@techreport{ietf-smime-sender-auth-00,
    number =    {draft-ietf-smime-sender-auth-00},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-smime-sender-auth/00/},
    author =    {Donald T. Davis},
    title =     {{Sender Authentication and the Surreptitious Forwarding Attack in CMS and S/MIME}},
    pagetotal = 0,
    year =      2001,
    month =     oct,
    day =       1,
    abstract =  {By default, a CMS signed-and-encrypted document or message authenticates only the document's originator, and not the person who encrypted the document. This subtle limitation exposes CMS and S/MIME signed-and-encrypted data to 'surreptitious forwarding.' Secure-messaging standards have treated surreptitious forwarding as an insoluble problem of user carelessness, and have long accepted the risk of this attack. This document discusses easy cryptographic remedies for this attack, suitable for incorporation into the CMS and S/MIME specifications. This document is an abridgement of {[}U2001{]}.},
}