Secure Shell (SSH) Key Exchange Method Using Hybrid Streamlined NTRU Prime sntrup761 and X25519 with SHA-512: sntrup761x25519-sha512
draft-ietf-sshm-ntruprime-ssh-06

Approval announcement
Draft of message to be sent after approval:

Announcement

From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, debcooley1@gmail.com, draft-ietf-sshm-ntruprime-ssh@ietf.org, job@sobornost.net, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org, ssh@ietf.org, sshm-chairs@ietf.org
Subject: Document Action: 'Secure Shell (SSH) Key Exchange Method Using Hybrid Streamlined NTRU Prime sntrup761 and X25519 with SHA-512: sntrup761x25519-sha512' to Informational RFC (draft-ietf-sshm-ntruprime-ssh-06.txt)

The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'Secure Shell (SSH) Key Exchange Method Using Hybrid Streamlined NTRU
   Prime sntrup761 and X25519 with SHA-512: sntrup761x25519-sha512'
  (draft-ietf-sshm-ntruprime-ssh-06.txt) as Informational RFC

This document is the product of the Secure Shell Maintenance Working Group.

The IESG contact persons are Paul Wouters and Deb Cooley.

A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sshm-ntruprime-ssh/

Ballot Text

Technical Summary

   This document describes a widely deployed hybrid key exchange method
   in the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol that is based on Streamlined NTRU
   Prime sntrup761 and X25519 with SHA-512.It specifies a mechanism to 
   protect against potential "record-now-decrypt-later" attacks from the 
   future invention of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC).

Working Group Summary

  The SSHM working group is recently re-opened after a long hiatus with the 
  agreement to bring the protocol RFCs up to a current state.  It has been a difficult 
  start, but there have been some good interactions.

  For this draft there was both controversy and an appeal to the responsible AD:

  This specific mechanism is based on an algorithm (NTRU Prime) that has not
  been selected as a "winner" in the NIST post-quantum competition. It should
  be noted that NTRU Prime has a fairly long history in the cryptographic community 
  and is widely deployed for at least 5 years in SSH products.  The SSHM WG has 
  other drafts in the pipeline to  handle NIST "winners" but how to signal IETF or 
  WG preferences in this space is inherently tricky.   The controversy was about the 
  intended RFC status (Informational) and the state of the algorithm in the registry 
  (SHOULD).  In the end 'rough concensus' was reached.


Document Quality

It is widely implemented, selected as the default KEX in OpenSSH, for about 5 years.  
Many of the SSH implementations have this already implemented.

There was an invalid IPR disclosure made, which has been removed.  The artifacts 
are still there, but it is not a valid IPR disclosure.

There are no Yang modules, Media Type registrations, or other expert reviews required.

Personnel

   The Document Shepherd for this document is Job Snijders. The Responsible
   Area Director is Deb Cooley.

RFC Editor Note