global
   routing system while generating load on router CPUs and occupying
   more RAM than necessary.  Containing this information within the
   administrative boundaries of a single AS helps reduce the burden on
   the rest of the global routing platform, reducing workload and noise.

3.5.  Lacking Benefit of Signaling Validation State

   RTR has been developed to communicate validated payload information
   to routers.  BGP Attributes are not signed, and provide no assurance
   against third parties adding them, apart from BGP Communities--
   ideally--being filtered at a network edge.  So, even in IBGP
   scenarios, their benefit in comparison to using RTR on all BGP
   speakers is limited.

   For EBGP, given they are not signed, they provide even less
   information to other parties except introspection into an ASes
   internal validation mechanics.  Crucially, they provide no actionable
   information for BGP neighbors.  If an AS validates and enforces based
   on RPKI, Invalid routes should never be imported and, hence, never be
   sent to neighbors.  Hence, the argument that exposing validation
   states through communities enables, for example, customers to filter
   RPKI Invalid routes is moot, as the only routes a customer should see
   are NotFound and Valid.

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4.  Advantages of Dissociating Validation States and BGP Path Attributes

   As outlined in Section 3, signaling validation states through
   transitive attributes represents risks for the stability of the
   global routing ecosystem.  Not signaling validation states, hence,
   has tangible benefits, specifically:

   *  Reduction of memory consumption on customer/peer facing PE routers
      (less BGP communities == less memory pressure).

   *  No effect on the age of a BGP route when a ROA or ASPA
      [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile] is issued or revoked.

   *  Avoids having to resend, e.g., more than 500,000 BGP routes
      towards BGP neighbors (for the own cone to peers and providers,
      for the full table towards customers) if the RPKI cache crashes
      and RTR sessions are terminated, or if flaps in validation are
      caused by other events.

5.  Guidance

   Operators SHOULD NOT signal RPKI-derived validation states using
   transitive BGP attributes.

   The document acknowledges that specific operational requirements,
   such as a BGP implementation used by an operator still being
   dependent on annotating RPKI-derived validation states using BGP
   attributes, may necessitate the use of BGP path attributes to signal
   validation states between BGP speakers.  If this is the case, the
   dependent operator SHOULD ensure that these attributes are removed
   before announcing NLRI to EBGP neighbors.  Depending on the supported
   functionality of the BGP implementations in use in a given AS,
   removal of the aforementioned attributes may not be consistently
   possible across the AS, leading to the conditions this document is
   intended to discuss.

6.  Operational Considerations

   This document provides guidance to prevent using BGP UPDATE messages
   to carry RPKI Validate State.  Following this guidance allows
   operators to enhance the stability of local routing tables and the
   global Internet routing system, in particular.

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7.  Security Considerations

   BGP is not guaranteed to converge, and the view on the RPKI within an
   individual administrative domain is only loosely consistent.
   External validation states annotated in a received NLRI may either
   depend on a different view on the RPKI than the one in the local
   administrative domain, or the NLRI may be several hours old itself.
   Hence, any validation states contained in a received route
   announcement only have significance in the sender's own local scope.

   Additionally, the use of transitive attributes to signal RPKI-derived
   validation states may enable attackers to cause notable route churn.
   This can be accomplished by an attacker issuing and withdrawing,
   e.g., ROAs for their prefixes, or by the attacker continuously
   altering transitive attributes used to signal RPKI-derived validation
   states for NLRI they re-advertise.  The latter is possible as NLRI
   carry no information allowing an ingesting party to validate the
   integrity of transitive BGP attributes.

   DFZ routers may not be equipped to handle BGP message churn in all
   directions at global scale, especially if aforementioned routing
   churn cascades, persists, or repeats periodically.  Adhering to the
   Section 5 helps prevent such churn.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not make any request to IANA.

9.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Aaron Groom, Wouter Prins, Gunnar
   Guðvarðarson, Nick Hilliard, William McCall, Theo Buehler, Jeffrey
   Haas, Luigi Iannone, and Mohamed Bboucadair for their helpful review
   of this document.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1997]  Chandra, R., Traina, P., and T. Li, "BGP Communities
              Attribute", RFC 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC1997, August 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1997>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

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   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

   [RFC4360]  Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
              Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
              February 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

   [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.

   [RFC8092]  Heitz, J., Ed., Snijders, J., Ed., Patel, K., Bagdonas,
              I., and N. Hilliard, "BGP Large Communities Attribute",
              RFC 8092, DOI 10.17487/RFC8092, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8092>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8210]  Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
              RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [CA-Outage1]
              ARIN, "RPKI Service Notice Update", August 2020,
              <https://www.arin.net/announcements/20200813/>.

   [CA-Outage2]
              RIPE NCC, "Issue affecting rsync RPKI repository
              fetching", April 2021,
              <https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/routing-
              wg/2021-April/004314.html>.

   [CA-Outage3]
              Snijders, J., "problemas con el TA de RPKI de LACNIC",
              April 2023, <https://mail.lacnic.net/pipermail/
              lacnog/2023-April/009471.html>.

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   [CA-Outage4]
              Snijders, J., "AFRINIC RPKI VRP graph for November 2023 -
              heavy fluctuations affecting 2 members", November 2023,
              <https://lists.afrinic.net/pipermail/
              dbwg/2023-November/000493.html>.

   [CIDR_Report]
              Huston, G., "CIDR REPORT", May 2026,
              <https://www.cidr-report.org/as2.0/>.

   [How-to-break]
              Snijders, J., "How to break the Internet: a talk about
              outages that never happened", CERN Academic Training
              Lecture Regular Programme; 2021-2022, March 2022,
              <https://cds.cern.ch/record/2805326>.

   [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]
              Snijders, J., Azimov, A., Uskov, E., Bush, R., Housley,
              R., and B. Maddison, "A Profile for Autonomous System
              Provider Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-26, 19 April 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
              aspa-profile-26>.

   [NIST]     NIST, "NIST RPKI Monitor", January 2024,
              <https://rpki-monitor.antd.nist.gov/>.

   [RFC8205]  Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
              Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
              2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.

   [RFC9319]  Gilad, Y., Goldberg, S., Sriram, K., Snijders, J., and B.
              Maddison, "The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, RFC 9319,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9319, October 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9319>.

   [RFC9582]  Snijders, J., Maddison, B., Lepinski, M., Kong, D., and S.
              Kent, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)",
              RFC 9582, DOI 10.17487/RFC9582, May 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9582>.

   [Side-Effect]
              Stucchi, M., "A BGP Side Effect of RPKI", February 2024,
              <https://labs.ripe.net/author/stucchimax/a-bgp-side-
              effect-of-rpki/>.

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Authors' Addresses

   Job Snijders
   BSD Software Development
   Amsterdam
   Netherlands
   Email: job@bsd.nl
   URI:   https://www.bsd.nl/

   Tobias Fiebig
   Max-Planck-Institut fuer Informatik
   Campus E14
   66123 Saarbruecken
   Germany
   Phone: +49 681 9325 3527
   Email: tfiebig@mpi-inf.mpg.de

   Massimiliano Stucchi
   Glevia GmbH
   CH- Bruettisellen
   Switzerland
   Email: stucchi@glevia.ch

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