Summary: Has 4 DISCUSSes. Has enough positions to pass once DISCUSS positions are resolved.
I do not believe we should publish this document with the term "socially acceptable data," because it endorses others' determinations of what is socially acceptable in a blanket fashion. I would recommend "other resources."
I support the DISCUSS ballots of Roman and Mirja and Benjamin's first three DISCUSS points.
I had a few questions about use case #3. (1) I want to discuss what I see as a dissonance between use case #3 (Section 4, “Alice is responsible for the trusted routing for a large organization …”) and the Security Considerations. It appears that use case #3 is explicitly describing an on-path attack per RFC3552. Is use case #3 a use case or an attack against RPKI? There seems to me to be an analog between use case #3 and the TLS/web MitM discussions where the consensus was not to standardize these features despite their existence. In what way do you see RPKI as different? (2) Thanks for the additional background in in . More to clarity along the lines of Mirja’s DISCUSS, I’m trying to unpack the use case #3 text in Section 4. Original Text: “Alice is responsible for the trusted routing for a large organization, commercial or geo-political, in which management requests to redirect their competitors' prefixes to socially acceptable data.” If Alice is “(us|china|uk|justabouteverybody)” per , who is the “management” in the context of a government? Furthermore, “competitor’s” is confusing to me because it seems odd to characterize the networks of objectionable content as competitors to other governments. I would have read this text as “Alice is a network operator who has been directed to inspect and redirect select prefixes to …”.  https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/qGulOfrDPxXgMC9HLJWpXYeBOi4
A few editorial nits: (1) Section 3. Editorial Nit. s/There are critical uses of the RPKI where a local administrative and/or routing domain, e.g. an end-user site, a particular ISP or content provider, an organization, a geo-political region, ... may wish to have a specialized view of the RPK./ There are critical uses of the RPKI where a local administrative and/or routing domain (e.g., an end-user site, a particular ISP or content provider, an organization, a geo-political region) may wish to have a specialized view of the RPK./ (2) Section 4. Editorial Nit. s/(LIR, PI holder, …)/(e.g., LIR, PI holder)/
I have strong misgivings about publishing this document in its current form. The review comment on its predecessor in sidr, "it is written like af able, not an RFC" really sticks with me, and while the style plays a role in my misgivings, I think there are some substantive concerns in play as well. I agree with Roman that there is strong qualitative overlap with situations like TLS MiTM, akin to a violation of the end-to-end principle. I also agree with Mirja that "re-routing to acceptable content" is questionable, and smacks of endorsing censorship. (And yes, I know that one person's censorship is another's parental controls.) My main concern, though, seems to be that this document presents a narrow slice of a broad issue, and does not lay clear the technical facts of the broader situation. Specifically, it lays out some examples where some parties may believe that it is desired to inject additional local information into a local view of the RPKI (or, roughly equivalently, to suppress such information). There are important details about what the two "local"s mean, who is authorized to impose such additional information, etc., but I think it is possible to write a useful document that does not reach a clearn answer on any of those questions. To be useful, though, we need to consider the consequences of having the capability to perform such local injection. There is new attack surface that must be protected from network attack, and a need for permissions/consent (contractual or otherwise) for the systems that are affected by the local view of the RPKI to trust the party/parties that are injecting the local view. Furthermore, there is a sizeable chance that the technical solutions to resolve these use cases will be technically unconstrained, allowing for the "local view" to fully override any and all of the RPKI, so the risk of granting such consent is potentially quite sizeable. I'm also a little concerned about the level of review that this document received; the responsible AD had to send it back to the WG once due to lack of evidence for consensus (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/5IBDpQZdsqJeYrxIsSI37c8QxRw), and I did not see a great deal of additional feedback after that. (Perhaps I was looking in the wrong place?)
