%% You should probably cite draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp-12 instead of this revision.
@techreport{ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp-11,
    number =    {draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp-11},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp/11/},
    author =    {Job Snijders and Tobias Fiebig and Massimiliano Stucchi},
    title =     {{Guidance to Avoid Carrying RPKI Validation States in BGP Path Attributes}},
    pagetotal = 15,
    year =      2026,
    month =     jun,
    day =       12,
    abstract =  {This document provides guidance to avoid carrying Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) derived validation states in Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Path Attributes whose change triggers a BGP UPDATE being sent across external BGP (EBGP) sessions. Annotating routes with BGP Path Attributes carried across EBGP sessions signaling validation states may cause needless flooding of BGP UPDATE messages through the global Internet routing system, for example when Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are issued, or are revoked, or when RPKI-To-Router sessions are terminated. Operators should ensure RPKI-derived validation states are not signaled in BGP Path Attributes whose change triggers a BGP UPDATE being sent across EBGP sessions. Specifically, operators should not associate Prefix Origin Validation state with BGP routes using any form of BGP Communities carried across EBGP session.},
}