RPKI Certificate Tree Validation by the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-tree-validation-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidrops WG)
Last updated 2017-07-20
Replaces draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-tree-validation
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text xml pdf html bibtex
Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd No shepherd assigned
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
SIDR Operations                                             O. Muravskiy
Internet-Draft                                            T. Bruijnzeels
Intended status: Informational                                  RIPE NCC
Expires: January 20, 2018                                  July 19, 2017

    RPKI Certificate Tree Validation by the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator
               draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-tree-validation-01

Abstract

   This document describes the approach to validate the content of the
   RPKI certificate tree, as it is implemented in the RIPE NCC RPKI
   Validator.  This approach is independent of a particular object
   retrieval mechanism.  This allows it to be used with repositories
   available over the rsync protocol, the RPKI Repository Delta
   Protocol, and repositories that use a mix of both.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 20, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Muravskiy & Bruijnzeels Expires January 20, 2018                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            RPKI Tree Validation                 July 2017

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Scope of this document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  General Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Hash comparisons  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Discovery of RPKI objects issued by a CA  . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Manifest entries versus repository content  . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Top-down Validation of a Single Trust Anchor Certificate Tree   5
     4.1.  Fetching the Trust Anchor Certificate Using the Trust
           Anchor Locator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  CA Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.2.1.  Finding the most recent valid manifest and CRL  . . .   7
       4.2.2.  Manifest entries validation . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Object Store Cleanup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Remote Objects Fetcher  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  Fetcher Operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.1.1.  Fetch repository objects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.1.2.  Fetch single repository object  . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Local Object Store  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  Store Operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       6.1.1.  Store Repository Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       6.1.2.  Get objects by hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       6.1.3.  Get certificate objects by URI  . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       6.1.4.  Get manifest objects by AKI . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       6.1.5.  Delete objects for a URI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       6.1.6.  Delete outdated objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       6.1.7.  Update object's validation time . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.1.  Hash collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.2.  Mismatch between the expected and the actual location of
           an object in the repository . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.3.  Manifest content versus publication point content . . . .  13
     9.4.  Storing of a TA certificate object before its complete
Show full document text