BGPsec Router Certificate Rollover
draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-rollover-04

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidrops WG)
Last updated 2017-12-12 (latest revision 2017-12-11)
Replaces draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Best Current Practice
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Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Chris Morrow
Shepherd write-up Show (last changed 2017-10-03)
IESG IESG state RFC Ed Queue
Consensus Boilerplate Yes
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Responsible AD Warren Kumari
Send notices to Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net>
IANA IANA review state Version Changed - Review Needed
IANA action state No IANA Actions
RFC Editor RFC Editor state MISSREF
Network Working Group                                            B. Weis
Internet-Draft                                               R. Gagliano
Intended status: Best Current Practice                     Cisco Systems
Expires: June 14, 2018                                          K. Patel
                                                            Arrcus, Inc.
                                                       December 11, 2017

                   BGPsec Router Certificate Rollover
                 draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-rollover-04

Abstract

   Certification Authorities (CAs) within the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) manage BGPsec router certificates as well as
   RPKI certificates.  The rollover of BGPsec router certificates must
   be carefully performed in order to synchronize the distribution of
   router public keys with BGPsec Update messages verified with those
   router public keys.  This document describes a safe rollover process,
   as well as discussing when and why the rollover of BGPsec router
   certificates are necessary.  When this rollover process is followed
   the rollover will be performed without routing information being
   lost.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 14, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Weis, et al.              Expires June 14, 2018                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         BGPsec certificate rollover         December 2017

   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Key rollover in BGPsec  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Rollover Process  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  BGPsec router key rollover as a measure against replay
       attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  BGP UPDATE window of exposure requirement . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  BGPsec key rollover as a mechanism to protect against
           replay attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Introduction

   In BGPsec, a key rollover (or re-key) is the process of changing a
   router's BGPsec key pair (or key pairs), issuing the corresponding
   new BGPsec router certificate and (if the old certificate is still
   valid) revoking the old certificate.  This process will need to
   happen at regular intervals, normally due to policies of the local
   network.  This document describes a safe rollover process that
   results in a BGPsec receiver always having the needed verification
   keys.  Certificate Practice Statements (CPS) documents may reference
   this memo.  This memo only addresses changing of a router's BGPsec
   key pair within the RPKI.  Refer to [RFC6489] for a procedure to
   rollover RPKI Certification Authority key pairs.
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