Origin Validation Clarifications
draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-02

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidrops WG)
Last updated 2018-07-21 (latest revision 2018-04-26)
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Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
Internet-Draft                                 Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Standards Track                          April 26, 2018
Expires: October 28, 2018

                    Origin Validation Clarifications
                    draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-02

Abstract

   Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among
   other things, vendor mis-implementations in two critical areas, which
   routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified
   by configuration.  This document is meant to clarify possible
   misunderstandings causing those mis-implementations.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
   be interpreted as described in [RFC8174] only when they appear in all
   upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
   words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 28, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

1.  Introduction

   Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among
   other things, vendor mis-implementations in two critical areas, which
   routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified
   by configuration.  This document is meant to clarify possible
   misunderstandings causing those mis-implementations.

   When a route is distributed into BGP, origin validation marks the
   announcement as NotFound, Valid, or Invalid per [RFC6811].
   Operational testing has shown that the specifications of that RFC
   were not sufficient to avoid divergent implementations.  This
   document attempts to clarify two areas seeming to cause confusion.

   The implementation issues seem not to be about how to validate, i.e.,
   how to decide if a route is NotFound, Valid, or Invalid.  The issues
   seem to be which routes to mark and whether to apply policy without
   operator configuration.

2.  Suggested Reading

   It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,
   [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], and RPKI-
   based Prefix Validation, [RFC6811].

3.  Mark ALL Prefixes

   Significant Clarification: A router MUST mark all routes in BGP
   coming from any source (eBGP, iBGP, or redistribution from static),
   unless specifically configured otherwise by the operator.  Else the
   operator does not have the ability to drop Invalid routes coming from
   every potential source; and is therefore liable to complaints from
   neighbors about propagation of Invalid routes.  For this reason,
   [RFC6811] says

   "When a BGP speaker receives an UPDATE from a neighbor, it SHOULD
   perform a lookup as described above for each of the Routes in the
   UPDATE message.  The lookup SHOULD also be applied to routes that are

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   redistributed into BGP from another source, such as another protocol
   or a locally defined static route."

   [RFC6811] goes on to say "An implementation MAY provide configuration
   options to control which routes the lookup is applied to."

   When redistributing into BGP from connected, static, IGP, iBGP, etc.,
   there is no AS_PATH in the input to allow RPKI validation of the
   originating AS.  In such cases, the router SHOULD use the AS of the
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