RPKI-Based Policy Without Route Refresh
draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr-07
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 9324.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Randy Bush , Keyur Patel , Dr. Philip F. Smith , Mark Tinka | ||
| Last updated | 2022-08-26 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Chris Morrow | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2022-06-06 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 9324 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date |
(None)
Needs 2 more YES or NO OBJECTION positions to pass. |
||
| Responsible AD | Warren "Ace" Kumari | ||
| Send notices to | morrowc@ops-netman.net | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed |
draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr-07
Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft IIJ Research Lab & Arrcus, Inc.
Updates: 8481 (if approved) K. Patel
Intended status: Standards Track Arrcus, Inc.
Expires: 27 February 2023 P. Smith
PFS Internet Development Pty Ltd
M. Tinka
SEACOM
26 August 2022
RPKI-Based Policy Without Route Refresh
draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr-07
Abstract
A BGP Speaker performing RPKI-based policy should not issue Route
Refresh to its neighbors because it has received new RPKI data. This
document updates [RFC8481] by describing how to avoid doing so by
either keeping a full Adj-RIB-In or saving paths dropped due to ROV
(Route Origin Validation) so they may be reevaluated with respect to
new RPKI data.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 February 2023.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. ROV Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Keeping Partial Adj-RIB-In Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction
Memory constraints in early BGP speakers caused classic [RFC4271] BGP
implementations to not keep a full Adj-RIB-In (Sec. 1.1). When doing
RPKI-based Route Origin Validation (ROV) ([RFC6811] and [RFC8481]),
and similar RPKI-based policy, if such a BGP speaker receives new
RPKI data, it might not have kept paths previously marked as Invalid
etc. Such an implementation must then request a Route Refresh,
[RFC2918] and [RFC7313], from its neighbors to recover the paths
which might be covered by these new RPKI data. This will be
perceived as rude by those neighbors as it passes a serious resource
burden on to them. This document recommends implementations keep and
mark paths affected by RPKI-based policy, so Route Refresh is no
longer needed.
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2. Related Work
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271] and Route
Refresh [RFC7313], the RPKI [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs), [RFC6482], The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to
Router Protocol [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis], RPKI-based Prefix
Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications,
[RFC8481].
3. ROV Experience
As Route Origin Validation dropping Invalids has deployed, some BGP
speaker implementations have been found which, when receiving new
RPKI data (VRPs, see [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis]) issue a BGP Route
Refresh [RFC7313] to all sending BGP peers so that it can reevaluate
the received paths against the new data.
In actual deployment this has been found to be very destructive,
transferring a serious resource burden to the unsuspecting peers. In
reaction, RPKI based Route Origin Validation (ROV) has been turned
off. There have been actual de-peerings.
As RPKI registration and ROA creation have steadily increased, this
problem has increased, not just proportionally, but on the order of
the in-degree of ROV implementing BGP speakers. As ASPA
([I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification]) becomes used, the problem will
increase.
Other mechanisms, such as automated policy provisioning, which have
flux rates similar to ROV (i.e. on the order of minutes), could very
well cause similar problems.
Therefore this document updates [RFC8481] by describing how to avoid
this problem.
4. Keeping Partial Adj-RIB-In Data
If new RPKI data arrive which cause operator policy to invalidate the
best route, and the BGP speaker did not keep the dropped routes, then
it would issue a route refresh, which this feature aims to prevent.
A route that is dropped by operator policy due to ROV is, by nature,
considered ineligible to compete for best route, and MUST be kept in
the Adj-RIB-In for potential future evaluation.
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Ameliorating the Route Refresh problem by keeping a full Adj-RIB-In
can be a problem for resource constrained BGP speakers. In reality,
only some data need be retained. If an implementation chooses not to
retain the full Adj-RIB-In, it MUST retain at least routes dropped
due to ROV, for potential future evaluation.
As storing these routes could cause problems in resource constrained
devices, there MUST be a global operation, CLI, YANG, etc. allowing
the operator to enable this feature, storing the dropped routes.
