BGPsec Router Certificate Rollover
draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-rollover-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidrops WG)
Last updated 2017-03-08
Replaces draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover
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Network Working Group                                            B. Weis
Internet-Draft                                               R. Gagliano
Intended status: Standards Track                           Cisco Systems
Expires: September 9, 2017                                      K. Patel
                                                            Arrcus, Inc.
                                                           March 8, 2017

                   BGPsec Router Certificate Rollover
                 draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-rollover-00

Abstract

   BGPsec will need to address the impact from regular and emergency
   rollover processes for the BGPsec end-entity (EE) certificates that
   will be performed by Certificate Authorities (CAs) participating at
   the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  Rollovers of BGPsec
   EE certificates must be carefully managed in order to synchronize
   distribution of router public keys and the usage of those public keys
   by BGPsec routers.  This memo provides general recommendations for
   that process, as well as describing reasons why the rollover of
   BGPsec EE certificates might be necessary.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

Weis, et al.            Expires September 9, 2017               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               BGPsec rollover                  March 2017

   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Key rollover in BGPsec  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  A proposed process for BGPsec key rollover  . . . . . . .   4
   4.  BGPsec key rollover as a measure against replays attacks in
       BGPsec  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  BGPsec Replay attack window requirement . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  BGPsec key rollover as a mechanism to protect against
           replay attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

2.  Introduction

   In BGPsec, a key rollover (or re-key) is the process of changing a
   router's key pair (or key pairs), issuing the corresponding new end-
   entity (EE) certificate and (if the old certificate is still valid)
   revoking the old certificate.  This process will need to happen at
   regular intervals, normally due to the local policies of a network.
   This document provides general recommendations for that process.
   Certificate Practice Statements (CPS) documents MAY reference these
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