Framework and Security Considerations for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) URI-List Services
draft-ietf-sipping-uri-services-07

SIPPING Working Group                                       G. Camarillo
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track                                A. Roach
Expires: May 16, 2008                                   Estacado Systems
                                                       November 13, 2007

 Framework and Security Considerations for Session Initiation Protocol
         (SIP) Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)-List Services
                 draft-ietf-sipping-uri-services-07.txt

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

Abstract

   This document describes the need for SIP URI-list services and
   provides requirements for their invocation.  Additionaly, it defines
   a framework for SIP URI-List services, which includes security
   considerations applicable to these services.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     3.1.  Requirements for URI-List Services Using
           Request-Contained Lists  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.2.  General Requirements for URI-List Services . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Framework  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     4.1.  Carrying URI Lists in SIP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     4.2.  Processing of URI Lists  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     4.3.  Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     5.1.  List Integrity and Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     5.2.  Amplification Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     5.3.  General Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   7.  Acknowledges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 11

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1.  Introduction

   Some applications require that, at a given moment, a SIP [RFC3261] UA
   (User Agent) performs a similar transaction with a number of remote
   UAs.  For example, an instant messaging application that needs to
   send a particular message (e.g., "Hello folks") to n receivers needs
   to send n MESSAGE requests; one to each receiver.

   When the transacton that needs to be repeated consists of a large
   request, the number of recipients is high, or both, the access
   network of the UA needs to carry a considerable amount of traffic.
   Completing all the transactions on a low-bandwidth access would
   require a long time.  This is unacceptable for a number of
   applications.

   A solution to this problem consists of introducing URI-list services
   in the network.  The task of a SIP URI-list service is to receive a
   request that contains or references a URI list (i.e., a list of one
   or more URIs) and send a number of similar requests to the
   destinations in this list.  Once the requests are sent, the URI-list
   service typically informs the UA about their status.  Effectively,
   the URI-list service behaves as a B2BUA (Back-To-Back-User-Agent).

   A given URI-list service can take as an input a URI-list contained in
   the SIP request sent by the client or an external URI list (e.g., the
   Request-URI is a SIP URI which is associated with a URI list at the
   server).  External URI lists are typically set up using out-of-band
   mechanisms (e.g., XCAP [RFC4825]).  An example of a URI-list service
   for SUBSCRIBE requests that uses stored URI lists is described in
   [RFC4662].

   The remainder of this document provides requirements and a framework
   for URI-list services using request-contained URI lists, external URI
   lists, or both.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Requirements

   Section 3.1 discusses requirements that only apply to URI-list
   services that use request-contained lists and Section 3.2 discusses
   requirements that also apply services using external lists.

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3.1.  Requirements for URI-List Services Using Request-Contained Lists

   REQ 1:  The URI-list service invocation mechanism MUST allow the
      invoker to provide a list of destination URIs to the URI-list
      service.

   REQ 2:  The invocation mechanism SHOULD NOT require more than one RTT
      (Round-Trip Time).

3.2.  General Requirements for URI-List Services

   GEN 1:  A URI-list service MAY include services beyond sending
      requests to the URIs in the URI list.  That is, URI-list services
      can be modelled as application servers.  For example, a URI-list
      service handling INVITE requests may behave as a conference server
      and perform media mixing for all the participants.

   GEN 2:  The interpretation of the meaning of the URI list sent by the
      invoker MUST be at the discretion of the application to which the
      list is sent.

   GEN 3:  It MUST be possible for the invoker to find out about the
      result of the operations performed by the URI-list service with
      the URI list.  An invoker may, for instance, be interested in the
      status of the transactions initiated by the URI-list service.

   GEN 4:  URI-list services MUST NOT send requests to any destination
      without authenticating the invoker.

4.  Framework

   This framework is not restricted to application servers that only
   provide request fan-out services.  Per GEN 1, this framework also
   deals with application servers that provide a particular service that
   includes a request fan-out (e.g., a conference server that INVITEs
   several participants which are chosen by a user agent).

4.1.  Carrying URI Lists in SIP

   The requirements related to URI-list services that use request-
   contained lists identify the need for a mechanism to provide a SIP
   URI-list service with a URI list in a single RTT.  We define a new
   disposition type [RFC2183] for the Content-Disposition header field:
   recipient-list.  Both requests and responses MAY carry recipient-list
   bodies.  Bodies whose disposition type is recipient-list carry a list
   of URIs that contains the final recipients of the requests to be
   generated by a URI-list service.

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   The default format for recipient-list bodies is service specific.
   So, URI-list services specifications MUST specify a default format
   for recipient-list bodies used within a particular service.  In any
   case, clients SHOULD NOT include any particular URI more than once in
   a given URI list.

   A UA server receiving a request with more than one recipient-list
   body parts (e.g., each body part using a different URI-list format)
   MUST behave as if it had received a single URI-list which contains
   all the URIs present in the different body parts.

