Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from an RPKI Origin Validating BGP Speaker to BGP Peers
draft-ietf-sidrops-validating-bgp-speaker-02

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidrops WG)
Last updated 2018-03-21
Replaces draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text xml pdf html bibtex
Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd No shepherd assigned
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
Network Working Group                                            T. King
Internet-Draft                                                C. Dietzel
Intended status: Standards Track                                 D. Kopp
Expires: September 22, 2018                                       DE-CIX
                                                         A. Lambrianidis
                                                                  AMS-IX
                                                              A. Fenioux
                                                               France-IX
                                                          March 21, 2018

     Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from an RPKI Origin
                  Validating BGP Speaker to BGP Peers
              draft-ietf-sidrops-validating-bgp-speaker-02

Abstract

   This document defines a new BGP transitive extended community, as
   well as its usage, to signal prefix origin validation results from an
   RPKI Origin validating BGP speaker to other BGP peers.  Upon
   reception of prefix origin validation results, peers can use this
   information in their local routing decision process.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2018.

King, et al.           Expires September 22, 2018               [Page 1]
Internet-DraSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from   March 2018

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  EBGP Prefix Origin Validation Extended Community  . . . . . .   3
   3.  BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Utilized at Validating
       Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Validating
       Peer to Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Local Routing Decision Process  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.2.  Validating Peers Receiving the EBGP Prefix Origin
           Validation State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.3.  Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not
           Available at a Validating Peer  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.4.  Error Handling at Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   RPKI-based prefix origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant
   operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt.  To
   facilitate acceptance and usage of prefix origin validation and
   ultimately increase the security of the Internet routing system,
   Autonomous Systems may provide RPKI-based prefix origin validation at
   certain vantage points.  The result of this prefix origin validation
   is signaled to peers by using the EBGP Prefix Origin Validation State
   Extended Community as introduced in this document.
Show full document text