Timing Parameters in the RPKI based Route Origin Validation Supply Chain
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rov-timing-06
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (sidrops WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Randy Bush , Jay Borkenhagen , Tim Bruijnzeels , Job Snijders | ||
| Last updated | 2022-02-07 | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
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| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
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| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rov-timing-06
Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
Intended status: Informational J. Borkenhagen
Expires: 11 August 2022 AT&T
T. Bruijnzeels
NLnet Labs
J. Snijders
Fastly
7 February 2022
Timing Parameters in the RPKI based Route Origin Validation Supply Chain
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rov-timing-06
Abstract
This document explores, and makes recommendations for, timing of
Resource Public Key Infrastructure publication of ROV data, their
propagation, and their use in Relying Parties, caches, and routers.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 11 August 2022.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Certification Authority Publishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Relying Party Fetching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Router Updating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Effect on Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Alternative Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Operational Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
This document explores, and makes recommendations for, timing of
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) publication of ROV data,
their propagation, and their use in Relying Parties (RP), caches, and
routers.
The RPKI ROA supply chain from CAs to when they reach routers has the
following structure:
Cerification Authorities: The authoritative data of the RPKI are
meant to be published by a distributed set of Certification
Authorities (CAs) at the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs (see
[RFC6481]).
Publication Points: The CAs publish their authoritative data in
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publicly accessible repositories which have a Publication Point
(PP) for each CA. A CA may publish directly at a PP or may use
the RPKI Publication Protocol [RFC8181].
Relying Parties: Relying Parties are a local (to the routers) set of
one or more collected and verified caches of RPKI data which the
RPs collect from the PPs.
Currently RPs can pull from other RPs, thereby allowing a somewhat
complex topology.
Routers: Validating routers fetch data from local RP caches using
the RPKI to Router Protocol, [RFC8210] and
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis]. Routers are clients of the caches.
Validating routers MUST have a trust relationship with, and a
trusted transport channel to, any RP(s) they use.
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis] specifies mechanisms for a router to
assure itself of the authenticity of the cache(s) and to
authenticate itself to cache(s).
As Resource Public Key Infrastructure based Route Origin Validation
(ROV) becomes deployed in the Internet, the quality of the routing
control plane, and hence timely and accurate delivery of packets in
the data plane, increasingly depend on prompt and accurate
propagation of the RPKI data from the originating Certification
Authorities (CAs), to Relying Parties (RPs), to Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) speaking routers.
Origin Validation based on stale ROAs allows accidental or
intentional mis-origination; announcement of a prefix by an AS which
does not have the authority to do so. Delays in ROA propagation to
ROV in routers might cause loss of good traffic. Therefore
minimizing propagation time of data from CAs to routers is important.
Before the data can start on the CA to router supply chain, the
resource holder (operator) MUST create, modify, or delete the
relevant ROA(s) through the CA's operational interface(s). The
operator is responsible for anticipating their future needs for ROAs,
be aware of the propagation time from creating ROAs to effect on
routing, and SHOULD create, delete, or modify ROAs sufficiently in
advance of any needs in the routing system.
There are questions of how frewwww3quently a CA publishes, how often
an RP pulls, and how often routers pull from their RP(s). Overall,
the router(s) SHOULD react within an hour of ROA publication. In
pessimistic circumstances, it could be two hours.
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For CAs publishing to PPs, a few seconds to a minute seems easily
achieved with reasonable software. See Section 3.
Relying Party validating caches periodically retrieve data from CA
publication points. RPs using rsync to poll publication points every
ten minutes would be a burden today, given the load it would put on
publication services, cf. one notorious repository which was
structured against specification. RPs using RRDP impose less load.
As the infrastructure moves from rsync to RRDP
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-prefer-rrdp], RRDP is designed for quite frequent
polling as long as Relying Parties use the If-Modified-Since (see
[RFC7232]) header and there is a caching infrastructure. For rsync,
an hour would be the longest acceptable window and half an hour the
shortest. See Section 4.
For BGP speaking router(s) pulling from the RP(s), five minutes to an
hour is a wide window. But, the RPKI-Rtr protocol does have the
Serial Notify PDU, the equivalent of DNS Notify [RFC1996], where the
cache tells the router that it has new data. See Section 5.
We discuss each of these in more detail below.
2. Related Work
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI
[RFC6480], RPKI Manifests [RFC6486], Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs), [RFC6482], the RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)
[RFC8182], The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router
Protocol [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis], RPKI-based Prefix Validation,
[RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications, [RFC8481].
3. Certification Authority Publishing
One constraint on publication timing can be ensuring the CRL and
Manifest ([RFC6486]) are consistent with each other and with respect
to the other repository data. With both rsync and RRDP protocols,
the publication point MUST be consistent before it becomes current
and is published.
Operators should beware that there may be implementation dependent
delays between instructing their CAs to create and/or update ROAs and
the publication of these changes in the PPs.
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4. Relying Party Fetching
rsync puts a load on RPKI publication point servers. Therefore
relying party caches have been discouraged from fetching more
frequently than on the order of a half hour. Times as long as a day
were even suggested. We specify that RPs using rsync SHOULD pull
from CA publication points every 30 to 60 minutes.
With RRDP ([RFC8182]), such constraints can be less relevant.