   A UA server receiving a recipient-list URI list which contains a URI
   more than once MUST behave as if that URI appeared in the URI list
   only once.  The UA server uses the comparison rules specific to the
   URI scheme of each of the URIs in the URI list to determine if there
   is any URI which appears more than once.  Additionally, Section 4 of
   the XML Format Extension for Representing Copy Control Attributes in
   Resource Lists [I-D.ietf-sipping-capacity-attribute] discusses cases
   where duplicated URI entries are tagged with different values of the
   'copyControl' attribute.  Naturally, URI-list services using the
   'copyControl' attribute defined in
   [I-D.ietf-sipping-capacity-attribute] need to follow the
   recommendations in [I-D.ietf-sipping-capacity-attribute] with respect
   to avoiding sending duplicated requests.

   The way a UA server receiving a URI list interprets it is service
   specific, as described in Section 4.2.

4.2.  Processing of URI Lists

   According to GEN 1 and GEN 2, URI-list services can behave as
   application servers.  That is, taking a URI list as an input, they
   can provide arbitrary services.  So, the interpretation of the URI
   list by the server depends on the service to be provided.  For
   example, for a conference server, the URIs in the list may identify
   the initial set of participants.  On the other hand, for a server
   dealing with MESSAGEs, the URIs in the list may identify the
   recipients of an instant message.

   At the SIP level, this implies that the behavior of application
   servers receiving requests with URI-lists SHOULD be specified on a
   per service basis.  Examples of such specifications are
   [I-D.ietf-sip-uri-list-conferencing] for INVITE,
   [I-D.ietf-sip-uri-list-message] for MESSAGE, and
   [I-D.ietf-sip-uri-list-subscribe] for SUBSCRIBE.

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4.3.  Results

   According to GEN 3, user agents should have a way to obtain
   information about the operations performed by the application server.
   Since these operations are service specific, the way user agents are
   kept informed is also service specific.  For example, a user agent
   establishing an adhoc conference with an INVITE with a URI-list may
   discover which participants were successfully brought in into the
   conference by using the conference package [RFC4575].

5.  Security Considerations

   Security plays an important role in the implementation of any URI-
   list service.  In fact, it is the most important common area across
   all types of URI-list services.

   By definition, a URI-list service takes one request in and sends a
   potentially large number of them out.  Attackers may attempt to use
   URI-list services as traffic amplifiers to launch DoS (Denial of
   Service) attacks.  This section provides guidelines to avoid these
   attacks.

5.1.  List Integrity and Confidentiality

   Attackers may attempt to modify URI lists sent from clients to
   servers.  This would cause a different behavior at the server than
   expected by the client (e.g., requests being sent to different
   recipients as the ones specified by the client).  To prevent this
   attack, clients SHOULD integrity protect URI lists using mechanisms
   such as S/MIME, which can also provide URI-list confidentiality if
   needed.

5.2.  Amplification Attacks

   URI-list services take a request in and send a potentially large
   number of them out.  Given that URI-list services are typically
   implemented on top of powerful servers with high-bandwidth access
   links, we should be careful to keep attackers from using them as
   amplification tools to launch DoS (Denial of Service) attacks.

   Attackers may attempt to send a URI list containing URIs whose host
   parts route to the victims of the DoS attack.  These victims do not
   need to be SIP nodes; they can be non-SIP endpoints or even routers.
   If this attack is successful, the result is that an attacker can
   flood with traffic a set of nodes, or a single node, without needing
   to generate a high volume of traffic itself.

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      Note, in any case, that this problem is not specific to SIP URI-
      list services; it also appears in scenarios which relate to
      multihoming where a server needs to contact a set of IP addresses
      provided by a client.

   There are several measures that need to be taken to prevent this type
   of attack.  The first one is keeping unauthorized users from using
   URI-list services.  So, URI-list services MUST NOT perform any
   request explosion for an unauthorized user.  URI-list services MUST
   authenticate users and check whether they are authorized to request
   the service before performing any request fan-out.

   Note that the risk of this attack also exists when a client uses
   stored URI lists.  Application servers MUST use authentication and
   authorization mechanisms with equivalent security properties when
   dealing with stored and request-contained URI lists.

   Even though the previous rule keeps unauthorized users from using
   URI-list services, authorized users may still launch attacks using a
   these services.  To prevent these attacks, we introduce the concept
   of opt-in lists.  That is, URI-list services should not allow a
   client to place a user (identified by his or her URI) in a URI list
   unless the user has previously agreed to be placed in such a URI
   list.  So, URI-list services MUST NOT send a request to a destination
   which has not agreed to receive requests from the URI-list service
   beforehand.  Users can agree to receive requests from a URI-list
   service in several ways, such as filling a web page, sending an
   email, signing a contract, or using the Framework for Consent-Based
   Communications in SIP [I-D.ietf-sipping-consent-framework], whose
   requirements are discussed in [RFC4453].  Additionally, users MUST be
   able to further describe the requests they are willing to receive.
   For example, a user may only want to receive requests from a
   particular URI-list service on behalf of a particular user.
   Effectively, these rules make URI lists used by URI-list services
   opt-in lists.

