Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route Server to Peers
draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-02

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidrops WG)
Last updated 2017-04-11
Replaces draft-ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light
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Network Working Group                                            T. King
Internet-Draft                                                   D. Kopp
Intended status: Standards Track                                  DE-CIX
Expires: October 12, 2017                                A. Lambrianidis
                                                                  AMS-IX
                                                              A. Fenioux
                                                               France-IX
                                                          April 10, 2017

Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route Server to Peers
             draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-02

Abstract

   This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation
   State Extended Community [RFC8097] to signal prefix origin validation
   results from a route server to its peers.  Upon reception of prefix
   origin validation results peers can use this information in their
   local routing decision process.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
   be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all
   upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
   words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2017.

King, et al.            Expires October 12, 2017                [Page 1]
Internet-DraSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from   April 2017

Copyright Notice

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Utilized at Route-Servers    3
   3.  Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route
       Server to Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Local Routing Decision Process  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Route Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation
           State Extended Community  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.3.  Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not
           Available at a Route-Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.4.  Error Handling at Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   RPKI-based prefix origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant
   operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt.  In order to
   boost acceptance and usage of prefix origin validation and ultimately
   increase the security of the Internet routing system, IXPs may
   provide RPKI-based prefix origin validation at the route server
   [RFC7947].  The result of this prefix origin validation is signaled
   to peers by using the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
   Community as introduced in [RFC8097].
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