[RFC8182] makes clear that polling as frequently as once a minute is
acceptable if and only if Relying Parties use the If-Modified-Since
header and there is caching. Absent use of the If-Modified-Since
header, the RRDP polling interval MUST NOT be more frequent than ten
minutes. Use of the If-Modified-Since header is strongly
RECOMMENDED.
Migration from rsync to RRDP in [I-D.ietf-sidrops-prefer-rrdp] is
recommended. During dual RRDP/rsync operation, should an RP need to
fall over from RRDP to rsync, a uniformly distributed jittered delay
with a mean of half the rsync interval SHOULD be used; so clients
falling over to rsync are as spread out as they would be if they used
rsync initallly.
A number of timers are embedded in the X.509 RPKI data which should
also be considered. E.g., CRL publication commitments, expiration of
EE certificates pointing to Manifests, and the Manifests themselves.
Some CA operators commonly indicate new CRL information should be
available in the next 24 hours. These 24 hour sliding timers, when
combined with fetching RPKI data once a day, would expose failure
windows, especially in the face of transient network issues between
the CA and RP. To ameliorate this, RPs SHOULD update from CAs at
least as frequently as once an hour.
In summary, the following timing constraints SHOULD be applied to
data update: RPs SHOULD update from CAs at least once an hour. To
avoid excess load, RPs SHOULD NOT update via rsync more frequently
than every 30 minutes. RPs using RRDP SHOULD NOT need to update more
frequently than every 10 minutes. Some form of timing jitter MUST be
applied to ensure load distribution across the community. RPs SHOULD
NOT force data fetch to be on the hour or similar times. Publication
Points SHOULD deploy RRDP services which honor If-Modified-Since.
In general, CAs should have Manifest, CRL, ... timers of a few days
to allow relying party operators to go away for the weekend and not
fear for their control plane.
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5. Router Updating
The rate of change of ROA data is estimated to remain small, on the
order of a few ROAs a minute, but with bursts. Therefore, the
routers may update from the (presumed local) relying party cache(s)
quite frequently. Note that [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis] recommends a
polling interval of one hour. This polling timing is conservative
because caches can send a Serial Notify PDU to tell routers when
there are new data to be fetched. As the RP cache and the router
belong to the same operator, routers are free to hammer the RPs as
frequently as they wish.
A router SHOULD respond with a Serial Query when it receives a Serial
Notify from a cache. If a router can not respond appropriately to a
Serial Notify, then it MUST send a periodic Serial Query no less
frequently than once an hour.
6. Effect on Routing
Once a router has received an End of Data PDU from a cache, the
effect on Route Origin Validation MUST be a matter of seconds to a
minute. The router MAY allow incoming VRPs to affect Origin
Validation as they arrive instead of waiting for the End of Data PDU.
See [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis] for some cautions regarding the
arrival and processing sequence of VRPs.
7. Alternative Technologies
Should the supply chain include components or technologies other than
those in IETF documents, the end effect SHOULD be the same; the
router(s) SHOULD react to invalid AS origins within the same overall
time constraint, one hour, two at most, from ROA creation at the CA
publication point to effect in the router.
8. Operational Expectations
Assuming the above recommendations, in worst conditions such as an
RPKI-rtr Notify PDU being ignored, it may take up to two hours for a
new ROA to propagate from creation at the CA to BGP speaking routers.
Therefore it is RECOMMENDED that planned changes in ROAs take this
propagation time into consideration. E.g. if a new route is to be
announced in BGP, the operators SHOULD create the ROA around three
hours before BGP announcement, or it may not propagate globally.
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9. Security Considerations
Despite common misconceptions and marketing, Route Origin Validation
is not a magic security protocol. It is intended to catch
operational errors, and is easily gamed and attacked through, for
example, AS Path manipulation. It is one tool in the prudent
operator's kit, and a good one.
If an attacker can add, delete, or modify RPKI data, either in
repositories or in flight, they can affect routing and thereby steer
or damage traffic. The RPKI system design does much to deter these
attacks. But the 'last mile' from the cache to the router uses
transport, as opposed to object, security and is vulnerable. This is
discussed in [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis].
Similarly, if an attacker can delay prompt propagation of RPKI data
on the supply chain described in this document, they can affect
routing, and therefore traffic flow, to their advantage.
10. IANA Considerations
None
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 2", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-
05, 22 December 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-05.txt>.
[RFC1996] Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone
Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC1996,
August 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1996>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
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[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC7232] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Conditional Requests", RFC 7232,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7232, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7232>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8181] Weiler, S., Sonalker, A., and R. Austein, "A Publication
Protocol for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 8181, DOI 10.17487/RFC8181, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8181>.
[RFC8182] Bruijnzeels, T., Muravskiy, O., Weber, B., and R. Austein,
"The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)", RFC 8182,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8182, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8182>.
[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.
[RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based
on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>.
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11.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-prefer-rrdp]
Bruijnzeels, T., Bush, R., and G. Michaelson, "Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Repository Requirements",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-
prefer-rrdp-01, 22 October 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sidrops-
prefer-rrdp-01.txt>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank George Michaelson, Massimiliano Stucchi and
Ties de Kock.
Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com
Jay Borkenhagen
AT&T
200 Laurel Avenue South
Middletown, NJ 07748
United States of America
Email: jayb@att.com
Tim Bruijnzeels
NLnet Labs
Email: tim@nlnetlabs.nl
URI: https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/
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Job Snijders
Fastly
Amsterdam
Netherlands
Email: job@fastly.com
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