   When a URI-list service receives a request with a URI list from a
   client, the URI-list service checks whether all the destinations have
   agreed beforehand to receive requests from the service on behalf of
   this client.  If the URI list has permission to send requests to all
   of the targets in the request, it does so.  If not, it does not send
   any request at all.

   The Framework for Consent-Based Communications in SIP
   [I-D.ietf-sipping-consent-framework] specifies a means for the URI-
   list service to inform the client that some permissions were missing
   and how to request them.

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      Note that the mechanism used to obtain permissions should not
      create opportunities to launch DoS amplification attacks.  These
      attacks would be possible if, for instance, the URI-list service
      automatically contacted the full set of targets for which it did
      not have permissions in order to request permissions.  The URI-
      list service would be receiving one SIP request and sending out a
      number of authorization request messages.  The Framework for
      Consent-Based Communications in SIP
      [I-D.ietf-sipping-consent-framework] avoids this type of attack by
      having the client generate roughly the same amount of traffic
      towards the URI-list service as the service generates towards the
      destinations.

   In order to have an interoperable way to meet the requirements
   related to opt-in lists described in this section, URI-list services
   MUST implement, and SHOULD use, The Framework for Consent-Based
   Communications in SIP [I-D.ietf-sipping-consent-framework].

5.3.  General Issues

   URI-list services MAY have policies that limit the number of URIs in
   the lists they accept, as a very long list could be used in a denial
   of service attack to place a large burden on the URI-list service to
   send a large number of SIP requests.

   A URI-list service generates a set of requests from a URI list.
   Section 19.1.5 of [RFC3261] provides recommendations that need to be
   taken into consideration when forming a request from a URI.
   Naturally, those recommendations apply to all SIP URI-list services.

   The general requirement GEN 4, which states that URI-list services
   need to authenticate their clients, and the previous rules apply to
   URI-list services in general.  In addition, specifications dealing
   with individual methods MUST describe the security issues that relate
   to each particular method.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document defines a new Content-Disposition header field
   disposition type (recipient-list) in Section 4.1.  This value should
   be registered in the IANA registry for Mail Content Disposition
   Values and Parameters with the following description:

            recipient-list    the body contains a list of URIs

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7.  Acknowledges

   Duncan Mills and Miguel A. Garcia-Martin supported the idea of 1 to n
   MESSAGE requests.  Jon Peterson, Dean Willis, and Jonathan Rosenberg
   provided useful comments.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2183]  Troost, R., Dorner, S., and K. Moore, "Communicating
              Presentation Information in Internet Messages: The
              Content-Disposition Header Field", RFC 2183, August 1997.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

   [I-D.ietf-sipping-consent-framework]
              Rosenberg, J., "A Framework for Consent-Based
              Communications in the Session Initiation  Protocol (SIP)",
              draft-ietf-sipping-consent-framework-05 (work in
              progress), June 2006.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC4453]  Rosenberg, J., Camarillo, G., and D. Willis, "Requirements
              for Consent-Based Communications in the Session Initiation
              Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4453, April 2006.

   [RFC4575]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., and O. Levin, "A Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP) Event Package for Conference
              State", RFC 4575, August 2006.

   [RFC4662]  Roach, A., Campbell, B., and J. Rosenberg, "A Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP) Event Notification Extension for
              Resource Lists", RFC 4662, August 2006.

   [RFC4825]  Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)
              Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)", RFC 4825, May 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-sip-uri-list-conferencing]
              Camarillo, G. and A. Johnston, "Conference Establishment

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              Using Request-Contained Lists in the Session  Initiation
              Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-sip-uri-list-conferencing-01
              (work in progress), January 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-sip-uri-list-subscribe]
              Camarillo, G., "Subscriptions to Request-Contained
              Resource Lists in the Session Initiation  Protocol (SIP)",
              draft-ietf-sip-uri-list-subscribe-01 (work in progress),
              January 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-sip-uri-list-message]
              Garcia-Martin, M. and G. Camarillo, "Multiple-Recipient
              MESSAGE Requests in the Session Initiation Protocol
              (SIP)", draft-ietf-sip-uri-list-message-01 (work in
              progress), January 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-sipping-capacity-attribute]
              Garcia-Martin, M. and G. Camarillo, "Extensible Markup
              Language (XML) Format Extension for Representing Copy
              Control Attributes in Resource Lists",
              draft-ietf-sipping-capacity-attribute-04 (work in
              progress), March 2007.

Authors' Addresses

   Gonzalo Camarillo
   Ericsson
   Hirsalantie 11
   Jorvas  02420
   Finland

   Email: Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com

   Adam Roach
   Estacado Systems
   Dallas, TX
   US

   Email: adam@estacado.net

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