Such an operator control MUST NOT be per peer, as this could cause
inconsistent behavior.
As a side note: policy which may drop routes due to RPKI-based checks
such as ROV (and ASPA, BGPsec [RFC8205], etc. in the future) MUST be
run, and the dropped routes saved per this section, before non-RPKI
policies are run, as the latter may change path attributes.
5. Operational Recommendations
Operators deploying ROV and/or other RPKI based policies should
ensure that the BGP speaker implementation is not causing Route
Refresh requests to neighbors.
BGP Speakers MUST either keep the full Adj-RIB-In or implement the
specification in Section 4. Conformance to this behavior is a
additional, mandatory capability for BGP speakers performing ROV.
If the BGP speaker does not implement these recommendations, the
operator should enable the vendor's control to keep the full Adj-RIB-
In, sometimes referred to as "soft reconfiguration inbound". The
operator should then measure to ensure that there are no unnecessary
Route Refresh requests sent to neighbors.
If the BGP speaker's equipment has insufficient resources to support
either of the two proposed options (keeping a full AdjRibIn or at
least the dropped routes), the equipment should either be replaced
with capable equipment or not use ROV. I.e. the configuration
setting in Section 4 should only be used in very well known and
controlled circumstances. Such circumstances could include
operational work-arounds such as the informed consent of the affected
peers.
Operators using the specification in Section 4 should be aware that a
misconfigured neighbor might erroneously send a massive number of
paths, thus consuming a lot of memory. Hence pre-policy filtering
such as described in [I-D.sas-idr-maxprefix-inbound] could be used to
reduce this exposure.
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If Route Refresh has been issued toward more than one peer, the order
of receipt of the refresh data can cause churn in both best route
selection and in outbound signaling.
Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) which provide [RFC7947] Route Servers
should be aware that some members could be causing an undue Route
Refresh load on the Route Servers and take appropriate administrative
and/or technical measures. IXPs using BGP speakers as route servers
should ensure that they are not generating excessive route refresh
requests.
6. Security Considerations
This document describes a denial of service which Route Origin
Validation or other RPKI policy may place on a BGP neighbor, and
describes how it may be ameliorated.
Otherwise, this document adds no additional security considerations
to those already described by the referenced documents.
7. IANA Considerations
None
8. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Alvaro Retana, Ben Maddison, Derek Yeung,
John Heasley, John Scudder, Matthias Waehlisch, Nick Hilliard, Saku
Ytti, and Ties de Kock.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2918] Chen, E., "Route Refresh Capability for BGP-4", RFC 2918,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2918, September 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2918>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
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[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC7313] Patel, K., Chen, E., and B. Venkatachalapathy, "Enhanced
Route Refresh Capability for BGP-4", RFC 7313,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7313, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7313>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based
on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>.
9.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 2", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-
10, 16 June 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
ietf-sidrops-8210bis-10.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification]
Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., and J.
Snijders, "BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Autonomous System
Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-09,
11 July 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-
sidrops-aspa-verification-09.txt>.
[I-D.sas-idr-maxprefix-inbound]
Aelmans, M., Stucchi, M., and J. Snijders, "BGP Maximum
Prefix Limits Inbound", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-sas-idr-maxprefix-inbound-04, 19 January 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-sas-idr-maxprefix-
inbound-04.txt>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
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[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC7947] Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
"Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", RFC 7947,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7947, September 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7947>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush
IIJ Research Lab & Arrcus, Inc.
1856 SW Edgewood Dr
Portland, Oregon 97210
United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com
Keyur Patel
Arrcus, Inc.
2077 Gateway Place, Suite #400
San Jose, CA 95119
United States of America
Email: keyur@arrcus.com
Philip Smith
PFS Internet Development Pty Ltd
PO Box 1908
Milton QLD 4064
Australia
Email: pfsinoz@gmail.com
Mark Tinka
SEACOM
Building 7, Design Quarter District, Leslie Avenue, Magaliessig
Fourways, Gauteng
2196
South Africa
Email: mark@tinka.africa
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