Timing Parameters in the RPKI based Route Origin Validation Supply Chain
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rov-timing-00
Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
Intended status: Informational J. Borkenhagen
Expires: November 27, 2020 AT&T
T. Bruijnzeels
NLnet Labs
J. Snijders
NTT
May 26, 2020
Timing Parameters in the RPKI based Route Origin Validation Supply Chain
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rov-timing-00
Abstract
This document explores, and makes recommendations for, timing of
Resource Public Key Infrastructure publication of ROV data, their
propagation, and their use in Relying Parties and routers.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 27, 2020.
Bush, et al. Expires November 27, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft RPKI ROV Timing May 2020
Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Certification Authority Publishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Relying Party Fetching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Router Updating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Effect on Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Alternative Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
This document explores, and makes recommendations for, timing of
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) publication of ROV data,
their propagation, and their use in Relying Parties (RP), caches and
routers.
The RPKI supply chain from CAs to reach routers has a structure as
follows:
Cerification Authorities: The authoritative data of the RPKI are
published by a distributed set of Certification Authorities (CAs)
at the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs (see [RFC6481]).
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Publication Points: The CAs publish their authoritative data in
publicly accessible repositories which have a Publication Point
(PP) for each CA.
Relying Parties: Relying Parties are a local (to the routers) set of
one or more collected and verified caches of RPKI data which are
collected from the PPs.
Currently RPs can pull from other RPs, thereby creating a somewhat
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