Abstract The phrasing "needs to" is very strong and implies that there is an absolute judgment that can be made as to the validity of the operation, when my impression is that the topic remains rather controversial. The wording "will want to" used in the Introduction seems to be more accurate. (The word "critical" in "critical circumstances", present in both Abstract and Introduction, is also prone to criticisms of hyperbolism.) Section 1 This document attempts to lay out a few of those use cases. It is not intended to be authoritative, complete, or to become a standard. It is informative laying out a few critical examples to help frame the issues. I appreciate that this document does not intend to be authoritative or complete. But to say that it is "help[ing] frame the issues" borders on irresponsible -- it presents *a* framing in which these use cases are cast favorably, but (per the Discuss point) does not include in that framing some significant points that cause the use cases to be cast less favorably. Section 4 Carol, a resource holder (Local Internet Registry (LIR), Provider Independent address space (PI) holder, ...), operates outside of the country in which her Regional Internet Registry (RIR) is based. Is "legal jurisdiction" more on topic than "country", for the purposes of this example? Someone convinces the RIR's local court to force the RIR to remove or modify some or all of Carol's certificates, ROAs, etc. or the resources they represent, and the operational community wants to retain the ability to route to Carol's network(s). [...] It seems unlikely to me that this is a matter on which the operational community would achieve full consensus. Perhaps "a subset of" is appropriate? Alice is responsible for the trusted routing for a large organization, commercial or geo-political, in which management requests routing engineering to redirect their competitors' prefixes to socially acceptable data. [...] Both "competitors' prefixes" and "socially acceptable" have been mentioned already as potentially problematic phrasing, IIRC, but I will mention them again. (Also, I don't really understand what "geo-political organization" is intended to mean, but maybe that's just as well.) Section 5 One wants to reproduce only as much of the Global RPKI as needed. Replicating more than is needed would amplify tracking and maintenance. The text would probably benefit from a bit more about what is being tracked and by whom. (I assume it is not users being tracked by a surveilance state, though I can't quite exclude that possibility given just the text at hand.) One can not reissue down from the root trust anchor at the IANA or from the RIRs' certificates because one does not have the private keys required. So one has to create a new trust anchor which, for ease of use, will contain the new/modified certificates and ROAs as well as the unmodified remainder of the Global RPKI. I'm not really sure what sense "trust anchor" is being used in, here. It does not seem to match up with the one described in Section 2.4 of RFC 6480, for example. Because Alice, Bob, and Carol want to be able to archive, reproduce, and send to other operators the data necessary to reproduce their modified view of the global RPKI, there will need to be a formally defined set of data which is input to a well-defined process to take an existing Global RPKI tree and produce the desired modified re- anchored tree. This feels very incompletely described. (Yes, I know, "not intended to be complete". But there's a level of incompleteness that seems to not be worth publishing, and we may be close to it.) I also don't have a great sense of whether there's supposed to be a single "re-anchored tree" or a forest of trees, and whether the full global RPKI tree is a subtree of this re-anchored tree, or a replacement/copied version is present therein. Simplified Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI (SLURM), [RFC8416], addresses many, but not all, of these issues and approaches. This document was originally a gating requirements document for SLURM and other approaches. The phrasing of this last sentence feels very unusual to me for an archival document. Section 6 "patching of trust" seems like a phrase without a clear meaning. Though, a large part of that is probably because "trust" itself is so hard to nail down... Modification 'recipes' may lack authentication. E.g., if modifications to the tree are passed around a la SLURM files, see [RFC8416], what was object security becomes, at best, transport security, or authentication by other trust domains such as PGP. Expounding on this with a couple more sentences would probably be worth the effort.
1) I’m not sure I really understand the following use case..? Also is “re-routing to acceptable content” actually a use case we want to endorse in an RFC? "Alice is responsible for the trusted routing for a large organization, commercial or geo-political, in which management requests routing engineering to redirect their competitors' prefixes to socially acceptable data. 2) This sentence in the security considerations section uses normative language without having the respective disclaimer in the document: “Hence they MUST be implemented to assure the local constraint.” However, I also don’t understand what such a normative statement is supposed to say. I’m not sure if local trust actors are the only solution to the stated use case/problems; if that’s what the sentence tries to say, I disagree, however, in any case it doesn’t seem to make sense to use normative wording here. 3) Also, this sentence in the security consideration section, needs probably more explanation: “Authentication of modification 'recipes' will be needed.” What is “will be needed” supposed to mean? How can this be achieved? What happens if it’s not implemented?
Thanks for the work on this document. I have two minor editorial suggestions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Please expand the following acronyms upon first use and in the title; see https://www.rfc-editor.org/materials/abbrev.expansion.txt for guidance. - RPKI - LIR - PI - RIR - CA --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ID Nits reports: ** The document seems to lack a both a reference to RFC 2119 and the recommended RFC 2119 boilerplate, even if it appears to use RFC 2119 keywords. RFC 2119 keyword, line 177: '...eds. Hence they MUST be implemented t...' Please consider adding the boilerplate specified in RFC 8174.
Thank you for writing this short document. I liked your 'suggested reading' section ;-) Text is sometimes a little too casual though such as in section 4 "not to condone borrowing" ;-)