RPKI Certificate Tree Validation by the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-tree-validation-02
SIDR Operations O. Muravskiy
Internet-Draft RIPE NCC
Intended status: Informational T. Bruijnzeels
Expires: December 30, 2018 NLNetLabs
June 28, 2018
RPKI Certificate Tree Validation by the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-tree-validation-02
Abstract
This document describes the approach to validate the content of the
RPKI certificate tree, as it is implemented in the RIPE NCC RPKI
Validator. This approach is independent of a particular object
retrieval mechanism. This allows it to be used with repositories
available over the rsync protocol, the RPKI Repository Delta
Protocol, and repositories that use a mix of both.
Status of This Memo
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 30, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Muravskiy & Bruijnzeels Expires December 30, 2018 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft RPKI Tree Validation June 2018
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Table of Contents
1. Scope of this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Hash comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Discovery of RPKI objects issued by a CA . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Manifest entries versus repository content . . . . . . . 4
4. Top-down Validation of a Single Trust Anchor Certificate Tree 5
4.1. Fetching the Trust Anchor Certificate Using the Trust
Anchor Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. CA Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.1. Finding the most recent valid manifest and CRL . . . 7
4.2.2. Manifest entries validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Object Store Cleanup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Remote Objects Fetcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Fetcher Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.1. Fetch repository objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.2. Fetch single repository object . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Local Object Store . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. Store Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1.1. Store Repository Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1.2. Get objects by hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1.3. Get certificate objects by URI . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1.4. Get manifest objects by AKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1.5. Delete objects for a URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1.6. Delete outdated objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1.7. Update object's validation time . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.1. Hash collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.2. Mismatch between the expected and the actual location of
an object in the repository . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.3. Manifest content versus publication point content . . . . 13
9.4. Storing of a TA certificate object before its complete
validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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